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ABSTRACT 
 
 
My dissertation examines the relationship between the theological political and 
temporality in the constitution of the colonial-capitalist world system from the fifteenth century 
to the nineteenth century. World systems and postcolonial approaches to colonial expansion have 
often reduced questions of theology to a discursive feature of producing difference through the 
binary frame of self/other in order to justify a will to power, territory, and capital accumulation. 
My dissertation argues that the theocentric epistemic tradition of commensurability and 
resemblances structured by theological temporal formations have played a large role in colonial 
expansion, and can be better understood by applying the decolonial concept of coloniality to 
illustrate how theology, political economy and philosophy form plural points of enunciation for 
the constitution of the colonial-capitalist world system. What is distinctive about this project is 
that I bring together world systems theory, postcolonial theory and theological political 
perspectives under a decolonial approach in order to highlight the importance of epistemology in 
the establishment of a global hierarchical system that produces and locates Western knowledge, 
cosmology and spirituality over non-Western forms. This dissertation, therefore, outlines a 
methodological trajectory that does not instrumentalize the theological to a materialist rendition 
of capitalist accumulation, colonial expansion and conquest. Rather, I will seek to characterize 
how capital, colonialism and theology were entwined, negotiated and expressed in often 
contradictory ways through the writings of some key European thinkers.  
By locating the work of Locke, Rousseau and Darwin within the theological matrices of 
coloniality, I challenge their assumed universal claims to knowledge and prescriptive truth 
iii 
 
claims while not reducing their work to a singular structure of determination. Rather, I explore 
the polyvalent and historically grounded points of enunciation and tension that enabled their 
particular forms of thought to be made possible. By accounting for the theological and temporal 
inscriptions of coloniality, I seek to uncover the secular assumptions embedded in dominant 
accounts regarding the constitution of the human that is inscribed within the hierarchical 
structure of the colonial-capitalist world system, and to open up new ways in which to 
conceptualize decolonal forms of resistance. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
Alexander, bishop, servant of the servants of God, to the illustrious sovereigns, our very 
dear son in Christ, Ferdinand, king, and our very dear daughter in Christ, Isabella, queen 
of Castile, Leon, Aragon, Sicily, and Granada, health and apostolic benediction…We 
have indeed learned that you, who for a long time had intended to seek out and discover 
certain islands and mainlands remote and unknown and not hitherto discovered by 
others…you, with the wish to fulfill your desire, chose our beloved son, Christopher 
Columbus, a man assuredly worthy and of the highest recommendations and fitted for so 
great an undertaking, whom you furnished with ships and men equipped for like designs, 
not without the greatest hardships, dangers, and expenses, to make diligent quest for these 
remote and unknown mainlands and islands through the sea, where hitherto no one had 
sailed…wherein dwell very many peoples living in peace, and, as reported, going 
unclothed, and not eating flesh. Moreover, as your aforesaid envoys are of opinion, these 
very peoples living in the said islands and countries believe in one God, the Creator in 
heaven, and seem sufficiently disposed to embrace the Catholic faith and be trained in 
good morals.
1
 
 
On May 4th, 1493 Pope Alexander VI issued the papal bull Inter caetera, which 
claimed spiritual authority and jurisdiction over the New World2 and the souls of its 
inhabitants for the Catholic Spanish monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella. This bull forms a 
constellation of ecclesiastical communiqués concerning the New World and Portuguese 
and Spanish; namely, the Tratado de Tordesilla of 1497, and the Requerimiento of 1512 
that claimed temporal dominion of the papacy over the New World and the souls that 
dwelled therein.3 Meanwhile, Atlantic mercantile trade circuits had been forming 
between 1250 and 1350 that were extended by Portuguese prince Henry the Navigator 
(1395-1460) who, upon “discovering” unknown lands, gained endorsement by Pope 
                                                        
 
1
 Pope Alexander VI, “Inter caetera,” 1493, <http://www.nativeweb.org/pages/legal/indig-inter-
caetera.html> 
2
 Indeed the “New World” including the “Americas” was not “discovered”, rather as Walter Mignolo 
suggests was an invention produced through colonial expansion of Western Latin Christian knowledge, 
cosmology and institutions. For further reading see, Walter Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America, Blackwell, 
2005.  
3
 Mignolo, Walter, The Idea of Latin America, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005, pp. 30 
  
2 
Nicholas V’s Romanus Pontifex (1455) to advance Catholicism.4 These interrelated 
theological-political processes index the entanglement between faith, land possession and 
conversion under the yoke of colonial expansion and conquest.  
 What is important about the language of the Inter caetera is that the peoples 
dwelling in these hitherto unknown lands were not conceptualized as racial Others 
through a modernist dehumanized epistemological structure that would authorize 
discourses of biological evolutionary taxonomies organized by physiognomic difference. 
Rather, they were apprehended under a theocentric epistemological tradition that licensed 
a discourse of similitude and resemblance: Indigenous peoples were held to live in peace, 
and they were said to believe in one God that was recognizable and translatable to the 
medieval theocentric epistemic tradition, or what Sylvia Wynter has called non-secular 
medieval Latin Christian theocentric sociogeny.5 Subsequent papal bulls would reiterate 
the same notion of human resemblance vis-à-vis the Indigenous inhabitants of the New 
World – Pope Paul III’s 1537 bull Sublimis Deus observed, “the Indians are true men.” 
Hence, a key concern of Europeans in the wake of colonial expansion was how to 
increase the truth of the Christian faith, save the soul of the non-Christian and bring back 
the deviated pagan soul into the fold of divine provenance. In this reading then, peoples 
of the New World were not seen as inhuman Others through a presumed self/other 
structure of difference, rather they were apprehended as human candidates for conversion 
to Catholic Christianity under an incorporative schema of theological salvation.  
                                                        
 
4
 Ibid 
5
 Wynter, Sylvia, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After 
Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument,” The New Centennial Review, 3(3), Fall 2003, pp. 266-7 
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 This is not to suggest, however, that ecclesiastical injunctions prevented “true 
men” of the New World from being dutifully mutilated, ceremoniously immolated and 
triumphantly vanquished as an enslaved curiosity and labour force. Rather, the very 
impulse to bring wayward pagans back into the divinely circumscribed dominion of 
Biblical monogenesis resulted in placing New World peoples in an impossible position: 
salvation through conversion or death. As “human” candidates for conversion, 
Indigenous peoples were obliged to accept the gospel and its dissemination peacefully, 
or, resist, and be cast as rebellious candidates for destruction.  
That Amerindians were apprehended as “human” through a theocentric lineage of 
similitude and resemblance offers a space to examine their largely tepid reception vis-à-
vis Europe. Before 1502 over three thousand miles of South America’s coastline was 
explored, and yet Margaret Hodgen observes that this “made relatively little impression 
on Europe.”6 Surprisingly, few detailed accounts of either Indigenous peoples or the 
natural environment were produced about the Americas. It was only over the first half of 
the sixteenth century that the most prominent publications concerning the New World 
were generated. For instance, Amerigo Vespucci – whose very name would be 
augmented to anoint hitherto unknown lands as “America” – penned letters that produced 
the first noteworthy declaration that the Americas was not an extension of Asia, Hernan 
Cortez’s Cartas de relacion (1522), Peter Martyr’s De orbe Novo (1530) was the first 
“history” of the New World, Francisco de Oviedo’s Historia general y natural de las 
                                                        
 
6
 Hodgen, Margaret, Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, pp. 104-5, quoted from Seth, Vanita , Europe’s Indians: Producing Racial Difference, 
1500-1900, Durham & London: Duke University Press, pp. 37 
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Indias (1535) and Francisco de Vitoria’s treatise On the Indies (1539) were all only 
published within a half-century following the so-called discovery of the New World.7  
It took over fifteen years before Columbus’s travelogues were translated to 
English, and the first Encyclopedia published in 1751 only devoted about a quarter of a 
page (about fifty lines) to the “Americas”, while “Alsace” was accorded over eighteen 
times the space. Surprisingly then, published works concerning the New World was quite 
limited, while between 1480 and 1609, about four times as many works were focused 
upon Asia and Turkey as opposed to America. Similarly, in sixteenth century France, 
there were over twice as many publications devoted to Muslim practices than on Africa 
and America combined.8 Indeed, these numbers suggest the intense anxiety Europe held 
vis-à-vis the “Islamic threat”, whereas Indigenous peoples were hardly met with such 
vociferous preoccupation. Accordingly, Vanita Seth observes, “It is difficult to speak the 
language of otherness when the other is virtually absent from the discourses of the self.”9   
This is not to suggest, however, that there was no curiosity about the New World 
and its inhabitants, as Christopher Columbus and other adventurers returned to the Old-
World with marvelous and exotic “possessions” that were paraded throughout European 
cities and towns. For instance, flora and fauna were on display to the European gaze, in 
addition to “strange” enslaved Indigenous peoples adorned with paint and bizarre forms 
of dress. However, Columbus’s letters and other accounts had little to remark about 
Indigenous peoples, nor was much interest in accounting for differences in Indigenous 
cultures. What is important to note is that despite what would seem as an extraordinary 
                                                        
 
7Seth, op. cit. 37 
8
 Ibid, 38 
9
 Ibid 
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event of the existence of a “New World”, this news seems to have met with an 
ambivalent attitude by many people in Europe.  
One could suggest that in the initial decades following the Age of Exploration that 
the New World was thought to be an extension of the East – it is reported Columbus died 
believing this. Further, it could be said that the so-called discovery of a New World 
represented such a massive cognitive challenge to established thought, and to a largely 
illiterate lay population, that time was needed to digest its magnitude. Indeed, to be 
considered an accomplished and erudite scholar meant knowledge of a limited set of 
canonical texts: Ptolemy’s geography, Euclid’s geometry, Aristotle’s politics, ethics, 
logics and science, and Lombard’s theology among few others.10 What is important to 
note is that knowledge production vis-à-vis the Americas in the late fifteenth and early 
sixteenth century was limited because techniques of instituting colonial rule took time to 
consolidate. As such, power was not configured through power-knowledge technologies 
associated with modern forms of governmentality via archival knowledge systems, 
anthropological catalogues and other forms of representational formations of power that 
index complex modern disciplinary forms of colonial regulation underpinned by 
universal global historical narratives of progress, biological evolutionary sequences, and 
racial schemas of difference.11      
The central argument that I pursue in this dissertation is that in the wake of 
colonial expansion, European knowledge was not mediated by a singular point of 
enunciation via a binary of self/other in order to simply justify a will to power, territory, 
and capital accumulation. Rather, I seek to identify the often competing and contradictory 
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logics, sensibilities and reasoning for apprehending difference and authorizing colonial 
expansion. Using Foucault’s periodization scheme, I pay particular attention to how the 
Renaissance (fifteenth and sixteenth century), the Classical Age (seventeenth and 
eighteenth century) and the Romantic (nineteenth century) epistemic traditions vis-à-vis 
human difference were entangled with Christian theology – specifically Western 
European Catholic and Protestant forms.  
I seek to complicate the narrative that presumes European representations of 
difference were always organized by some form of opposition through a self/other binary 
that may have first been introduced by a Greek/barbarian12 form, and then was simply 
reinscribed as Christian/pagan and then subsequently displaced by European white/non-
European racial Other. Consequently, this presumed framework of self/other is presented 
as a stable transhistorical phenomenon that is rearticulated to accommodate various 
colonial “encounters” in order to justify an underlying motivation for power, territorial 
expropriation and resource extraction.13  
Consequently, Western European forms of Christianity, I held, was simply a 
justificatory moral narrative to placate the violence of colonialism, and was deployed to 
resignify acts of violence such that those acts were rendered moral deviations from the 
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 William Spanos (2000), for instance, contests the presumed Greek point of origin for an “imperial will to 
power”, and suggests that it is a function of the Western cultural process of “remembering” its past through 
an imperial Roman frame. Moreover, he argues that the “Greek/barbarian” binary was ideologically 
produced in relation the socio-political transformations precipitated by the Peloponnesian War and other 
shifts in relation to the Greek city-state structure (66). Consequently, he states, “It cannot be taken, as it has 
been by traditional literary historians, cultural critics, and political scientists and continues to be by 
contemporary postcolonial critics, as a definitive representation of the collective or national attitude of the 
classical Greeks toward these constituencies of Others” (71). Nevertheless, I depart from Spanos’s 
presumed self/other structure of difference in my dissertation and highlight the role of theology in 
mediating how European commentators represented colonial difference through forms of resemblances and 
commensurability. For further reading see, William V. Spanos, In Americas Shadow: An Anatomy of 
Empire, Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis, 2000   
13
 Seth, op. cit., 3 
  
7 
otherwise ostensibly benign project of colonialism. Such a reading of European 
knowledge, structured by a singular teleological history – from a presumed Greek to 
Christian and to scientific enunciations of self/other – I now believe misses the nuances 
and bounded nature of conceptualizing difference. As such, I do not seek to map the 
content of Renaissance and Classical forms of representations of the non-Christian, non-
West through a transhistorical binary of self/other. Instead, I seek to trace the historically 
contingent epistemological traditions and discursive processes that mediated the 
apprehension of human and cultural difference through commensurability, rather than the 
sole frame of opposition.  
The transhistorical self/other structure also runs the risk of reproducing a linear 
Eurocentric narrative that presumes colonial expansion was underpinned by an 
autonomous and coherent European self-identity that was produced through unique 
internal characteristics. This “first in Europe, then elsewhere” teleology assumes a global 
diffusionist path that either subsumes, neutralises, or transforms contingent differences 
into vehicles for the spread of its own logic in form of derivatives.14 This narrative misses 
the nuances and contradictions concerning how a European self-identity was produced 
through colonial expansion, rather than preceding it. Moreover, it misses the multiple 
negotiations and appropriations of non-European knowledges, cosmologies and 
spiritualities that a self/other binary cannot sustain. In contrast to this Eurocentric 
approach, I highlight the historically specific systems of knowledge production, methods 
of reasoning and practices informed by the neglected registers of resemblances and 
                                                        
 
14
 Chakrabarty, Dipesh, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 48 
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theocentric forms of incorporation that underpinned European attempts to apprehend, 
organize and translate difference in the wake of colonial expansion.15 
Colonial expansion, as I refer to it, is not reducible to techniques of land theft, 
resource extraction, or labour exploitation; and Christian theology was not simply used as 
a justificatory logic for the consolidation of colonial governance. By indexing the 
constitutive role of epistemology, cosmology and theology that entangle with the 
materiality of global power structures, I will argue that Christian theology was co-
produced by and entwined with colonial processes in often contradictory and contingent 
fashions under the mantle of incorporative redemption in order to negotiate human and 
cultural difference. Throughout my dissertation, therefore, I use the decolonial concept of 
coloniality rather than empire, colonialism and imperialism commonly deployed by 
postcolonial approaches.  
According to Robert Young, the term “empire” historically has been used to 
conceptualize the administrative centre of a state bureaucracy for establishing hegemonic 
control of one entity over another. Historically, moreover, empire has been distinguished 
by two main trajectories: a) “imperialism” which can be understood as the ideological 
and financial structures of domination; b) “colonialism” which can be understood as a 
diverse set of practices for establishing settlement, or for establishing commercial power 
via trading companies.16 At other moments, all three of these conceptual categories are 
used interchangeably as synonyms for broad range of hegemonic forms of power. 
Consequently, the conceptual terrain concerning “empire”, “imperialism” and 
“colonialism” is unstable because these terms are historically bounded and contingent 
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 Seth, op. cit. 3 
16
 Young, Robert J.C., Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 16 
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upon different logics of control in addition to manifold experiences of domination and 
resistance. For instance, the concept of “empire” is sometimes used to describe a global 
system no longer bound territorially to a metropolitan administrative centre, but that is 
underpinned by the tripartite ensemble of imperialism, colonialism and capitalism. In 
other moments, “colonial” is used to describe a general grid of perception that is 
circumscribed by the ideological systems of power centred in Europe and the U.S., 
whereas “imperialism” sometimes is deployed to describe neo-colonialism, that is, 
pervasive economic forms of domination that have persisted beyond the formal 
independence of subjugated colonies. The main point to be made is that these key terms 
have been deployed in overlapping often in contradictory ways.     
The limitation of this commonly accepted postcolonial conceptual schema for 
decolonial thinkers is that the global nature of what can be called empire, imperialism, 
and colonialism are often reduced to material processes concerning the juridical-political 
mechanisms of control vis-à-vis a conquering state power over another. Consequently, 
“decolonization” is often understood through the narrow parameters of national 
liberation, and, therefore, is dependent upon the presence of a colonial administration that 
has direct control over policy and economy. Instead, decolonial thinkers underscore the 
epistemological domains of the heterogeneous and interwoven colonial-capitalist global 
system of power. Hence, I use the term “coloniality”, introduced by Annibal Quijano, as 
opposed to “colonialism”, in order to emphasize the notion of a global epistemic 
  
10 
hierarchy that privileges Western knowledge, cosmology and spirituality above non-
Western knowledge, cosmology and spirituality.17  
Another prominent framework for investigating colonial expansion has been 
world systems theory; however, I suggest it has fallen short of accounting for the 
historically bounded character and multiple tensions regarding the production and 
organization of hierarchal forms of global domination. I argue that one cannot simply 
presume that colonialism is reducible to theories of political economy that subsume 
questions of theology to a secular, materialist justification for capital accumulation 
commonly assumed by world systems theory. While world systems analysis is attentive 
to political economy in the establishment of global capitalism as a world system, it has 
often reproduced a Eurocentric perspective that locates the origins of the so-called 
capitalist world system by analyzing imperial competition within Europe alone. 
Consequently, the primary impetus for actors and institutions for colonial expansion is 
explained by material interests: shorter routes to the East that inadvertently led to the so-
called discovery of the New World by Spain. These processes led to territorial 
expropriation, resource extraction and labour exploitation for the ceaseless accumulation 
of capital on a global scale. From this perspective, economic relations for the extraction 
of surplus value led to new class structures, which are then conceptualized as the main 
sites of social and political relations of domination as opposed to other relations of 
power.18    
                                                        
 
17
 Grosfogel, Ramon, “World-Systems Analysis in the Context of Transmodernity, Border Thinking, and 
Global Coloniality,” Review (Fernand Braudel Centre), 29(2), 2006, pp.171, 174 
18
 Ibid, 170 
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 Without surrendering an analysis concerning the significance of global capitalism, 
and existence of particular class structures, how can we attend to the theological political 
domains that are constitutive of the world system in addition to the perspectives of 
subaltern knowledges and experiences? While one can subsume theology into a 
materialist analysis of capital, I suggest that this is important to examine how political 
economy, political theology and subaltern viewpoints are entangled and co-produced. 
This approach of co-contaminated points of power, or “plural points of enunciation” can 
help reorient a reductionist analysis of a “capitalist world-system” towards examining the 
constitution of the “colonial-capitalist world system” that views economy as one of the 
points of enunciation, rather than the sole origin.  
Traditional debates regarding the conceptual location of the “theological” and 
“political” have been concerned with either subordinating the political to the theological, 
or subordinating the theological to the political, or suggesting a strict separation between 
the two registers. Instead, I suggest that the genealogical and structural imbrication 
between these two domains makes any conceptual separation unstable even when 
political and social theories of global capitalism, empire and colonialism do not directly 
invoke any explicit divine associations.  I further suggest that the theological has a 
permanence that continued to co-constitute incipient secular forms of thought of John 
Locke (chapter two), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (chapter three), and Charles Darwin 
(chapter four) despite their claims that religious forms of political authority and 
knowledge may be undesirable, regressive or even impossible.19 Hence, rather than 
instrumentalizing the theological to a materialist rendition of colonial expansion and 
                                                        
 
19
 De Vries, Hent and Lawrence Eugene Sullivan (eds.), Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-
Secular World, Fordham University Press, pp. 26  
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conquest, this dissertation will outline a different methodological trajectory as I 
endeavour to characterize how they are co-constituted and negotiated. 
What is distinct about this project is that I bring together world systems theory, 
postcolonial and theological political perspectives under a decolonial framework in order 
to highlight the importance of epistemology in the establishment of a global hierarchical 
system that deems Western knowledge alone as being capable of achieving universality.  
While I draw upon each of these critical approaches, I have found they all neglect the 
significance of the theological in their analysis. I argue that these approaches have often 
presumed that theological domains have either been largely displaced or overcome by 
secular forms of thought and knowledge traditions. In other instances, questions of the 
theological are reduced to simplistic moral prescriptions that were deployed to in order 
justify a deeper underlying will to power and capital accumulation. Conversely, my 
project highlights how the largely neglected theological registers of colonial expansion, 
which emerged through historically contingent circuits of reasoning, mediated the 
production of European knowledge, practices and sensibilities. As a result, I draw 
attention to how the theological-political comes to bear upon the secular assumptions that 
animate critical historical approaches to colonial expansion, and, significantly, I offer a 
series of new interventions to extend the analytical parameters of decolonial theory.   
From a decolonial perspective that is attentive to political theology, the Inter 
caetera was not simply a theological justification for global capital accumulation, but 
was a constitutive domain that entangled material interest with theological concerns for 
the spread of global Christianity in order to save the souls of the so-called pagan, and to 
defend the truth claim of Catholicism against various pagan and infidel figures. The main 
  
13 
point which is the original contribution of my dissertation is that I examine the 
epistemological structure of the colonial-capitalist world system, with particular focus 
upon its theological registers, and their effects upon subaltern experiences and knowledge 
systems.  
Over the course of the Renaissance, a Christian theocentric structure of 
management and control was being put in place, in part, through internal competition 
between the Christian Atlantic nations of Europe – namely, Spain and Portugal – vis-à-
vis African and Indigenous souls, land and labour.20 Control and management here refers 
to the actors and institutions of the Atlantic powers that generated the rules for decision-
making power over the colonial-capitalist world system that emerged following 1492. For 
decolonial thinkers such as Quijano, the colonial-capitalist world system was structured 
by a particular formation of power called the “colonial power matrix” that established 
control over the domains of the economy, of authority, subjectivity, knowledge, and 
cosmology.  
  According to the decolonial thinker Walter Mignolo, the historical foundations of 
the colonial power matrix was theological. As I will discuss further in chapter one, 
various papal bulls and decrees by the clergy established distinctions between the “true” 
Catholic Christians, Jews, Muslims, and other so-called deviant sects of Christianity. For 
Mignolo, while religious distinctions and conflicts have a long history, 1492 transformed 
the way in which human difference was conceived and organized when Catholic Spain 
forcibly converted, mercilessly tortured and eventually expelled Muslims and Jews from 
the Iberian peninsula. In Aragon and Catalonia, for instance, Muslims were removed 
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under threat of death and escorted by Spanish delegates who charged them money 
whenever they drank from rivers or sought temporary retreat in the topiary shade.21 
Mignolo suggests that these distinctions were based upon blood purity, and, as such were 
racial, and that this formed the foundation for racial schemas between Spanish, African 
and Indigenous peoples. By the eighteenth century, he says, blood purity as a signifier for 
race would be transferred to the skin. Similarly, Quijano also suggests that racial 
configurations introduced by blood purity are the main location of difference that 
structures relationships within the colonial matrix of power until today.  
Where I depart from these decolonial thinkers is that I argue throughout my 
dissertation that while Spanish notions of blood purity may in fact indicate an incipient 
form of modern race thinking, I do not find that modern forms of racial distinctions are a 
feature of Renaissance or Classical epistemology (an argument they would not 
necessarily contest). This position, I suggest, presumes that difference was mediated 
through a discourse of bio-evolutionary notions of race/racism via a self/other structure in 
which the body was made available as a constituted object of power. However, as I will 
suggest, the medieval theocentric epistemological tradition organized difference through 
resemblances and incorporation derived from Biblical readings of monogenesis, while the 
body was largely flexible and not scientifically knowable via physiognomy. As a result, I 
constantly reference the importance of temporality; particularly, the incorporative 
temporal arrangement of sacred Judeo-Christian time in order to grasp the shifting 
theological epistemological structure and how this impacted upon the constitution of 
difference.  
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 In chapter one, I examine the fifteenth and sixteenth century, and suggest that 
Indigenous peoples of the New World were not represented through a modern biological 
frame of racial typologies. Rather, I argue that European commentators generated novel 
readings of Biblical origin narratives in attempts to render Indigenous people knowable 
and as potential candidates for salvation via conversion. However, arguments to bring the 
“pagan Indian” back into the fold of a divine Christian heritage simultaneously produced 
authorizing discourses for the spread of empire. Hence, I will seek to explain how 
European empire, characterized by territorial expansion and material resource 
expropriation, was entangled with theological discourses of salvation.   
I will examine some main theological debates held by key figures of the Age of 
Exploration, including Francisco Di Vitoria (1483–1546), Bartolome de Las Casas 
(1484–1566) and Juan Gines de Sepulveda (1490–1573). I will highlight the 
contestations, negotiations and arguments made for the conquest of the New World and 
the conversion and enslavement of its Indigenous inhabitants. I will suggest that the 
emergence of religio-secular humanist arguments regarding the existence of different 
types of humans, some being inherent slaves, occurred through epistemological shifts 
related to temporality. Hence, I will suggest that the role of Christian theology in relation 
to the spread of empire does not function ideologically as a materialist alibi for acquiring 
or confiscating territory and resources. Instead, empire was also spread through the 
intense desire bring the Indigenous “pagan” back into the fold of divine concord.  
 In chapter two I shift focus to the seventeenth century and the liberal political 
theory of John Locke (1632–1704). I examine how Locke’s relationship to colonial 
bureaucratic administrations, Protestant Christian theology, and his labour theory of 
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property formed plural points of enunciation for the formation of the colonial-capitalist 
world system. Instead of focusing my analysis around a singular materialist framework 
that reduces his theory of property to the level of motivation for territorial expropriation, 
resource extraction and resource exploitation, I suggest that his thought should be 
centralized around four co-dependent registers. One is the colonial travelogues 
concerning the New World and its inhabitants; the second, English political economic 
debates between mercantilism and the plantation colonial model; the third, establishing 
the labour theory of property ownership for authorizing a particular English ritual of land 
occupancy; and the fourth one being, Protestant theological arguments for producing an 
individuated form of self-ownership in order to establish the colonial plantation system.  
In the third chapter, I examine the eighteenth century and the Enlightenment 
political thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). In this regard his theory of 
human perfectibility so key to his notions of European decadence and civil society were 
generated through the coloniality of knowledge. I argue that his thought should be 
centralized around a constellation of four interrelated domains. His philosophy of the 
origins of natural man and his essential nature was co-constituted by colonial travel 
literature and missionary accounts that merged Christian biblical origin narratives of 
monogenesis and Platonic philosophy of the perfected form is one domain. Linnaean 
classificatory schemas regarding the location of the human in the theologically derived 
Great Chain of Being created the epistemic conditions for Rousseau to examine the 
singular nature of human in relation to other sentient beings is the second. Third, 
Rousseau builds upon Protestant Christian notions of the inward detached subject – in 
part produced through the political philosophy of John Locke – through his unique novel 
  
17 
form and musical productions, which further engenders processes of disenchantment and 
the establishment of the universal individuated self. A fourth domain concerns how he 
introduces temporally varied stages of the human in order to suggest that European civil 
society, characterized by property enclosure and contractual property relations, underpins 
the human potential for degeneration and perfectibility, rather than being a result of an 
essentialized human nature. I argue Rousseau provides a critique of modernity; however, 
he ends up authorizing European colonialism, and, by extension slavery via the 
establishment of European civil society that he initially identifies as the very location of 
human corruption and degeneration.  
In the fourth chapter, I examine the nineteenth century and the work of Charles 
Darwin (1809–1882). I illustrate that Darwin’s biological evolutionary theory of descent 
with modification by means of natural selection was not produced by a disenchanted, 
scientific biological notion of the human. Rather, I trace the emergence of his thought 
through four co-dependent domains; first, I argue that this bio-evolutionary theory was 
dependent upon the discursive reorganization and transformation of “religion” into a 
psychological category of cognitive belief through eighteenth and nineteenth century 
colonial historiography. Second, I examine Darwin’s notebook entries from his Beagle 
voyage (1831–1836), and pay particular attention to how he represented 
contemporaneous Indigenous peoples that he encountered globally as mentally inferior 
primitive savages through the temporal grid of historicism. Third, I explore his distinctive 
gradient theory of the origin of religious cognition. I show that he restructured the 
progressive sequences characteristic of Victorian anthropological theories of religion 
within a bio-evolutionary diagram. Consequently, I illustrate that he located rudimentary 
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forms of religious cognition within primitive humans and non-human animals in order to 
create a bio-evolutionary link. That humans descended from non-human animals was an 
idea Darwin made primarily through appeals to religion rather than the science of 
physiognomy. Fourth, I argue that Darwin’s anti-slavery positions were conveyed by an 
endorsement of the global spread of British colonial humanitarian government. 
Furthermore, I illustrate that Darwin’s abolitionist positions were underpinned by 
locating non-Europeans as mentally inferior primitive savages, and that consequently the 
potential for human perfectibility on the part of the otherwise unchanging Indigenous 
subject depended upon the colonization of this figure.  
 Tracing the shifting epistemic traditions and structural imbrication between the 
theological and political in the constitution of the colonial-capitalist world system 
illustrates the historical and discursive contingencies surrounding the representation of 
human difference. By locating the work of Locke, Rousseau and Darwin within the 
theological matrices of coloniality, I challenge their assumed universal claims to 
knowledge and prescriptive truth claims whilst avoiding the reduction of their work to a 
singular structure of determination. My interest is in the polyvalent and historically 
grounded points of enunciation that enabled their particular forms of thought to be made 
possible.  
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Chapter 2  
Mapping the Theological and Political Coordinates of the Age of Exploration 
 
In this chapter I will examine the period of the Renaissance and trace some main 
shifts that culminated with the Spanish conquest of Al-Andalusia and the subsequent Age 
of Exploration during the fifteenth and sixteenth century. In particular, I will examine the 
global expansion of the Atlantic imperial powers that established settler colonial 
sovereign claim over the Americas and the Caribbean. I will situate my analysis by using 
the decolonial concept of coloniality in order to highlight the epistemological structure of 
the colonial-capitalist world system that emerged following 1492. Coloniality indexes the 
hidden constitutive logics of modernity and traces the interconnected domains of power 
that has plural points of enunciation. The power matrix affects all dimensions of social 
existence and establishes a global hierarchy that privileges Western knowledge, 
cosmology, authority, subjectivity and labour over non-Western forms.  
In particular, this chapter will explore three main domains of the power matrix 
that emerged through the Age of Exploration. The first is a spiritual/religious hierarchy 
that privileged Western Latin Christian theology over non-Christian spiritualities via the 
globalization of the Catholic and later Protestant church; the second, an epistemic 
hierarchy that privileged Western forms of knowledge and cosmology over non-Western 
forms of knowledge and cosmology; and the third, an ontological hierarchy that 
privileged a Christian conception of the human over non-Western conceptions of being in 
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the world.1 In doing so, I emphasize the role of the Judeo-Christian temporal formation of 
salvation that mediated the structures of reasoning for classifying, translating and 
organizing non-European forms of human difference.   
For decolonial thinkers such as, Enrique Dussel, Walter Mignolo, Anibal Quijano, 
Ramon Grosfogel and others, race and racism are the main organizing categories that 
structure all of the hierarchies of the colonial-capitalist world system. As a point of 
departure from this approach, I do not suggest that race and racism are the main locations 
for establishing human difference during the Renaissance. As I will suggest, discourses of 
evolutionary biological race thinking emerge through various epistemological shifts – 
throughout, mainly, the later portion of the nineteenth century – and as such were not 
available during this epoch. Further, suggesting that race and racism organizes the 
colonial power matrix assumes that the Renaissance epistemology organized difference 
via the self/other binary sequenced by biological evolutionary taxonomies. Conversely, I 
suggest that similitude and commensurability, mediated through the familiar, 
characterized theocentric Renaissance epistemology.2 While I agree that the colonial 
power matrix constructs Western systems of knowing and being over non-Western ones, 
I argue that these hierarchies of power were established by assimilating differences into 
forms of resemblances – New world inhabitants were apprehended as knowable through 
familiar theological genealogical schemas. Put differently, inhabitants of the Americas 
and the Caribbean were conceptualized as children of God through the familiar 
organizing principal of the theologically inscribed Great Chain of Being, rather than 
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dehumanized racial Others via biological racial taxonomies.  
A key register that linked epistemology and coloniality during the Renaissance 
was the theo-politics of knowledge. Accordingly, the main site of difference was 
constituted by Christian theology upon the axis of what Sylvia Wynter names the “True 
Christian self” and Moors, Jews, and other infidel figures. According to Mignolo, this 
logic was underpinned by the category of salvation, which continues to inform the 
matrices of coloniality. For Mignolo and Wynter, the theocentric epistemological 
structure of the Renaissance was focused upon saving the soul of the human through 
conversion, and would culminate in attempting to save the soul of the non-Christian by 
bringing them back into the fold of divine provenance through establishing diverse 
colonial institutions and global missionary projects. 3 Moreover, for Mignolo, church 
authority and mercantilist trading interests converged in order to secure Atlantic colonial 
hegemony over the Americas. From this perspective, discourses of human salvation 
entangle with geopolitical and economic interests under the mantle of coloniality.  
While I am mostly in agreement with the assessment of plural points of power for 
securing Atlantic interests over the New World, I will highlight the often conflictual, 
negotiated and provisional nature of these co-produced relations. Competing 
interpretations of Christian theology vis-à-vis conceptions of human and cultural 
difference greatly impacted the trajectories of authorizing colonial sovereignty, the 
exploitation of land and labour, and practices of conversion. Hence, there was not a 
unified and coherent colonial script that all actors followed in order to maximize interest 
for Spanish or Portuguese empire, rather, coloniality represents a non-linear and shifting 
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process of entangled points of power.  
In this chapter I will explore some broad historical and epistemological shifts that 
produce settler colonial sovereign power over the New World. It will be split into two 
principal sections; first, I will undergo a genealogy of settler colonial sovereignty that is 
generated through shifting conceptions of temporality and its relationship to the 
fluctuating category of the human. I will suggest that one cannot assume that an a priori 
homogenous Christian European self-identity was simply transplanted to the Americas in 
the late fifteenth century and later transposed into a secular settler European sovereign 
claim. Instead, I will argue that the Age of Exploration generated various contestations, 
fissures and entanglements between Christian theology, Renaissance humanism, and 
political economy.4 
Second, I will suggest that the Spanish settler colonial sovereign claim over the 
New World emerged through colonial conflict instead of preceding it with pre-
established norms and/or a coherent logic of “discovery.” Rather, Spanish settler colonial 
ownership centred around questions concerning legitimate sovereign jurisdiction and was 
coproduced through several entangled domains, including: (a) papal decrees that 
authorized spiritual dominion over the New World and the souls that lived therein; (b) 
international-legal jurisprudence developed by Francisco de Vitoria that reconfigured 
divine law by authorizing Spanish sovereignty over the New World and its inhabitants 
via natural law; (c) debates between Bartolome de las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepulveda  
concerning whether Amerindian difference accorded them sovereign status coeval with 
the Catholic Spanish in order to legitimately resist colonialism. Put differently, were 
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Amerindians human enough to launch a just war against Catholic Spanish colonizers, or 
were they inherent slaves that could only be redeemed via death?  
In the next section I will briefly outline a recent model of settler colonialism by 
Lorenzo Veracini who suggests settler colonial sovereign capacity was generated by 
processes internal to Europe and then traveled to the colonial setting in order to produce a 
distinct settler colonial formation. In contrast to this Eurocentric approach that I identify 
as the establishment of an ideal-type modular form of sovereignty that is transplanted or 
diffused to the colony via migration by a path-dependent mimesis, I will suggest that 
settler sovereign capacity is better understood through co-constitution.  
 
 
Settler-Colonialism: Sovereign Modularity and Diffusion  
Veracini argues that settler colonialism is a distinct form of colonialism that is 
both a global and transnational structure of pan-European settler colonial sovereign 
capacity.5 Robert Young suggests that while colonialism and imperialism are both 
broadly characterized by domination of one group over another, he suggests that there is 
a diversity of colonial and imperial histories that are irreducible. He argues that these two 
categories need to be understood in their historical specificity because they represent 
heterogeneous processes that were often contradictory and did not follow a linear 
trajectory.6 
Young suggests that historically forms of empire are not unique to modern world 
history; however, older forms of empire tended to focus upon expansion within a single 
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land mass. For instance, the Roman empire, which acted as a model for many nineteenth 
century colonial projects, extended its influence from the centre Rome, eventually 
splitting into the Byzantine and Holy Roman empires under the umbrella of a single land 
mass. Due to technological shifts in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, new 
navigational potentials allowed empires to extend their population globally and maintain 
contact between metropole and colony. Young suggests that unlike premodern forms of 
empire that attempted to maintain geographical uniformity, new forms of empire no 
longer required geographical coherence.7  
These broad historical and technological shifts generate conceptual distinctions 
between empire, imperialism, colonialism, and there is a further distinction of settler 
colonialism. For Young, empire developed into two main structures; first, imperialism, 
which is characterized as a bureaucratic system of governance produced and controlled 
by the centre for ideological and economic purposes. Second, a form of empire produced 
for colonial settlements by individuals, or commercial extractive economies in order to 
accumulate capital on a global scale.8 
Veracini suggests that the conceptual category of the colony be further 
distinguished by two elements. First, he argues that a colony is a political entity that is 
controlled by an external agency, and, second, an external agency that reproduces itself in 
a particular location. For Veracini, the subjugation of an Indigenous population by an 
external agency through the migration flows and localized reproduction of settler 
communities constitutes a link between migration and colonialism. Nevertheless, he 
further suggests that one cannot conflate migration and settler colonialism because not all 
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migrations are settler colonial migrations, and, further, not all colonialisms, as Young 
also suggests, are settler colonial projects.9 As a result, Verancini suggests that there must 
be a conceptual distinction between the processes and structural features of settler 
colonialism.  
Verancini states that while both migrants and settlers move across different 
geographical locations, settlers permanently reside in a particular site while in other 
colonial political domains, colonial entities such as officials, administrators, various 
missionaries and adventures return to the metropole.10 He further argues that the settler 
colonial imperative to establish a regenerative settler community may fail or be obscured 
by migration flows and patterns. Consequently, immigrants are fundamentally marked by 
a political difference resulting in differential management strategies that produce and 
organize hierarchies between settlers, migrants and the subjugated Indigenous population.  
For Veracini, settler subjects are not simply immigrating, but rather carry a logic of 
conquest intimately connected to sovereign capacity. He argues settlers establish a 
political order through this sovereign capacity while migrants are drawn into a political 
order that has been pre-established. However, while migrants are often incorporated into 
the settler project, he argues they permanently lack sovereign entitlement. Varacini states,  
[A] very different sovereign charge is involved in their respective displacements; not only 
do settlers and migrants move in inherently different ways, they also move towards very 
different places…the political traditions Settler Colonialism focuses on concentrate on 
autonomous collectives that claim both a special sovereign charge and a regenerative 
capacity.11 
 
For Veracini, the nexus between people, power, space and time indexes settler colonial 
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sovereign capacity. Hence, he suggests there is a preceding structure of sovereign 
entitlement enacted within the European metropole, both individually and collectively 
that is transplanted within the colony even though there may not have been a conscious 
psychological imperative to produce some version of a utopian political formation.12 
Rather, there is double displacement, first a displacement of loyalty between the settler 
community and the metropole and a second displacement of Indigenous sovereign claims.  
He further states,  
The dynamics of imperial and colonial expansion, a focus on the formation of national 
structures and on national independence (together with a scholarship identifying the 
transoceanic movement of people and biota that does not distinguish between settler and 
other types of migration), have often obscured the presence and operation of a specific 
pan-European understanding of a settler colonial sovereign capacity. Settler Colonialism 
addresses a scholarly gap.13 
 
While it is certainly debatable whether such a scholarly gap exists within postcolonial 
and Indigenous studies literature, I will discuss Verancini’s focus upon settler sovereign 
entitlement that for Veracini “migrates” from Europe. It is within this domain of a 
migrating sovereign entitlement that I argue cannot be sustained because it reproduces a 
Eurocentric historicist account of sovereignty. Although Veracini suggests that settler 
sovereign capacity “migrates” from Europe, he does argue settler political traditions and 
configurations of power divide from the host metropole thereby spawning a new settler 
colonial political formation. For instance, he states that settler colonialism “is not a 
leftover from transplanted political traditions, it is the beginning of a distinct political 
tradition and its sovereignty.”14 Veracini suggests that a settler colonial political entity is 
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a self-constituting act established through a sovereign movement across space; however, 
he suggests that this travelling sovereign entitlement displaces itself within the settler 
space and generates an autonomous and regenerative claim that is distinguished from the 
metropole. He argues that sovereignty should be understood as a pluralistic category that 
is not necessarily associated with producing political institutions and can co-exist along 
with and in relation to other sovereign entities, whether colonial, imperial or postcolonial 
formations.15 
 Veracini suggests then, similar to Benedict Anderson’s modular understanding of 
nationalism,16 that sovereignty has a modular character, what Veracini names “corporate 
sovereign forms”17 that travel across time and space through a modality of replication 
that eventually produces a unique settler colonial regenerative sovereign capacity. This 
settler sovereign capacity, he argues, produces a strained form of accommodation with 
other sovereignties – such as external metropole sovereign claims – and subsumes pre-
existing polyvalent Indigenous relationships to land.  
 He argues that the structure of corporate settler sovereignty is located within “the 
settler archive of the European imagination.”18 This is the preceding discourse of settler 
sovereign entitlement that is modular and travels through a structure of mimesis to the 
colony. Upon its “arrival” to the settler space, he argues this European archive 
instantiates itself through a denial of its violent epistemological underpinnings and a 
repression of psychoanalytic traumas that constitute a crisis of legitimate belonging. I 
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will not address the discourse of settler disavowal and repression; instead, I will explore 
the epistemological and ontological antecedents regarding the settler archive of the 
European imagination that is held to be the foundation of settler sovereign capacity.  
For Veracini the lingering traces from European metropole sovereignty continue to 
impact this new settler colonial formation via the settler archive of the European 
imagination. However, I would like to ask, how are the matrices of the settler archive of 
European imagination constituted through colonialism? In other words how was 
European metropole sovereignty generated through the colonial “encounter” and not a 
precursor to it? 
 
 
Tracing a Co-Produced Genealogy of the Settler Archive of the European 
Imagination 
 
In this section, I will examine the production of the “settler archive of the 
European imagination” through two main historical moments that emerged from 1492: 
the fall of Muslim Spain and the “discovery” of the New World. The aim of this section 
is to illustrate that (a) “Europe” was not a fully coherent or unified geopolitical entity in 
the wake of late fifteenth century settler colonial expansion; in fact, “European identity” 
became further fractured and fragmented through coloniality; (b) the “settler archive” 
was produced through a theocentric Renaissance epistemological structure that 
apprehended human and cultural differences based upon commensurability and 
resemblances, rather than a self/other binary; (c) in contrast to Veracini then, I suggest 
there was no preceding “settler archive of the European imagination” that served as the 
conceptual location for a migrating settler colonial sovereign claim over the New World 
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– such an archive and settler colonial sovereignty was co-constituted through colonial 
processes.    
Wynter provides a lucid account for some main epistemological shifts that 
constitute the settler archive of the European imagination. She undertakes an in-depth 
examination regarding the shifting ways in which representations of Indigenous 
difference has been constituted through a variegated process of what it means to be 
human. Her analysis will help to illustrate that medieval and Renaissance thought 
produced various competing conceptual frames for apprehending human difference, 
rather than a linear and coherent narrative of an assumed European self that was simply 
superimposed upon Indigenous and African peoples in the Age of Exploration.19  
Within these broad historical transformations Wynter identifies at least two broad 
shifts in Renaissance epistemology and the conception of human ontology that I will 
focus upon. The first is the appearance of a Christian centered conception of theological 
man governed by the agency of divine providence. The second is the emergence of a 
hybrid religo-secular conception of the human that was fashioned through 
epistemological shifts throughout the Age of Exploration.  
Wynter suggests that the antecedents of Renaissance humanism are located within 
a non-secular medieval Latin-Christian theocentric sociogeny. She states that this 
juncture is characterized by distinctions generated between the True Christian Self and 
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variously situated heretics, infidel enemies of Christ, and pagan idolaters.20 For Wynter, 
the issue of religious difference was already canonized with studies related to the God’s 
and religious rites of antiquity that was preserved through the different epochs, literature 
on Asiatic religious practices, and experiences catalogued during the crusades.21  
One may suggest that the crusades or any number of historical junctures could be a point 
of articulation for human difference drifting into racial logics of sub-human 
interpellation; however, various thinkers (Johannes Fabian, Margaret Hodgen, Bernard 
McGrane, Anthony Pagden, Vanita Seth, Sylvia Wynter) argue that the main categories 
of differentiation utilized during the medieval Christian epoch were not based upon race, 
but that of the non-Christian, pagan, infidel, or some version of savage existence bereft of 
religion altogether. Despite the constitution of difference upon the axis of 
Christian/infidel; heretic; pagan there was an incorporative logic based upon the category 
of redemption – although not free from acts of violence, the possibility for the non-
Christian to enter the domain of theocentric notions of human through conversion, acts of 
penance and transformations in habit and sensibility was available.  
Part of the reason the pagan could be located as a candidate for incorporation is 
due to the temporal arrangement of sacred Judeo-Christian time. As I will discuss later, 
the production of the savage and primitive through the denial of covealness depends upon 
the secularization of Judeo-Christian temporality that occurs through epistemological 
shifts of the Enlightenment. Consequently, a racial logic of dehumanization was not yet 
available because the sacred conceptual temporal structure of this period was not yet 
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generalized and universalized through a historical sequential apparatus that could 
suppress the simultaneity of other cultures by placing them in a lesser stage of 
development as well as organize epidermal forms of human difference through biological 
evolutionary schemas.  
I want to emphasize that I am not suggesting an essentialized exclusionary 
violence within Christian notions of salvation, Christianity, or monotheism generally. 
Instead, I am interested in the shifting relations of power and theological lineages of the 
Age of Exploration, and how particular articulations of Christian metaphysics were 
intensely debated and negotiated. To simply suggest that Christianity was the hand-
maiden of empire and colonialism is to miss many of the negotiations and often 
contradictory processes that animated the Age of Exploration.   
Johannas Fabian suggests that Judeo-Christian sacred time was conceived as a 
sequence of events that befell a chosen group in accordance with the divine provenance 
of one savior, i.e. God. A significant feature of this sacred linear temporal structure was a 
covenant in a linear telos of salvation between one group of Christian believers and God. 
Indeed, as Fabian suggests, even the Spanish conquistador who administered sadistic 
forms of violence upon the Indian attempted to incorporate him into the sacred temporal 
structure of divine Christian heritage:  
In the medieval paradigm, the Time of Salvation was conceived as inclusive or 
incorporative. The Others, pagans and infidels (rather than savages and primitives), were 
viewed as candidates for salvation. Even the conquista, certainly a form of spatial 
expansion, needed to be propped up by an ideology of conversion…the explorers were 
expected to round up, so to speak, the pagan world between the center of Christianity and 
its lost periphery in order to bring it back into the confines of the flock guarded by the 
Divine Sheppard.22 
                                                        
22
 Fabian, Johannes, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002 (1983), pp. 26 
32 
 
 
Within this incorporative theocentric conception of the world, the domain of cultural 
difference was not translated through the discourse of racial difference. Differences in 
pigmentation were attributed to geographic contexts that held darker pigmentation was a 
result of exposure to the sun. This geographical notion of explaining cultural differences 
while retaining a theological discourse of monogenesis would allow the pagan and infidel 
a place in domain of theocentric conceptions of human. Put differently, if all of the 
earth’s inhabitants derived from the fallen progeny of Adam, the taxonomy of cultural 
difference would be apprehended outside a modern biological basis of racial difference. 
The main axis of human difference was translated upon the basis of religion and 
language; this was characterized by the notion of a variegated assembly of “nations” 
while the term “race” was reserved for zoological descriptors of the animal world.23  
Vanita Seth suggests that this discourse of similitude was a result of the structure 
of apprehending difference through genealogy, which is distinct from history. This 
structure of genealogy indexes the epistemological structure of similitude during the 
Renaissance. For Seth, these elaborate a-historical biblical taxonomies did not emerge 
through the developmental sequences of historical time. Rather, the enormous creative 
and intellectual effort to assimilate the Indian and African subject through a shared 
history was culled from biblical exegesis produced complex genealogical maps. Seth 
states, “The genealogical project of tracing indigenous American lineage back to the Old 
World, and thus rendering it malleable to Christian interpretations, resulted in the 
identification of some twenty possible nations as the ancestral forefathers of the New 
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World’s inhabitants.”24 Further, I suggest that a result of the genealogical structure of 
similitude was the production of the aporia of colonial redemptive melancholy (discussed 
below). Hence, I examine how New World inhabitants could simultaneously be part of a 
Christian lineage, yet be so distinct in their religious and cultural practices. 
This Christian genealogical conception of the world via incorporation, in part, 
made possible by metaphysical teleological “Time of Salvation” contrasted with earlier 
Greek, mainly Aristotelian, notions of conceptualizing difference based upon natural 
slavery. Anthony Pagden argues that Greek thought from Homer to Aristotle 
conceptualized the category of human as biologically unified from the same species. 
However, there were varying types of humans distinguishable based upon language and 
the ability to form political communities via the city,  
For most Greeks, and for all of their cultural beneficiaries, the ability to use language, 
together with the ability to form civil societies (poleis) – since these were the clearest 
indications of man’s powers of reason – were also the things that distinguished man from 
other animals…if ‘man’ is to be taken as something more than a morphological category, 
the Greeks’ failure to recognize the barbaroi amounted, in effect, to a denial of their 
humanity.25 
 
For Pagden, redemption was not a feature within Greek a schema that closed off entrance 
into the ΟȚțουȝέȞη (ecumene) – civilized non-barbarous life.26 As I will show, classical 
ideas regarding natural slavery will paradoxically creep back into the contested terrain of 
divine and natural law concerning the juridical status of Indigenous and African subjects.  
Wynter suggests that the temporal arrangement of the dominant theological 
juncture of late medieval Europe, as opposed to classical notions, was produced through a 
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cosmic ontological discourse that posited the celestial domain as perfected divine 
transcendence. This engendered a form of cognition that placed divine metaphysical truth 
in the hands of the Church, while the earth was conceptualized as the post-Adamic fallen 
zone of sinful man who could reach salvation through various acts of penance.27 
The dominant structuring theocentric sociogeny would authorize monogenesis as 
the key hermeneutical apparatus for apprehending cultural difference. Monogenesis, 
suggests mankind was created in a single act, and, as such, homogenous in all 
characteristics. On the other hand, polygenesis, a hypothesis not widely circulated as it 
breached orthodox Christian understandings, suggests that the human was manifest from 
various acts of creation at a plurality of spatio-temporal points. Hodgen suggests a third 
strand of “secular” inquiry that would render ethnological analyses through the frame of 
historico-environmentalism.28  
Following the work of Fabian, Seth and Wynter, to suggest that there was a fully 
formed disenchanted “secular” gaze that apprehended cultural difference through 
environmentalism would perhaps be a hasty characterization. This is because the 
universalization and generalization of Judeo-Christian time was not yet possible. Fabian 
and Wynter do suggest, however, that cognitive fissures appeared in the enchanted 
cognitive schema due to technological changes in circumnavigation during the 
Renaissance. This could account for conceptualizing human difference via a hybrid 
sacred-profane matrix – but to suggest a total epistemological “break” from dominant 
sacred temporality is tenuous. In fact, Hodgen later suggests that monogenesis was 
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incorporated into the ideas of the most “convicted enviromentalists.”29  
Diversity within the dominant monogenetic schema was understood to come after 
Adam’s creation and placement within the earthly realm of fallen time – exactly how and 
when heterogeneity would descend upon the homogeneous original human form would 
generate various theories, “All who concerned themselves intellectually with the manners 
and customs of mankind were in some measure defenders of the Judeo-Christian 
formula…it was the Bible – and in the Bible the first eleven chapters of Genesis – that 
held the lost key to the lost lock of the cultural riddle.”30 The advocates of monogenesis 
would produce novel Biblical exegesis in order resolve the issue of cultural diversity vis-
à-vis the category of Adamic homogeneity.    
Monogenesis was conceived through the frame of principal demographic events 
marking the diffusionist geographic dispersal of man. This sequential order of events 
would start with the creation and fall of Adam and Eve. The narrative would continue to 
posit that their offspring was dispersed throughout the earth, and end with their 
depopulation and subsequent repopulation. In order to retain the stability of original 
man’s homogenous character, it would be proposed that three ruptures took place: “once 
by Cain and this posterity, again by the descendants of the sons of Noah, and once again 
at Babel; each episode being accompanied by periods of prolonged human migration, 
mingling, cultural diffusion, and degeneration.”31 
  The first rupture was that as punishment for the fratricide between Cain and Abel 
– the offspring of Adam and Eve – God exiled Cain to the Land of Nod; thereby 
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dispersing man from the original abode of Adamic culture. Cain would become an 
unsanctified wanderer producing his progeny with various wives eventually becoming the 
ancestral villain credited with peopling the first city of tents and shepherds.32 The second 
event of geographic human dispersal took place with Cain’s offspring spreading evil 
throughout earth leading to divine instruction for Noah to construct an ark. After the 
monumental Flood, Noah and his wife as well as his three children and their wives were 
left subsequently peopling the planet with various homelands. Finally, with the dispersal 
of the remnants of Babel, various nations and languages were left to wither within a flux 
of degeneration.33  
Hogden and Wynter suggest the lay intelligentsia were brokers of a discourse that 
generated their own ontology as the embodiments of enslavement to the “original sin of 
fallen man” that could only be ameliorated through direct mediation of the ostensible 
truth articulated through the Church and clergy.34 As Hogden observes, “To encourage 
the mind to play wantonly with its own powers was denounced as self-indulgence; to 
seek learning outside the accustomed categories of medieval logic and information was to 
invite scandal.”35 The Renaissance, however, would place value upon the register of 
curiosity, observation and calculation – agonizing ethnological inquiries would emerge 
and flourish as the Age of Exploration opened vistas to the marvels of the New World.  
As I have alluded to above, cognitive breaches would continue to occur as 
increased circumnavigation would place Western Christendom in further “contact” with 
the peoples of Africa and Americas. Indeed no Biblical precedent could account for this 
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variety of cultural diversity; nevertheless, as mentioned, genealogical maps would 
attempt to make sense of such difference. Further, a well-known hierarchical ordering 
principal that serialized metaphysical and material existence within a conceptual schema 
would complement monogenesis. The neo-Platonic notion of the Great Chain of Being 
was used so that all creatures, from angels to mermaids, could be located within a precise 
order or metaphysical chain – linking and unifying all existence within divine 
provenance.36  
Both medieval and Renaissance thought featured the Great Chain of Being as a 
theological and philosophical discourse and was disseminated through the works of 
Plotinus, Boethius, Mirandola, Ficino and various others.37 Hodgen states, “The 
multiplicity of things, or the variegated world of nature, was held together by a golden 
chain, so scaled that the more remote a thing might be from its original source, the lower 
its grade of perfection.”38 The hierarchical Chain was a perhaps the most important 
discourse for apprehending human and cultural difference during this juncture – as I will 
show in chapter three, the Chain remains a vital conceptual tool well into the eighteenth 
century, and features in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.   
 Wynter identifies the work of Italian Renaissance humanist of the fifteenth 
century Pico della Mirandola as a significant shift in conceptualizing the narrative of 
Genesis. Mirandola’s treatise Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486) examined the origin 
and nature of man in relation to the divine and man’s freedom to ascend and descend in 
the classical Platonic Chain of Being. In Wynter’s reading, Mirandola reformulated the 
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normative Christian discourse concerning the fall of Adam and Eve from paradise into 
earth and their subsequent abasement in Original sin. On the one hand, Mirandola 
suggested that man originated by God’s desire to create a being placed within the centre 
of the Platonic metaphysical Chain of Being, but, crucially, endowed with the ability to 
move up and down the Chain: “fall” himself to level of beasts through being enslaved to 
the base passions. On the other hand, man could “rise” to the highest status upon earth 
through cultivating the passions and using reason. Wynter states,  
The relation here is one of analogy. While reason is not a god, “it partakes of some of 
God’s functions” in that it is intended to rule over a “lower order of reality.” The 
fundamental separation for Pico was one between two orders of creation, with man 
placed by God at the midpoint between them… Placed between these two realms, man 
was the only creature “confined by no bounds,” free to “fix limits of nature” for himself, 
free to be “molder and maker of himself.”39 
 
Hence, Mirandola is credited with placing man outside the Chain of Being through the 
freedom to ascend and descend by cultivating the faculties.40  
It should be noted that Mirandola’s conception of man as God’s vicegerent on 
earth, with the mobility to move up and down the hierarchical Chain of Being has its 
roots in classical Islamic thought. While Mirandola may be the first western thinker to 
account for the freedom of man to move up and down the Chain through ordering the 
passions and virtue of reason, this notion was articulated over four hundred years before 
Mirandola by the medieval Islamic philosophy of Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn al-Ghazali. 
This is significant because as it indexes the hybrid nature of philosophical knowledge 
production, rather than a simple excising of non-western and non-Christian knowledge 
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systems. Further, as I will discuss below, despite Spain and Portugal producing their 
identities in opposition to the figure of Muslim infidel, this relation was also one of co-
imbrication.  For instance, Islamic scientific and navigational knowledge acquired 
through medieval developments in mathematics and astronomy was translated by Jewish 
interpreters to the Portuguese – these knowledges would enable the expansion voyages of 
competing empire (discussed further in chapter 2).41    
The discursive maneuver, popularized by Mirandola, of positioning man not as a 
static placeholder between God and man within a degenerative logic, but rather as 
holding the potential to ascend towards perfectibility would indeed place a particular 
form of Christianity as the highest manifestation of spiritual perfection. Concomitantly, 
Indigenous and African peoples could be mistreated, enslaved, killed and their lands 
could be confiscated through the enactment of various papal bulls including the 1455 
Romanus Pontifex and 1493 Inter caetera.42 However, ontologically speaking, they were 
still seen as children of God despite being located in the frame of religious 
differentiation.  
It is this juncture within the Renaissance from which the foundations of the settler 
sovereign claim were emerging. Further, we can examine how a dominantly transcendent 
ontology of the human, redeemable through acts of penance articulated by the clergy 
shifts, more concretely, to a hybrid sacred-profane one. Further, I will attempt to illustrate 
that a constitutive feature of Spanish imperial expansion was made possible, in part, by a 
metaphysical Christian temporal structure. As I have suggested above, it is important to 
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highlight how the theological imbricates with the political in order to provide a more 
robust account concerning the theological lineages of concepts of the political, authority, 
law, sovereignty and authorizations of violence as well as territorial expropriation.  
In the next section I will illustrate the importance of the fall of Al-Andalusia in 
relation to the Age of Exploration. Accordingly, I highlight how human difference was 
conceptualized by Catholic Spain and Portugal vis-à-vis Muslims and Jews. The issue of 
authentic Catholic conversion would greatly impact the trajectories of Spanish empire in 
relation to the New World. Two main interrelated processes index the importance of the 
fall of Muslim Spain. In the first, Islam represented a geo-existential threat to 
Christianity, and, as such, intense anxiety loomed concerning inauthentic converts that 
were held to be lingering within Spain particularly. Attempts to globalize Christianity in 
the wake of colonial expansion are linked to seeking converts in order to mobilize 
successive crusades against Islam. In the second was a religious missionary impulse to 
save the soul of the pagan Amerindian held to be part of a displaced Noachian Christian 
lineage. These two theo-political processes entangled and would sometimes conflict with 
Atlantic mercantile interests for land expropriation, resource extraction, and labour 
exploitation.   
A millennial form of religious purification can best characterize the theological 
political climate of Spain – particularly leading up to 1492. Long had there been attempts 
to secure a pure Catholic polity, and the doctrine of limpieza de sangre (purity of blood) 
emerged, which was a genealogical discourse that linked Old Christians to a pre-Islamic 
Visigothic and Latin heritage. Establishing blood concentration, for decolonial thinkers, 
relates to the emergence of race and racism as biological markers for constituting human 
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difference. In contrast, I would suggest that purity of blood was meant to determine one’s 
religious lineage, as the primary mode of conceptualizing the ontological status of the 
human held by medieval Latin Christian sociogeny was, as Wynter reminds us, based 
upon the “True Christian self.” Racial distinctions, in their modern form, require a 
secularized and progressive temporal character in order to sequence biological 
evolutionary taxonomies through the body within a hierarchical structure – I will come 
back to this point several times. The main point I wish to make here is that the 
epistemological tradition of this epoch did not make available modern forms of biological 
racial discourse. Blood was used as an index for tracing one’s religious heritage via 
aforementioned theocentric genealogical maps. 
For instance in 1391, priest Ferrran Martinez delivered a series of anti-Jewish 
sermons in Seville leading to the deaths and forcible conversion of thousands of Jews as 
well as the destruction of Jewish homes and synagogues. Further, in 1412, Catherine of 
Lancaster and regent of Castile and Leon ordered all Jews and Muslims to end economic 
and social activities with Christians and remain in specified housing quarters under threat 
of death or property seizure.43 In the following decades the forced conversions of over 
three hundred thousand Jews (conversos) and an unknown number of Muslims 
(moriscos) would result in an intensification of Inquisition aimed at producing sincere 
converts under a pure Catholic community.  
Other effects of the pure blood discourse included burning over two thousand 
conversos alive between 1485 and 1501. Further, on March 31, 1492 Catholic monarchs 
Ferdinand and Isabella signed an edict that ordered all Jews to convert to Christianity or 
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be exiled from Spanish territory within three months and forty days. As a result, over 
50,000 Jews chose to convert, while about 150,000 chose exile; moreover, in 1497 
Portuguese king Manuel I provided the same edict of baptism or exile to both Jews and 
Muslims as a condition for marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella’s daughter, Isabel.44  
For the Muslim population of Spain before and following the fall of Granada in 1492, 
their conversion was the site of intense debate and effort. For instance, the archbishop of 
Toledo, Francisco Jimenez de Cisneros lost patience with a slower process of Christian 
evangelical initiatives and began to forcibly convert masses of Muslims in public squares. 
Cisneros professed to Pope Alexander VI that he had converted three thousand Moors in 
a single day and would later remark to his concerned church council in Toledo, “if the 
infidels couldn’t be attracted to the road to salvation, they had to be dragged to it.”45 And 
on January 16, 1500 Cisneros proclaimed, “there is now no one in the city who is not 
Christian, and all the mosques are churches.”46  
Subsequently, the Muslims of Granada rebelled, in response Ferdinand joined the 
campaign to quell the upheaval, and in March 1500 massacred the inhabitants of entire 
villages. Ferdinand stated that in one massacre in Lanjeron: “the occupants were baptized 
before perishing”; it is reported Bartolome De Las Casas (discussed further below) likely 
was witness to these events and at the age of fifteen or sixteen marched with the militia 
from Seville to Granada to participate in the crushing the Muslim rebellion.47  
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Ferdinand and Isabella continued their efforts, and on October 1501 ordered all “books of 
the Mahometan impiety” in Granada be seized under threat of death or the confiscation of 
property and subsequently destroyed in a public bonfire. Millions of Spanish Muslims 
would either be converted or exiled throughout the fifteenth century, Mathew Carr states,  
…the Muslim population of Iberia at the beginning of the twelfth century, including 
Berbers, Arabs, and indigenous converts to Islam, may have reached as high as 5.5 
million. At the end of the fifteenth century, the number of Muslims in Spain was 
probably between 500,000 and 600,000, out of a Spanish population of roughly 7 to 8 
million.48     
 
Throughout the sixteenth century, the ascendency of the Ottoman empire created further 
anxiety and various incitements for the reestablishment of the crusades. However, this is 
not to posit a unified Christian monolith; the Inquisition turned its gaze upon variously 
perceived Christian heretical orders such as the Lutherans and some Catholic mystic 
orders such as the Alumbrados.49 On the other hand, the perceived threat of the Muslim 
did also allow for the articulation of a unified Christian community: following the 
Turkish siege of Vienna in 1529, Martin Luther called for Turkenkrieg – a war upon the 
Turks who he regarded as the incarnation of Satan, while successive popes appealed to 
the Holy Roman Emperor to unite all Christianity in a Turkish crusade.50 As I mentioned 
above, the eschatological coordinates of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries sought 
sincere converts for what many saw as an theologico-existential crisis vis-à-vis ominous 
infidel figures – most notably the Muslim,  
It was a period in which many Christians lived in expectation of an imminent Day of 
Judgment and the beginning of a new Christian millennium, or renovation 
mundi…According to the widely circulated ‘letter of revelation’ written in 1486 [stated] 
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Ferdinand himself was the Hidden One, who was destined to ‘subdue all kingdoms from 
sea to sea, and he will destroy all the Moors of Spain’…Columbus’s search for a new 
route to the Indies was partly intended to make possible a double-pronged assault on 
Islam from east to west. 
…In a letter to Ferdinand and Isabella written in 1493, Columbus promised ‘that in seven 
years from today I can provide Your highness with five thousand mounted troops and 
fifty thousand foot-soldiers for the war and conquest of Jerusalem, upon which 
proposition this enterprise was taken.’ The Catholic Monarchs clearly shared these 
aspirations to some extent. In 1494, bulls of crusade were circulated in Spain to generate 
support for a military expedition to North Africa. Three years later, Spain seized the 
Moroccan port of Melilla and acquired the first of its military and trading outposts in 
North Africa.51  
 
The reason I have delved briefly into this history of blood purity, absolute fixation upon 
sincere conversion, and the religio-political climate of Muslim Spain, its conquest, and 
subsequent ascendency of the Ottoman empire is to highlight the nexus between the 
theological and political: the manner in which institutions were congealing through 
various debates, legal codes and acts of violence vis-à-vis the infidel and refractory 
convert. 
As a result of Spain’s Jewish and Muslim historical presence and widely known 
intensification of Inquisitorial techniques of violence, neighboring principalities viewed 
Spain as a citadel of recalcitrant conversos, moriscos, apostates and heretics.52 In my 
reading, this illustrates that “Europe” was a highly fragmented and contingent entity 
without a coherent and bounded character. Rather, the aforementioned representations of 
difference and locations of violent subjugation caused further fissures in producing a 
coherent European Christian self. This runs counter to the position that a Christian 
European self-identity – and later a secular Western self-identity – was simply constituted 
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through the oppositional representation of the non-European Other.53 As Seth argues, 
privileging a religion-based self-other binary risks assimilating variegated theological and 
ancient knowledges into a textual alibi for a teleological rendition of empire, imperialism, 
colonialism and settler colonialism.54 In other words, presupposing a self/other binary 
where the self is Christian and the other is non-Christian assumes complex theological 
and political knowledges were structured and deployed through a predetermined grid. I 
would further suggest such a method not only misses the various contestations and 
negotiations of different epistemological and ideational locations, but also risks occluding 
processes of appropriation and hybridity that shaped and continue to influence the 
trajectories of modernity.  
After the conquest of Granada, and in the wake of the expulsion and forced 
conversions of Jews and Muslims, it was Christopher Columbus who broached Spain as 
fulfilling a Christian millennial vision:  
Your Highnesses, as Catholic Christians, and princes who love and promote the holy 
Christian faith, and are enemies of the doctrine of Mahomet, and of all idolatry and 
heresy, determined to send me, Christopher Columbus, to the above-mentioned countries 
of India, to see the said princes, people, and territories, and to learn their disposition and 
the proper method of converting them to our holy faith; and furthermore directed that I 
should not proceed by land to the East, as is customary, but by a Westerly route, in which 
direction we have hitherto no certain evidence that any one has gone.55 
 
Columbus’ messianic discourse should be placed within an incorporative sacred temporal 
structure in order to understand the parameters of Spanish imperialism; indeed, Spanish 
empire was not simply a task of trouncing Portugal for dominance over material resource 
expropriation, but also of the unfolding of the Time of Salvation consecrated by divine 
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authority (discussed further below). In other words I would like to gesture to the complex 
entanglements between particular Christian theological imputations of conversion and 
salvation in addition to competing imperial territorial expansion voyages, material 
resource expropriation and juridical registers and how they assembled, in often 
contradictory ways, vis-à-vis Indigenous peoples and lands of the Americas.  
  Subsequent to Columbus’ exploits emerges a main point of tension between 
papal temporal and metaphysical claims of authority and the sovereign claim of Spanish 
empire over the New World. Pope Alexander VI’s papal bull divided the Americas 
between the Spanish and Portugal in order to secure the spread of Christianity and to 
maintain a balance of power between the two Atlantic imperial states.56 However, 
Ferdinand sought to secure temporal and spiritual dominance under the yoke of Spanish 
empire. Ferdinand created several theological and juridical bodies, or juntas in order to 
authorize the establishment of Spanish sovereign claim, beyond the Church, over the 
New World and its people.57 
 
 
Theological Filiations of Spanish Settler Sovereign Power  
Anthony Anghie suggests that theologian and jurist Francisco de Vitoria 
represents a key figure in the production of Spanish sovereign claim vis-à-vis Indigenous 
peoples of the Americas. For Anghie, one of the main concerns for Vitoria was not 
establishing order among a priori sovereign entities; instead, Vitoria’s epistemological 
and juridical conundrum was one of translating cultural difference: “Who is sovereign? 
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What are the powers of a sovereign? Are the Indians sovereign? What are the rights and 
duties of the Indians and the Spaniards? How are the respective rights and duties of the 
Spanish and the Indians to be decided?”58 In order to address these questions, Anghie 
states that Vitoria explores the social and cultural registers of Indigenous life: their 
rituals, customs and behaviors.  
For peoples of the Americas and peoples of Africa a question loomed: where does 
one place them in the Chain of Being? Hodgen states that there were various options for 
slotting in the non-European within the chain of being:  
First, the savage could be accepted as a man like other men, and inserted in the scale of 
being with European and other known men; second, he could be regarded as something 
different from and less than, European man, and be inserted in the scale in a secondary 
human category; or third, he could be interpreted as an animal, and given a place, perhaps 
the highest, among the other animals.59 
 
Within the dominant theocentric frame that conceptualized human difference through 
Biblical monogenesis, the neo-Platonic Chain of Being necessitated apprehending 
Indigenous and African peoples through the category of human. While both Indigenous 
and African peoples may have been seen as animalistic in their cultural disposition and 
aesthetically reviled, or held in the liminal zone between curiosity and heretical horror, 
theologically speaking, they were still human. However, this conception undergoes shifts 
through the production of Vitoria’s jurisprudence.   
Anghie examines how the foundations for international law were coproduced 
through colonialism, rather than being fully formed in Europe and deployed to the 
colonies through a diffusionist historicist account. It is within this domain that I would 
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like to supplement the work of Veracini, mentioned above, who espouses a form of 
modular European sovereignty that “migrates” to the colony in order to enact the 
production of a new and unique settler colonial sovereign claim. I will examine how 
Anghie indexes key shifts that emerged through Spanish sovereign claims over both 
papal and Indigenous authority, and the corollary of new representational logics 
concerning the ontology of both the Spanish and Indigenous peoples of the Americas.   
Anghie argues that Vitoria opposed the normative juridical framework that binds 
human relations through divine law, and he contested, as mentioned above, the right for 
conquest by way of papal decree sanctioned through the spread of the Christian faith. 
Instead, Vitoria argues that papal authority, established through divine law, should be 
displaced by the power of a “secular sovereign” figure ruling on the basis of natural law. 
Anghie states that at this juncture of the Renaissance, Vitoria was not able to produce a 
coherent notion of what exactly the sovereign is: if it relates to a state like formation, or 
general polity with a system of laws.60 This establishment of natural law relates to the 
Indigenous subject because the registers of ownership and property were deemed, 
according to Vitoria, to be outside the scope of divine papal authorization. In other 
words, for Vitoria, ecclesiastical decree cannot deny Indigenous peoples their property 
simply because they are unbelievers.61  
Vitoria further truncates the normative grounds for Spanish – and by extension 
other European nations deriving their right to conquest by referencing the papacy – 
conquest by stating that temporal and spatial jurisdiction over the earth is not derived 
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from religious license, nor does the pope hold dominion over unbelievers because they 
could not be bound to a law before being subject to it:   
Vitoria denies that the sovereign, the Emperor, could have acquired universal temporal 
authority through the universal spiritual authority of Christ and the Pope. He questions 
whether divine law could provide the basis for temporal authority, methodically denies a 
number of assertions of Papal authority and concludes that “The Pope is not civil or 
temporal lord of the whole world in the proper sense of the words ‘lordship’ and ‘civil 
power.’”62 
 
In Anghie’s reading, this generates a problem regarding jurisdiction for Vitoria as it 
locates the Indigenous subjects as belonging to a different juridical order. As mentioned 
earlier, theologically speaking, Indigenous peoples were still considered human. Vitoria 
relies upon reason and installs it as a universal category to resolve the problem of 
differential jurisdiction.63 Vitoria states, “the true state of the case is that they are not of 
unsound mind but have according to their kind, the use of reason”64 and, hence, are 
bound by the doctrine of jus gentium.  
This doctrine, which not did fall under divine law, but natural law, binds all 
nations and is administered by the sovereign. Jus gentium allows the Spanish the right to 
“travel” and “sojourn” in the Americas, and, as a result, Indigenous peoples cannot 
prevent it. Vitoria paradoxically hails forth theological legitimacy from monogenesis, 
suggesting in the days of Noah it would be inhuman to deny the permission of travel. 
This illustrates that despite Vitoria stating that legitimacy for territorial incursion by 
Spanish empire did not require theological license, but rather the authority of the law of 
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nations via universal reason, he still deploys theological monogenesis as the translatable 
category for a hybrid sacred-profane conception of the human.      
While it would seem Indigenous peoples are able to reach perfectibility by way of 
the faculty of reason ordering the passions (hailing forth Mirandola and the Chain of 
Being), they are still culturally different to the Spanish. This presents a paradox: the 
Indian is both universal and particular. It would seem that for Vitoria, while reason is the 
central category to ascend the Chain of Being and realize a perfected self, rather than fall 
to the realm of beasts, it is Catholic Christianity and Spanish cultural practices that are 
positioned as the pinnacle form for refining reason.  
Anghie suggests that Vitoria reintroduces Christian norms as originating in the 
universally applicable law of nations. Put differently, Vitoria’s previously held decision 
displacing divine law with natural law, authorized by reason, repositions normative 
Christian categories within the universal matrix of jus gentium. The basis for waging war 
upon Indigenous peoples for resisting conversion is now achieved through hailing forth 
jus gentium authorized by the sovereign figure instead of divine authority.65 Indeed, the 
theological is not evacuated, but rather rearranged within an emerging colonial apparatus 
that is not fully formed at this juncture of the Renaissance, but rather congealing. 
Indigenous peoples were then seen by Vitoria to be inherently incapable of waging a just 
war because only sovereign entities have this power. Consequently, Indians are 
intrinsically conceptualized as non-sovereign, or, in Anghie’s words: “partially 
sovereign”,   
Vitoria’s insistence, in his analysis on just war, that only Christian subjectivity is 
recognized by the laws of war, ensures that the Indians are excluded from the realm of 
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sovereignty and exist only as the objects against which Christian sovereignty may 
exercise its power and wage war.66 
 
Hence, because the Indian is represented as pagan they can be subject to a perpetual war; 
moreover, they are ontologically unable to fulfill the requirements to resist Spanish 
expansion. Anghie suggests that Vitoria represents the Indian at this juncture as 
“unredeemable” – the only solution to the unbeliever becomes death, Vitoria states,  
And this is especially the case against the unbeliever, from whom it is useless ever to 
hope for a just peace on any terms. And as the only remedy is to destroy all of them who 
can bear arms against us, provided they have already been in fault.67   
 
This determination of the ontological status of the Indigenous subject as naturally 
unredeemable is a moment of reintroducing Aristotelian notions of natural slavery into 
Vitoria’s theological itinerary. John Mair, Scottish theologian and thinker deployed neo-
Aristotelian philosophy in order to theorize the inherent slavery of Indigenous peoples. 
Pagden suggests that Vitoria was influenced by Mair’s thought during his time at College 
de Saint Jacques at Paris where Mair and his colleagues left a venerable intellectual mark 
by merging ancient moral philosophy with theology and jurisprudence.68 Mair comments 
upon the natural condition of inherent slavery of the Indian, 
And this has now been demonstrated by experience, wherefore the first person to conquer 
them, justly rules over them because they are by nature slaves. As the Philosopher says in 
the third and fourth chapters of the first book of the Politics, it is clear that some men are 
by nature slaves, others by nature free; and in some men it is determined that there is such 
a thing and that they should benefit from it. And it is just that one man should be a slave 
and another free, and it is fitting that one man should rule and another obey, for the 
quality of leadership is also inherent in the natural master.69     
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For Mair, Aristotle’s Politics was not a commentary upon the specific conditions of 
fourth century Athens, but rather a universal categorization that some humans are 
intrinsically natural masters and others are barbarous slaves. The representation of 
Indigenous people through the commingling of different philosophical, juridical and 
theological domains by Vitoria raises a series of vital questions: if Indigenous peoples are 
naturally unredeemable, were they still candidates for conversion? Was the temporal 
structure of the Time of Salvation evacuated, or rearranged into a different temporal 
schema? If the Indigenous subject was simultaneously both inherently unredeemable and 
a suitable candidate for conversion, how was cultural and religious difference 
apprehended and represented? Finally, what were the implications for conceptualizing the 
category of the human through the entangled registers of theology and humanism in the 
wake of empire?  
 For Wynter, this juncture indexes a major shift in the incorporative schema of 
Latin Christian theological salvation where the human was able to access redemption 
through penance articulated by the religious authority of the Church. In this reading, 
Vitoria introduces a new hybrid religio-secular conception of the human. Anghie 
provides details of this shift by suggesting Vitoria’s instantiation of the universal 
category of reason generates an ontology of the Indian that is simultaneously secular-
humanist under the doctrine of just gentium and religious due to being a pagan. Put 
another way, the Indian is ontologically constituted by reason and is thus capable of using 
reason to reach perfectibility authorized by Catholic Christianity and Spanish cultural 
practices (these two domains are not mutually exclusive). However, paradoxically, 
Indians are pagan, thus inherently incapable of using reason to reach a theologically 
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sanctioned form of perfectibility in order to gain sovereign status coeval with Spanish 
imperial sovereign power. The category of redemption was displaced from the domain of 
penance primarily defined by the religious jurisdiction of the Church to new secular 
powers invested in the sovereign.  
Anghie suggests the sovereign is a secular figure. I would suggest that while the 
sovereign figure authorizes its right to travel and sojourn separate from papal authority, 
Vitoria secures this legitimacy by referencing the metaphysical permissibility of earthly 
travel articulated in monogenesis. I read Anghie and Wynter together in order to suggest 
that the sovereign entity is a hybrid religio-secular entity and that therefore religious 
authority is not eliminated, but rather is displaced, rearranged and articulated to various 
discursive locations due to shifts in relations of power.   
Ways of apprehending time also underwent displacements: what else could 
account for a temporal transformation in what Fabian characterizes as the Time of 
Salvation? Fabian suggests that it is only at a later juncture of the Enlightenment with its 
corollary of the decline in celestial understandings of agency, that the universal structure 
of history was retained while its specific divine Christian character was transformed. For 
instance, Fabian describes the epistemological shifts in experiences of travel within the 
context of secular understandings of space, agency and the origin of humankind,  
In the Christian tradition, the Savior’s and the saints’ passages on earth had been 
perceived as constituent events of a sacred history…But for the established bourgeoisie 
of the eighteenth century, travel was to become (at least potentially) every man’s source 
of ‘philosophical knowledge… Religious travel had been to the centers of religion, or to 
the souls to be saved; now, secular travel was from the centers of learning and power to 
places where man was to find nothing but himself…religious and metaphysical searches 
for mankind’s origin and destiny were to give place to a radically immanent vision of 
humanity at home in the entire world and at all times.70 
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For Fabian, travel, as a technique of disenchanted self-realization marks the emergence of 
the secularization of time. I read Fabian, Anghie and Wynter together and suggest that the 
colonial “encounter,” the emergence of a hybrid religio-secular conception of human, in 
addition to the emergence of the settler colonial state indexes the antecedents of Fabian’s 
eighteenth century production of a “radically immanent version of humanity.” Or, 
alternatively, one could suggest there is an issue of competing or conflicting 
periodization issues with these different thinkers.  
I would suggest that the structuring temporal coordinates at this juncture of the 
renaissance should be still be conceptualized as the Time of Salvation with its 
incorporative logic, but with a rearranged schema. On the one hand, redemption of the 
true Christian took place upon the axis of penance defined by religious authority. The 
Age of Exploration, and the thought of Vitoria, indexes redemption of the hybrid sacred-
secular sovereign upon the axis of reason authorized by the juridical spheres of the 
emerging state, yet still sanctioned by monogenesis.  
On the other hand, the Indian is drawn into the rearranged incorporative temporal 
logic of the Time of Salvation, which means they are split between being candidates for 
redemption, but, in the end, are represented as inherently unredeemable. They get 
incorporated into a temporal logic that redeems them through destruction and as a labor 
force for Spanish sovereign expansion of empire. However, if this is the case, why 
attempt to Christianize the pagan? Why bother with the elaborate institution of Christian 
missionaries? As I have argued, a clear European Christian self-identity was not simply 
transposed onto the New World. These multifarious interests were not unified within a 
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single linear expansive logic; instead, the Age of Exploration produced further 
fragmentation of a bounded Spanish, Christian, and European character. 
The Indian was put in an impossible ontological location: bound by universal 
reason articulated by the universally binding law of nations the Indian cannot have their 
property expunged by simple virtue of not being Christian; however, denying Spanish 
imperial incursion would violate Biblical narratives of reciprocity sanctioned by 
Noachian monogenesis. Simultaneously, Indians are pagan, so the use of their reason 
cannot lead them to sovereign status, and, thus, salvation. Rather, they are conceptualized 
as naturally unredeemable through the re-articulation of, ironically, “pagan” Aristotelian 
philosophy espoused by Mair. Wynter states,  
It is, therefore, the very humanist strategy of returning to the pagan thought of Greece 
and Rome for arguments to legitimate the state’s rise to hegemony, outside the limits of 
the temporal sovereignty claimed by the papacy, that now provides a model for the 
invention of a by-nature difference between “natural masters” and “natural slaves,” one 
able to replace the Christian/Enemies-of-Christ legitimating difference.71  
 
As Pagden and Wynter suggest, the determination of the Indians as natural slaves in 
accordance with neo-Aristotelian thought coincides with the shifting production of the 
ontology of the human as able to reach salvation through using reason in order to adhere 
to the emerging juridical political space of the emerging settler colonial state.   
 
 
Bartolome de las Casas, Juan Gines de Sepulveda and Natural Slavery 
It is within the aforementioned shift from theocentric conceptions of the human to 
a hybrid sacred-profane rational one that Bartolome de las Casas and Juan Gines de 
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Sepulveda would hold their famous debates at Valladolid. For Wynter, despite this shift, 
she stresses that there was not a complete epistemological break, but rather the emerging 
conception of rational human contains the traces of Christian metaphysics as well as its 
theological “schematic structure.”72 Further, despite Sepulveda’s humanist arguments he 
was still wedded to a millennial vision of global Christianity. Sepulveda had served under 
Cardinal Tomas de Vio Caytano between 1469 and 1534 as an assistant in producing the 
New Testament in Spanish and was a head figure in refuting the ideas of Martin Luther in 
the Counter-Reformation.73 Further, Pagden suggests Sepulveda’s Democrates secundus 
was a final installation of a trilogy that began in 1529 with Ad Carolum ut bellum 
suscipiat in Turcas calling for another Christian crusade against the Muslim Turk.74 
 Sepulveda’s natural slavery discourse authorized by Mair’s integration of 
Aristotelian philosophy was not simply a conception of differing degrees of reason under 
the rubric of the human; rather, in Wynter’s reading, it indexed a shift to representations 
of differing degrees of the human itself.75 However, again, it should be stressed that 
Indigenous peoples were not simply understood as inhuman, or as animals, or as racial 
Others at this juncture. For Sepulveda, the Indian was still a candidate for conversion 
under what I have suggested is a reordered metaphysical temporal structure of 
redemption; hence, the Indian was still considered human.76 
Las Casas appealed largely to arguments of St. Thomas Aquinas – Aquinas was 
the one of central consultants for the Dominican order and influenced the work of 
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Vitoria, who Las Casas also referenced – who conceptualized the origins of the pagan 
condition through two main categories. The first category of pagans was the “invincibly 
ignorant,” which by no fault of their own were not exposed to the truth of Christianity. 
For Las Casas, successful conversion of the invincibly ignorant Indian was his primary 
concern, and, importantly, he did not challenge neo-Aristotelian thought regarding 
natural slavery, but entered into the dialectic with a normative Christian theological 
repertoire.77 I would suggest his famous Defense of the Indian can, in part, be understood 
as a further development of the noble savage tradition, which, arguably, could be sourced 
to Columbus’ diary entries that Las Casas abstracted and studied closely. Columbus 
remarks,  
It has often occurred when I have send two or three of my men to any of the villages to 
speak with the natives, that they have come out in a disorderly troop, and have fled in 
such haste at the approach of our men, that the fathers forsook their children and the 
children of their fathers. This timidity did not arise from any loss or injury that they had 
received from us; for, on the contrary I gave to all I approached whatever articles I had 
about me, such as cloth and many other things, taking nothing of their in return: but they 
are naturally timid and fearful. As soon however as they see that they are safe, and have 
laid aside all fear, they are very simple and honest, and exceedingly liberal with all they 
have; none of them refusing any thing he may possess when he is asked for it, but on the 
contrary inviting us to ask them. They exhibit great love towards all others in preference 
to themselves: they also give objects of great value for trifles, and content themselves 
with very little or nothing in return.78  
 
The naturally timid and childlike character of the Amerindian in of Columbus’ 
representations is related to the later noble savage discourse of Michel de Montaigne and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, which juxtaposed an originary and uncorrupted “natural human” 
to one of modern European decadence (discussed in chapter three). In short, the sacred 
temporal and ontological coordinates of this juncture of the Renaissance could not 
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represent the Indigenous subject as a non-coeval, pre-modern analogue to European 
moral and political depravity. Instead, I suggest that for Columbus and Las Casas, 
representing Indigenous peoples as child-like malleable candidates for Catholic 
conversion was generated through a larger representational matrix of this epoch: the Time 
of Salvation operative in relation to the image of the Muslim infidel and the recalcitrant 
Jew. I suggest conversion, and more precisely sincere conversion, represents a central 
conceptual location to understand Las Casas’ defense of the Indian.      
 The crisis of authentic conversion with regards of the Jew and Muslim, as well as 
the urgency concerning conquering Muslim Spain were significant factors in seeking 
candidates for conversion in order to fulfill the widely circulated eschatological vision 
and millennial ambition: the apocalyptic triumph of Christendom. I am not seeking to 
reduce these processes to a singular origin; however, the political climate in Spain 
concerning a purified Catholic polity and global evangelical mission is where I locate the 
theological political epistemological coordinates of Las Casas and Sepulveda’s famous 
debates.  
 Las Casas’s defense of Indigenous peoples of the New World is often celebrated 
as a heroic discourse drawn from an unprejudiced universal human impulse. In my 
reading, however, Las Casas’s putatively valiant defense for Indigenous autonomy and 
peace is constitutive of a Noble Savage discourse produced in opposition to the figures of 
true barbarism: Muslims and Jews that represented an existential threat to the theocentric 
conception of the human: the True Christian self.  
There are three main points I will focus upon concerning Las Casas’s defense. 
First, without proper theological justification the Indigenous pagan could not a priori fall 
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under the jurisdiction of the Church as this would justify Muslim rule in Spain and 
Ottoman ascension. Second, while the Indian is not forced to become Catholic, they are 
bound by universal natural law to receive the gospel and may not stop it from being 
spread. Third, forced conversion would produce inauthentic neophytes, the same reviled 
vintage of converso and morisco that infected Spain. Instead, authentic converts are 
required in order to fulfill a Christian eschatological narrative culminating in global 
Christendom. Much like Vitoria, Las Casas was concerned with legitimate jurisdiction 
and the translation of religious and cultural difference.     
For Las Casas, if ecclesiastical authority was generated a priori over the New 
World simply because the Indian was an unbeliever, this would authorize Muslim 
expansion:  
[If] war against the Indians were lawful, one nation might rise up against another and one 
man against another man, and on the basis pretext of superior wisdom, might strive to 
bring the other into subjection. On this basis the Turks, and the Moors – the truly barbaric 
scum of the nations – with complete right in accord with the law of nature could carry on 
war, which, as it seems to some, is permitted to us by lawful decrees of the state. If we 
admit this, will not everything high and low, divine and human, be thrown into 
confusion?79  
 
Las Casas does not rebuke the use of neo-Aristotelian philosophy for formulating the 
parameters of legitimate religious expression; indeed, rogues exist in the form of the 
Muslim infidel, who, for Las Casas, is incapable of producing legitimate jurisprudence, 
let alone a just war. Las Casas relies on the category of natural reason, as Aquinas did 
before him, suggesting that the Muslim is endowed with human quality. However, he 
rejects the gospel and remain abased in worldly pleasure and sin; consequently, the 
Muslim descends to the realm of animals. We see here the reformulated Great Chain of 
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Being articulated by Mirandola employed to plot the Muslim as human yet animalistic 
through the category of reason. Despite being philosophically and politically erudite, 
“truly barbaric” Islamic “scum” represented the genuine threat to Catholic Spain as they 
willfully wallow in sexual debauchery as well as other perverse carnal pleasures. Las 
Casas remarks, 
The Turks and Arabs are a people said to be well versed in political affairs. But how can 
they be honored with this reputation for uprightness when they are an effeminate and 
luxury-loving people, given to every sort of sexual immorality? The Turks, in particular, 
do not consider impure and horrible vices worthy of punishment.  
Furthermore, neither the Greeks nor the Romans nor the Turks nor the Moors should be 
said to be exercising justice, since neither prudence nor justice can be found in a people 
that does recognize Christ, as Augustine proves.  
When, therefore, those who are devoid of Christian truth have sunk into vices and crimes 
and have strayed from reason in many mays, no matter how well versed they may be in 
the skills of government, and certainly all those who do not worship Christ, either 
because they have not heard his words even by hearsay or because, once they have heard 
them, reject them, all these are true barbarians.80   
 
While he does mention Greeks and Romans, Las Casas pays special attention to the 
Muslim, in particular the Muslim sexual travesties and moral bankruptcy he perceives. 
He views them as being legitimate candidates for punishment – including death. 
Interestingly, Las Casas deems all “true barbarians” those who do not worship Christ. 
However, he devotes attention towards distinguishing between the vincibly and 
invincibly ignorant throughout the Defense.  
For the invincibly ignorant Indian pagan, they are all represented as potential 
subjects of Christ, but not yet voluntary and thus not subject to the authority of the 
Church. For Las Casas, the Church had no prior jurisdiction over the pagan even if their 
religious and cultural practices were reviled as demonic or misplaced imputations of 
divine agency. Paradoxically, however, as potential subjects the Indian pagan is placed 
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under the dominion of Christian spatio-temporal divine provenance. Las Casas suggests 
all creatures in heaven and earth fall under dominion of Christ and he appeals to last 
chapter of the Gospel to authorize Christian legitimacy, “…according to Matthew: ‘All 
authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me,’ and so all peoples of the earth are 
his (Christ’s) subjects by the authority and power over every creature he has received, not 
only as God but also as man, from the Eternal Father.”81 Further Las Casas states, “…the 
gospel must be preached to all nations without distinction, in a brotherly and friendly 
manner, along with the offering the forgiveness of sins.”82 As a result, Christians have a 
theologically sanctioned obligation to spread the gospel globally; however, they may not 
forcibly convert others, he passionately states,  
For men are obliged by the natural law to do many things they cannot be forced to do 
against their will. We are bound by the natural law to embrace virtue and imitate the 
uprightness of good men. No one, however, is punished for being bad unless he is guilty 
of rebellion. Where the Catholic faith has been preached in a Christian manner and as it 
ought to be, all men are bound by the natural law to accept it, yet no one is forced to 
accept the faith of Christ. No one is punished because he is sunk in vice, unless he is 
rebellious or harms the property and persons of others. No one is forced to embrace virtue 
and show himself as a good man. One who receives a favor is bound by the natural law to 
return the favor by what we call antidotal obligation. Yet no one is forced to this, nor is 
he punished if he omits it.83 
 
Here Las Casas bounds all Indigenous peoples to universal natural law, just as Vitoria did 
before him, the Indian is not forced to become Catholic, but they may not stop the Gospel 
from being disseminated. If they were to prevent Catholicism from being preached this 
would render them rebellious, and, therefore, in breach of natural law. This illustrates the 
entanglement between religious authority, which was punctuated by the theocentric 
temporality of salvation regarding the production of potential subjects of Christ, and 
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secular authority inscribed by the political jurisdiction to rule over non-Christian lands. 
Consequently, Las Casas produced a hybrid religio-secular form of power by drawing 
from both Vitoria and Aquinas concerning the inherent right to spread Catholicism. 
 Aquinas’s famous Summa Theologica produced new authoritative exegesis for the 
doctrine of just war. For Aquinas, if the unfaithful were to “hinder Christ’s faith” it was 
that they be met with defensive force. Aquinas applied the notion of hindering Christ’s 
faith through such a wide scope that through the category of defense Catholicism could 
wage a perpetual global war against the theological-ontological status of unbelief.84 
Aquinas states, 
there are some who have never received the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews; and 
these are by no means to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may believe, 
because to believe depends on the will; nevertheless they should be compelled by the 
faithful, if it be possible to do so, so that they do not hinder the faith, by their 
blasphemies, or by their evil persuasions, or even by their open persecutions. It is for this 
reason that Christ's faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not indeed for the purpose 
of forcing them to believe (for even if they were to conquer them, and take them 
prisoners, they should still leave them free to believe, if they will), but in order to prevent 
them from hindering the faith of Christ.85 
 
Similarly Las Casas argues the pagan should not be forcibly brought under the yoke of 
Christian authority, and, like Aquinas, Las Casas does not broach reasons of unbelief as 
the basis for spread of Catholicism and defensive acts of violence. Rather, the very 
ontology of unbelief justifies the global spread of Catholicism – acts of vengeance are 
subsequently licensed through a defensive war against rebellion. In fact Las Casas 
defends Indigenous cultural and religious practices at various moments, even suggesting 
they are “governed by laws that at very many points surpass ours, and could have won 
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the admiration of the sages of Athens”; however, they are rendered rebellious if they 
impede the Catholic faith.  
This is not to simply suggest, however, that Las Casas was not interested in 
authentic non-violent conversions. I would suggest he certainly was concerned with acts 
of violent forcible conversion as theologically it was prohibited. Moreover, as I have 
suggested above, the use of coercion would generate inauthentic converts just as Spain’s 
conversos and moriscos: a locus of intense anxiety in Spain. Much like Columbus, Las 
Casas suggests that the Indian pagan is an innocent and childlike subject,  
completely innocent, meek, harmless, temperate and quite ready and willing to receive 
and embrace the word of God…And so what man of sound mind will approve a war 
against men who are harmless, ignorant, gentle, temperate, unarmed, and destitute of 
every human defense?86  
 
Representations of the Indigenous neophyte as harmless and ignorant noble savages did 
not generate a rejection of Spanish empire and the spread of Catholicism; instead, this 
representational matrix appealed to his mandate of generating authentic converts. As 
stated above, this placed these potential subjects of Christ in an impossible double 
location: accept the gospel peacefully, or, resist conversion and be constituted as 
rebellious agents preventing the Word.       
This is further confirmed through his various petitions and letters in 1517, 1518, 
1531 and 1543 for the introduction of “justly obtained” African slaves in the Americas to 
replace the dwindling Indigenous population and beleaguered Spanish settlers.87 In these 
appeals, and in his famous recanting, Las Casas was more concerned that acts of violence 
impeded authentic conversion. For instance, Las Casas reflected upon the first chronicle 
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of Gomez Eanes de Zurara’s Portuguese slave expedition of 1444 upon the west coast of 
Africa. Zurara’s accounts recorded the forced partition of toddlers from their grieving 
mothers and children from their parents, causing Zurara to remark with astonishing 
disregard: “the partition took a lot of trouble.”88 For Las Casas, Portuguese empire and 
slavery is not what primarily concerned him; instead he lamented about the potential for 
conversion. What sincerity, he queried,  
could they have for the faith, for Christian religion, so as to convert to it, those who wept 
as they did, who grieved, who raised their eyes, their hands to heaven, who saw 
themselves, against the law of nature, against all human reason, stripped of their liberty, 
or their wives and children, of their homeland, of their peace?”89  
 
Las Casas, writing in the third person, would further state,  
This note to give license to bring black slaves to these lands was first given by the cleric 
Casas, not taking into account the injustice with which the Portuguese captured and 
enslaved them; then, having discovered this, he would not for all the world advocate this, 
for he held enslaving them both unjust and tyrannical; and the same goes for the 
Indians.90 
 
For Lawrence Clayton, Las Casas’s moving words are apprehended as a passionate 
rejection of slavery and territorial expropriation. Conversely, I would suggest that Las 
Casas was not diametrically opposed to enslavement, imperial territorial expansion, or 
various acts of violent punishment. Despite his recanting of advocating for African 
enslavement, he remained resolute that the proposed slaves were obtained by just title. He 
rejected forcible conversion and was repelled by the violent imposition of the Gospel, as 
this would presuppose an a priori jurisdiction over peoples and lands. Rather, when “the 
Catholic faith has been preached in a Christian manner and as it ought to be, all men are 
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bound by the natural law to accept it.” 91 Thus, he advocated Catholicism’s spread 
through acts of non-material violence, in short, to spread the Gospel through kindness in 
order to produce a sincere conversion of the heart. However, one was obliged to receive 
the gospel and not prevent doing so, which would constitute an act of disobedience, or 
war requiring defensive punishment.  
He also discusses the legitimacy of destroying pagan idols, and states the church 
has no power to do so, stating,  
Christ did not give the Church power over the pagans to annoy, persecute, afflict, and 
arouse them to riot and sedition, and to hatred of the Christian religion, but (only the 
power) of gentleness, service, kindness, and the words of the gospel to encourage them to 
put on the gentle yoke of Christ…punishing pagans who worship idols is not the business 
of the Church since it sets up an obstacle to the gospel.92 
 
The central locus of concern Las Casas identifies in the above passages concerning 
breaches against the law of nature and human reason was preventing the potential 
neophyte from embracing Christ. I have attempted to locate Las Casas within the 
temporal structure of Salvation, with a commitment to an ontology of the human as a 
True Christian in relation to the theological political crisis of the spread of Islam, and 
obstinate conversos and moriscos. Through this reading, I would suggest that Las Casas 
was opposed to imperialism and slavery only when inhibiting the evangelical mission of 
producing authentic converts.  
 For Sepulveda, the idolatry and cannibalistic rituals of the Aztecs were not simply 
conceived as false, or demonic imputations of divine agency, but evidence of their 
inherent slave nature. Yet, paradoxically, as mentioned, he still conceptualized them as 
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subjects for conversion.93 Indigenous sacred practices were apprehended as crimes 
against humanity as translated through universal natural law. For Sepulveda and Mair, the 
Indian was drawn into the universal category of natural law and then paradoxically 
through this inclusion is conceptualized as being an intrinsic slave due to cultural and 
religious difference. Hence, the Indian is not simply excluded from the logic of universal 
reason, but is constituted as an unredeemable barbarous slave through its very 
coordinates; thereby indexing the aporetic universal-particularity of Christian European 
culture. As I will elaborate upon below, the convergence between increased competition 
between the Atlantic imperial nations for dominance in trade, epistemological shifts in 
apprehending time, and the increased privatization of religion would lead to Sepulveda’s 
conception of differential taxonomies of human difference to emerge as hegemonic 
principals. 
Despite the production of entangled registers of Christian theology, ancient Greek 
philosophy and jurisprudence within the historical context of emerging imperial territorial 
expansion, Hodgen suggests there were various articulations that positioned so-called 
savage man as sub-human, or a superior animal type. For Hodgen, travel writing 
regarding marvelous creatures of the New World challenged theological notions of 
difference represented through the category of the human. Hodgen states,  
In the first book on America, published in English in 1511 (or even earlier in a Dutch 
edition), the Indians were described as “lyke bestes without any reasonableness…And 
they ete also on(e) a nother. The man etethe his wyf his chylderne…they hange also the 
bodyes or persons fleeshe in the smoke as men do with us swynes fleshe”94  
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In fact, as Seth argues, we can trace representations of the marvelous and fabulous that 
continue to “haunt” the modern itinerary of apprehending diversity. Seth states,  
the relevance of the wild man extends beyond the temporal bounds of the Classical and Medieval 
world and continues to haunt the imagination of the Renaissance through images of cannibalism; 
the ideals of the enlightenment through representations of noble savagery and…the unconscious 
of modern men and women (the wild man within; the wild man as pathology).95  
For Seth, tales of monsters and wild men living on the periphery of the world widely 
circulated throughout voyage writings, poetry and political theories, and this has 
continued into the modern era. 
 Representations of human difference were heterodox and are not reducible to a 
simple logic of excluding Amerindian and African peoples from the category of the 
human in order to authorize imperialism. Rather the very notion of what registers were 
held to characterize the human was a site of uncertainty as well as intense debate and 
inquiry. As such, a clear and coherent self/other discourse was not deployed in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries – this would presuppose that a fully formed conception 
of European self-identity was positioned against an equally coherent representation of the 
Other. One can read Wynter, Hodgen and Anghie as illustrating that to represent a 
homogenous fully formed European entity before the colonial “encounter” took place is 
false; rather, their work illustrates that the New World was a venue for examining the 
fragmentation and subsequent coagulation of a contingent European self-identity – this 
process, therefore, was not based upon a linear trajectory. Going back to my initial 
argument in relation to Veracini, I suggest that a modular form of corporate settler 
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sovereign capacity, underpinned by “the settler archive of the European imagination” did 
not precede the colonial conflict, but was constituted through it. Put differently, a 
structure of sovereign entitlement was not produced by processes internal to Europe 
which then traveled to the New World in order to produce a distinct settler colonial 
formation; rather, it was provisionally fashioned through contested, negotiated and 
historically bounded processes of coloniality.  
The New World represented a site for the contestation of various co-constituted 
theological, juridical, philosophical and material registers – not the simple displacement 
of a fully formed homogenous European self-identity or sovereign form within a new 
geographical context. As I have suggested, similar to Seth, Christian theological 
interpretations conflicted with each other, for instance: Vitoria’s contestation of papal 
authority, and the debates between Las Casas and Sepulveda using theology, 
jurisprudence and Greek philosophy to authorize different conceptions of Indian 
difference and trajectories for Spanish empire. Finally, as Seth remarks aptly, the colonial 
conflict with the New World did not produce a secular European self-consciousness. 
Instead, by tracing various displacements and rearrangements of temporality, I argue that 
the metaphysical matrices of competing Christian theological interpretations were 
reordered, not excised, occluded, or overcome.  
Hogden suggests that Renaissance thinkers throughout the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries largely circulated the notion that cultural diversity remained 
traceable to the posterity of Noachian dispersal. Ethnological studies seeking to explain 
the Noahian origins of newly “discovered” cultural, religious and aesthetic differences 
proliferated and ruptured the commonly accepted notion of monogenesis.  For instance, 
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Johann Boemus, struggled to reconcile his collected works of cultural customs and 
manners with conventional Biblical exposition.96  
Boemus suggested it was Ham – son of Noah – and not Cain, who breached the Adamic 
lineage. Ham constituted a community that deviated from the original Adamic Christian 
path of divinity and subsequently devolved into wickedness and a plurality of reprobate 
behaviors as they moved across the earth. Boemus remarks that the descendants of Ham, 
having journeyed upon the path of uncivil and barbarous degenerationism have “hardly 
any difference be discerned between them and brute beasts.’”97 Hogden states that there 
are various moments in Boemus’ rather orthodox Biblical annotations that illustrate a 
discursive drift into notions of polygenesis, that is, plural moments of human creation. In 
Hodgen’s reading, Boemus articulates the possibility of three geographical zones of 
human creation: Ethiopia, Judea and China. Hodgen states,  
Manifestly, in this dual or triple implantation of the race, Boemus appears less the 
advocate of a theory of plural creations than the victim of that intellectual conflict which 
afflicts any transitional generation. Or, since during the earlier Renaissance many men 
could not make up their minds on this and related questions, he stands as an example of 
that uncertainly.98  
 
This “transitional generation” speaks to the contestation and production of a hybrid 
sacred-profane conception of man. Wynter argues that the discursive alignment of 
African peoples with the descendants of Ham would rearticulate itself with a conception 
of the “subrational Negro.”99 This again illustrates the double location of, in this case, 
African peoples within the theocentric structure of monogenesis: they are devoid of 
reason because they are not Christian, but they remain candidates for redemption.  
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I would suggest that what Hodgen reads as an “intellectual conflict” (also illustrated by 
Anghie, Wynter and my readings regarding the conflicting productions of African and 
Indigenous difference) can be understood as an aporia of redemptive colonial 
melancholy. This melancholic discourse produces the ontology of the Indigenous and 
African subject as necessarily redeemable due to the dominance of Biblical narratives of 
monogenesis. However, they were also conceptualized as inherently unredeemable for 
severing their lineage from the telos of divine provenance. Put another way, the Indian 
and African subjects were represented as being manifest from an originary Adamic 
heritage, and, thereby the redemptive temporal coordinates would locate them as 
candidates for incorporation into the Time of Salvation. However, through motley 
genealogical taxonomies, they were simultaneously represented as severing their 
Christian filiation thereby rendering them intrinsically incapable of employing a form of 
reason coeval with their colonial interlopers. Consequently, Indigenous and African 
peoples were represented as being natural slaves indexed by their repugnant, curious and 
ghastly cultural and religious practices.  
Therefore, I push Hodgen, Wynter and Anghie’s examinations towards reflection 
upon the aporia of a melancholic discourse with regards to the hybrid sacred-profane 
ontology of the peoples of the Americas and Africa. Paradoxically they were seen as both 
candidates for salvation within a reordered sacred genealogical temporal structure, but 
also seen as inherently unredeemable due to their lineage having resulted in the severing 
of the covenant with a particular representation of an original and authentic Christian 
heritage.  
Crucially, at this juncture, it was not a scientific, biological notion of race that 
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constituted the ontology of the peoples of the Americas as intrinsically unredeemable. 
This is because temporality was not yet universalized and generalized under the rubric of 
secular historical time in order to allow for racial taxonomies. Rather, discursively, 
thinkers such as Boemus drifted between theologically authorized notions of 
monogenesis and more unconventional notions of polygenesis – but still under the 
rearranged redemptive temporal schema of the Time of Salvation. This, I have suggested 
represents an aporia of redemptive colonial melancholy, which is commensurate with 
Wynter’s notion of a hybrid religio-secular production of human. 
It should also be mentioned that during this period there was increased 
proliferation of civic political discourse that conceptualized the hierarchical Chain of 
Being through social duty. For instance, Jean Bodin applied the Chain of Being to notions 
of citizenship aimed to discourage the idea that all citizens were equal.100 Within this 
social feudal structure, sovereign power loomed over estates that were comprised of 
several enclaves and each was endowed with specific qualities of purpose. For Wynter, 
the ushering in of this conception of man guided by reason is a result of a syncretism 
between a semi-secularized Judeo-Christian discourse of human perfectibility by way of 
disciplining the passions – described above through Mirandola – and man as a political 
subject of the state. Wynter suggests that the discourse of human 
perfectibility/imperfectability was now conceptualized in a modern form through the 
category of reason.101 These epistemological and material shifts would still be wedded to 
the neo-Platonic hierarchical Chain of Being, but, crucially, not yet “secularized” in a 
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modern sense through biological notions of racial differentiation, nor fully apprehended 
by a modern secular empty homogenous temporal structure.  
This point is important to note, as Wynter is not suggesting that the theological 
was completely evacuated by the emergence of the conception of rational man as a 
political subject of the emerging state. Rather, there was a reformulation of Christian 
conceptions of fallen man able to seek redemption through penance, as described above, 
such that man was now able to seek an entangled sacred-secular redemption through 
cultivating reason and disciplining his irrational nature.   
This redescription had, in turn, enabled the new behavior-motivating “plan of salvation” 
to be secularized in the political terms of the this-worldly goals of the state. Seeing that 
because the “ill” or “threat” was now that of finding oneself enslaved to one’s passions, 
to the particularistic desires of one’s human nature, salvation/redemption could only be 
found by the subject able to subdue his private interests in order to adhere to the laws of 
the politically absolute state, and thereby to the “common good.” This meant that the 
primary behavior-motivating goal, rather than that of seeking salvation in the civitas dei, 
was now that of adhering to the goal of the civitas saecularis.102 
 
This hybrid sacred-profane form of salvation would become embodied with the political 
subject subordinating his interests to the common good delineated by the juridical 
structure of the state. In illustrating these shifts, I am not attempting to trace a coherent 
and intelligible colonial “script” that every entity followed under a fully formed mantle of 
secular European consciousness. I have sought to illustrate above that scriptural readings 
would shift, in part, to deal with an ever-bloating ethnological itinerary generated through 
the Age of Exploration. I have examined how difference was apprehended through a 
complex and highly contested constellation of co-constituted theological narratives of 
Cain and his degenerate posterity, shifting to Ham and then supplemented with neo-
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Platonic and neo-Aristotelian philosophy in order to develop juridical solutions to the 
increasingly expansive Spanish and Portuguese colonial state.  
As a result, I suggest that the ground for the emergence of settler sovereign 
capacity was constituted through complex processes concerning the Judeo-Christian 
theological structure of the Time of Salvation in relation to the sincere conversion of the 
infidel Muslim and Jew, which then culminated with the Age of Exploration. 
Consequently, the antecedents of the “settler archive of the European imagination” 
cannot be presumed to have formed prior to and outside of the sacred temporality of 
divine redemption and displacements of religious authority to a religio-secular sovereign 
power. Instead, I have sought to complicate the assumed category of a European self-
identity that was transplanted to the colony through a structure of mimesis in order to 
generate a distinct sovereign claim.  
In the next chapter, I will explore the political philosophy of John Locke in order 
to interrogate the structure of coloniality and the colonial matrix of power. I will examine 
the intensification of competing imperial territorial expansion voyages and index the 
contested terrain between various points of enunciation of coloniality in the registers of 
Christian theology, mercantile economic theory, and the principal of individuated 
property ownership. I will seek to illustrate the contingencies, contestations and co-
imbrications of differing epistemological and temporal domains that prelude the 
emergence of a more coherent, but very much still enchanted European consciousness in 
the seventeenth century. 
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Chapter 3 
 
John Locke, British Empire and the De-Mediation of Extra-Human Agency 
  
 
In the previous chapter I attempted to suggest that the New World Indigenous 
inhabitants were largely apprehended through a discourse of similitude vis-à-vis the non-
Christian pagan. As such, difference was constituted through assimilation and 
resemblances – the pagan could become knowable through the culling the annals of 
sacred texts and the production of genealogical maps that traced their origin back into an 
Adamic heritage. Also, I attempted to suggest that one of the major conditions of 
possibility for apprehending difference during the Renaissance was the temporal 
arrangement of the Time of Salvation, which structured the world through theocentric 
frames. 
This chapter will examine the emergence of Locke’s labour theory of property as 
a constitutive process of coloniality. This juncture represents a key epistemological 
reconfiguration of the Time of Salvation towards a transitory period where we see the 
incipient production of the autonomous individual no longer completely immersed within 
a theocentric temporal structure. Liberal1 notions of the inward looking and self-
governing subject influenced by Protestant theology and the colonization of the Americas 
create the material and epistemic circumstances for evacuating extra-human agency from 
                                                        
1 I recognize that “liberalism” is a diverse and heterogeneous historical tradition, and I am cognizant that 
Locke should not be assimilated into the conceptual habitat of other liberal thinkers, such as Constant, Mill, 
Rawls, Hobbes, and others. As Talal Asad observes, “the history of liberalism in North America is not the 
same as that in Europe—or, for that matter, in parts of the global South where it can be said to have a 
substantial purchase. Liberalism isn’t located simply in classical texts, and of course it jostles with other 
traditions in the West.” For further reading, see Asad, Talal., et al. Is Critique Secular?: Blasphemy, Injury, 
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land: this marks a key moment in the constitution of the individuated subject no longer 
absolutely subsumed by notions of divine decree.  
I will examine John Locke’s theory of property as it relates to the formulation of a 
defense of an English style plantation system in opposition to other colonial maritime 
powers. Further, I will also examine how Locke, in order to authorize English colonial 
possession of the Americas, was also informed by the Protestant Christian notion of de-
mediating extra-human agency from land. I shall situate these processes of Lockean 
property acquisition within the decolonial frame of the colonial power matrix.  
To date, two main frames of analysis have largely circumscribed Locke’s theory 
of property. The first is the socioeconomic frame that situates his thought as an economic 
justification for English empire. This frame sees Locke’s theory of property as emerging 
from individualist property rights, capitalist accumulation and self-interest shaped by the 
relationship between mercantilism and incipient capitalist relations. The second major 
frame focuses upon Locke’s moral sensibilities shaped by Protestant theology and how 
his articulations of property are wedded to the Christian natural law tradition. This frame 
emphasizes Locke’s belief in natural law as a divine structure linked to the intrinsic will 
of God’s design, God’s workmanship that authorizes human equality, and the ethical 
commitment for the common good over the hording of individual property.2 On the one 
hand, the socioeconomic frame that suggests Lock’s theory of property is predicated 
upon individual self-interest and unrestrained acquisition of property and wealth. On the 
other, the theological frame emphasizes the divinely authorized natural law tradition of 
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bounding individual self-interest and accumulation to a moral duty of serving others and 
maintaining common grant.  
This chapter will situate the socioeconomic and theological registers of Locke’s 
theory of property within the colonial power matrix thereby offering an alternative to the 
notion that these two domains are in opposition. I will illustrate that Locke’s theory of 
property via the plantation model was, in part, produced in opposition to the dominant 
mercantile economic doctrines that shaped English imperialism as well as Spanish, 
Dutch, French and Portuguese maritime imperialist paradigms. However, rather than 
reducing Locke’s thought to an economic justification for the theft of resources and 
territory, I will highlight the constitutive role of Protestant theology in the production of 
his theory of property. Hence, I will not reduce the theological to a justification for a 
deeper underlying materialist motivation that underpinned imperialism; instead, I will 
argue these two registers are entangled. I will argue that Locke’s theory of property is 
dependent upon the de-mediation of extra-human agency from land, which is an 
epistemological pre-condition for enabling the colonial expropriation of territory from 
Indigenous people.  
There have been recent studies that have attempted to link Locke’s relationship to 
English colonialism and his personal involvement with colonial institutions (Barbara 
Arneil, Neil Wood, Herman Lebovics, David Armitage). While these studies have 
indexed Locke’s investments in slave trading companies and his bureaucratic role as 
secretary to the Council of Trade and Plantations, they have largely reduced the domain 
of colonialism to an economic materialist motivation for resource expropriation. 
Consequently, these studies have fallen short of elucidating the overlapping registers of 
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colonialism, political economy and theology that emerge from plural points of 
enunciation. This study intends to examine the epistemological underpinnings of Locke’s 
theory of property vis-à-vis overlapping hierarchies of power in order to help shift the 
conceptual terrain of analysis beyond the narrow registers of a purely economic 
justification or a theological one. I situate Locke’s theory of property within the 
epistemological constellation of what Peruvian scholar Anibal Quijano calls the “colonial 
power matrix” and what others refer to as the colonialty of power. I argue that colonality 
is central to understanding how Locke’s theory of property is generated from the co-
imbrication of materialist interests in territorial expropriation and from theologically 
authorized discourses of property ownership by labour via settlement, planting and 
harvesting.  
While I have outlined the importance of attending to the coloniality of power in 
previous sections, my appropriation of the decolonial frame is an analytical move of 
shifting the geo-politics of knowledge in order to uncover and trace the registers of the 
theo-political and ego-political underpinnings of Locke’s thought. What I mean by 
tracing theo- and ego politics is the contestation of Eurocentric notion of a universal and 
neutral epistemological frame that underscores much of Western philosophical traditions 
of the colonial world-system. Santiago Castro-Gomez names the Eurocentric practice of 
concealing the particular point of view and contextual systems of power from which 
knowledge is produced as the “point zero” perspective. This “point zero” standpoint, 
“represents itself as being without a point of view. It is this ‘god-eye view’ that always 
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hides its local and particular perspective under an abstract universalism.”3 The majority 
of Locke scholarship has neglected the locations from which Locke speaks thereby 
reproducing the “ego-politics of knowledge”, that is, a non-situated “ego” that delinks 
ethnic/racial/gender/sexual/theological registers from Locke’s epistemic positions. As 
result of this delinking, Locke is represented as producing his theory of property through 
a universalistic frame that occludes the constitutive role concerning the coloniality of 
power. 
Various theorists such as Walter Mignolo, Ramon Grosfugal, Gloria Anzaldua 
and Enrique Dussel, among others, suggest that every person speaks from a particular 
epistemological location that is wedded to overlapping systems of power – indeed Locke 
is no different. Nobody can step outside of the overlapping class, gender, racial, sexual, 
spiritual, linguistic, geographical and temporal registers of the colonial-capitalist world 
system that situate one’s knowledges. Dussel and others calls this situated and 
contextualized field of partial knowledge production the “geo-politics of knowledge”, or 
“body-politics of knowledge.” Accordingly, I am attempting to re-situate Lockean 
scholarship within the body-politics of knowledge that defies the ego-political pretenses 
that conceal the processes of coloniality that serve as Locke’s environment of enunciation 
for his theory of property.  
I emphasize that Locke’s theory of property and land ownership that unfolds 
through English and Protestant registers was universalized through the ego-politics of the 
colonial power matrix. The ideal conception of human subjectivity, land, and ownership 
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that Locke theorized was based upon a particular standpoint (body-politics, or geo-
politics of knowledge) of what Mignolo calls “the perception of Christian, White, and 
European males.”4 The geo- and body-politics of knowledge concerning Locke’s theory 
of property emerge from his experiences as a white/Protestant Christian/ English/ male 
situated within imperial and colonial contexts. Hence, I situate Locke’s thought within 
the unfolding of a larger world-system that initiated itself in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries (explored in chapter one). This larger world-system is underpinned by 
overlapping heterogeneous hierarchies, or heterarchies that has produced a structure of 
control and power of knowledge, economy, subjectivity that were regulated by the 
Atlantic colonial powers both in in their opposition to each other and in their exploitation 
of labour and expropriation of territory.5 As a result, neither a reductionist political 
economy frame nor a theological one can capture the multifarious social relations that 
produce entangled and overlapping hierarchies of power and relations of domination over 
Indigenous inhabitants of the Americas.  
 
 
Liberal Universalism, Coloniality and Locke’s Theory of Property  
Liberalism, in theory, is often held as having a universal and inclusive character. 
One only need invoke the categories of the universal associated with human equality and 
freedom along with social institutions that are meant to uphold these innate individual 
qualities in order to index inclusive liberal values and political visions. Conversely, when 
liberalism is examined as a historical process and political practice, it becomes associated 
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with the subordination and political exclusion of various groups and identifiable types 
based upon race, class, gender, sexuality and so on. One could suggest, for instance, that 
theory is often located in a zone that is free of violence and that the historical 
exclusionary outcomes of liberalism are the product of attempting to put theory into 
practice. Further, one could suggest that dubious political actors have misapplied the 
universal and inclusive thrust of liberal theory due to individual forms of prejudice and 
that liberalism can be recuperated by including those historically left out. However, 
various thinkers such as Uday Singh Mehta, Walter Mignolo, Vandita Seth, Sylvia 
Wynter, Denise De Silva, and others suggest it is through the very production of 
universality6 that forms of exclusionary violence are enacted and that liberal thought in 
particular unfolds as a constitutive feature of coloniality.   
 Jennifer Pitts, for instance, suggests that the relationship between liberalism and 
empire is largely debated upon disagreements as to whether or not liberalism has an 
imperialist thrust due to the values of equality and freedom being embodied in political 
doctrines such as the rule of law and notions of historical progress that necessitate the 
production of civilizing missions. Others suggest that political doctrines such as the rule 
of law is evidence of the commitment of liberal thought to the anti-imperialist principals 
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of self-government and universal human equality; consequently, the illiberal outcomes of 
European colonialism are outcomes of the failure to fully implement the universal 
categories prized by liberal theory by way of duplicitous ideology or intention.7  
 For Pitts, the first conception holds that liberal theory is inherently contaminated 
with an imperial logic that cannot convincingly provide reasons why many thinkers who 
are said to be liberal opposed European empire at various moments. The second argument 
that illiberal practices of imperialism do not necessarily link to a structural and generative 
logic of exclusion cannot properly account for why liberal political thought has been 
mobilized in favor of European imperial expansion. Pitts suggests that one cannot 
essentialize liberalism as either ineluctably anti-imperial or imperialist, but rather one 
must assess the historical contexts and political pressures that led to such deep cleavages 
concerning one of the most looming political issues of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, that is, European colonial expansion. Mehta argues similarly that an analysis is 
required concerning the relationship between inclusive theoretical claims made by liberal 
universal notions and the effect of exclusionary liberal practices via colonialism. For 
Mehta, the result of violence that can be attributed historically to liberal support for 
empire illustrates the ambivalence of universal conceptions of inclusivity. 
 Pitts makes it clear that she is not attempting to suggest that there is merely a gap 
between liberalism in its theoretical commitments and its practice, or that political 
pressure led to liberal thinkers abandoning their notions of universal human dignity and 
equality. Rather, Pitts suggests that liberalism should be understood as a practice – that 
the generative theoretical categories of liberal theory were constituted through 
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imperialism and colonialism. She states, “Liberal theory has been constituted by its 
engagement in politics, and it is an important if often overlooked historical fact that the 
creation and consolidation of empires was central to that process.”8 What Pitts is 
suggesting is that liberal theory’s foundational categories of equality and freedom were 
not constituted in a vacuum outside political relations, and, importantly, liberal notions of 
universality are co-constituted through colonialism. 
For Locke theorists, the issues of coloniality are most often explained by moral 
failure or the aforementioned limitation of putting liberal theory into practice. For 
instance, John Dunn states Locke’s relationship to slavery and land expropriation is not a 
product of any deliberate moral rationalizations, but rather “moral evasion.”9 Similarly 
Douglas Lewis locates Locke within a narrative concerning the impossibility of bridging 
universal human rights with practice, and suggests that Locke “affirmed a doctrine of 
universal rights but failed to live up to the demands of the doctrine in the activities of his 
life. His passions or self-interests came between him and his duties in relation to 
slavery.”10 These explanations, however, require the bracketing-out the constitutive role 
of colonialism in the production of Locke’s deployment of universality. As mentioned 
above, Locke’s liberal theories were produced as a practice through the registers of 
coloniality, not as separate processes. Hence, the positions that seek to locate Locke’s 
universal categories as separate from imperialism fail to recognize how the very 
production of the European universal human emerges through the colonial production of 
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human and cultural difference. As I will discuss later, Locke’s theory of labour, which 
presupposes the body as something owned by the universal human subject, must produce 
subjects that do not own their own bodies, and, therefore, are not fully self-authorizing 
human subjects that can appropriate the products of their labour. However, I do not wish 
to move too far ahead of the argument I am seeking to construct – at this point, I want to 
highlight that we cannot simply separate Locke’s liberal universalisms from the colonial 
power matrix, but rather situate them as co-produced registers.    
Instead of attempting to elucidate Locke’s whole theory of property in relation to 
the state of nature in this section, I shall outline the basic structure of his theory in order 
to set the parameters of the argument in this chapter. Rather than focusing upon the 
details of his theory of property, I am most interested in revealing some dominant 
epistemological and ontological assumptions of coloniality for Locke during this juncture 
in order to better trace the colonial power matrix. I will highlight two main domains: 
individual property accumulation and how theological notions of God’s common grant 
mediate it.   
Locke starts his theory of property with a theological authorization that God 
provided the earth to all of mankind through common grant and he ties this to a particular 
reading of Genesis authorizing man to subdue nature. Genesis 1:28 states: “God blessed 
them and said to them, ‘Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. 
Rule over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky and over every living creature that 
moves on the ground.’” Locke states in his Two Treatises,  
…it is very clear, that God, as king David says…has given the earth to the children of 
men; given it to mankind in common…God, who hath given the world to men in 
common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and 
convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and 
comfort of their being. And tho’ all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, 
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belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; 
and no body has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest mankind, in any of 
them, as they are thus in their natural state.11 
 
Locke, therefore, suggests that the earth has been given to all mankind in common – the 
main task he sets out for himself is to argue “how men might come to have a property in 
several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any 
express compact of all the commoners.”12 In other words, Locke seeks to justify private 
ownership of land despite the theologically authorized notion of common ownership.13  
 For Locke, one can appropriate what is held in common grant by all people 
through labour – this is known as the labour theory of property which warrants primitive 
accumulation. Locke contends that because a person owns their body, they, therefore, 
own the product of labour generated by the body (I shall discuss the importance of this 
notion of the self-owning individual later in the chapter). Consequently, a person can 
come to possess property from the common grant through the mixing of their labour and 
enclosing it through fixed boundaries; however, as a proviso, there still must ostensibly 
be enough property for others and it must be used and not go to spoil. As I will discuss 
below, this labour theory of property that is wedded to the fixed boundary/enclosure is a 
particular English ritual of colonial possession that was, in part, constituted in opposition 
to the other Atlantic colonial powers – each of whom each had differing prescriptions of 
colonial tenure. Locke states,  
God gave the world to Adam, and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his 
posterity…Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every 
man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The 
labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever 
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then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left in, he hath mixed his 
labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property 
(emphasis original) .14 
 
As Kristen Shrader-Frechette suggests, the theologically authorized starting point of 
common ownership of land is often missed by various thinkers (Robert Nozick, Sibyl 
Schwartzenbach) who argue Locke offers a labour theory of value in order to provide a 
general schema concerning the acquisition of private property. Others suggest Locke 
seeks a specific justification for unowned and uninhabited land; further, some thinkers 
claim that Locke’s theory of property is based upon arguments of social utility, 
sufficiency and merit of personal labour.15 However, it is vital to contest this Eurocentric 
narrative and stress that Locke was not merely outlining a process of appropriating land 
that was not inhabited through notions of social utility, or recompense for hard work. 
Rather, Locke’s task is a combination of two interrelated processes to authorize colonial 
possession. First, it is to extinguish Indigenous conceptions and relations to land in order 
to authorize his theory of property; second, it is to justify the enclosure of land via private 
ownership despite having clearly articulated that God has provided land for all “men” in 
common grant.  
Unlike various aforementioned commentators, who have reproduced a 
disembodied and decontextualized explanation for Locke’s theory (the ego-politics of the 
coloniality of knowledge), I will shift the geo- and body-politics of Locke’s theory of 
property. Hence, while my outline of Locke’s theory of property is quite brief, I will 
attend to the broader task of illustrating that his theory of property, while often decoupled 
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from its particular colonial foundations, is not universal, but became universalized 
through the coloniality of knowledge.  
 
 
Colonial and Economic Relationship to Locke’s Theory of Property  
Barbara Arneil’s seminal work locates the contextual underpinnings of Locke’s 
conceptions of British empire concerning the Americas within three main domains: first, 
the reliance upon of travel writing of the New World; second, metropole English 
economic political debates concerning the profitability of the plantation colonial model; 
third, establishing labour via cultivation as the basis for establishing natural right to land 
proprietorship in order to subsume natural law jurisprudence concerning prior occupancy 
held by Amerindians.16 As I will illustrate below, there is also a fourth register of 
theology that is a significant feature of Locke’s theory of embodiment and property.  
 
 
Colonial Travelogues and the Americas  
Linking Locke’s philosophy to historical and political domains opens up 
investigations into some of his personal connections with various colonial institutions and 
the constitutive role they had in influencing his overall thought. For instance, recent 
scholarship has discussed his financial interest in the slave trade including monetary 
investments in the Royal African Company and the Company of Merchant Adventures, 
which was created to develop the Bahama Islands. Further he owned thousands of acres 
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of land in the province of Carolina and was the secretary to the Lord Proprietors of 
Carolina from 1668-75, secretary to the Council of Trade and Plantations from 1673-76, 
and commissioner of the Board of Trade from 1696-1700. Locke also co-drafted with his 
patron Lord Ashley the Carolina Constitution, and Hermon Lebovics suggest that his 
contemporaries in England considered him as one of the most knowledgeable men with 
regards to the colonies.17   
 John Harrison and Peter Laslett have studied the books contained in Locke’s 
personal library in order to assess the role of colonial travel literature in shaping his 
thought of the colonies. They published the contents of Locke’s library and they listed 
195 titles concerning voyages and travels, 80 devoted to geography and a voluminous 
870 related to theology. Harrison and Laslett even sought to elucidate which books Locke 
may have read and consulted the most by examining Locke’s makeshift bookmarkers 
constructed from old letters,  
The presence of these markers shows that the work has been read and that something in it 
had to be remembered. Indications such as this, and all the evidence of Locke’s having 
actually read a volume, are commonest in his books of travel, exploration, and 
geography…Everyone who has had occasion to comment on Locke’s books has pointed 
out that works of this sort were the great strength of his collection. Here we can be quite 
certain, even without numbers of private libraries to compare with Locke’s, that the 
presence of 195 titles which can be called Voyages and Travel made it a very remarkable 
collection.18  
 
The majority of the travel titles were related to voyages made by European explorers to 
the Americas. From these travel books, Arneil suggests, Locke derives much of his 
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primary material for his notions of the state of nature and natural man.19 For instance, Sir 
Walter Raleigh’s History of the World, Samuel Purchas’s Pilgrims and Richard Hakluyt’s 
Principal Navigations comprised some widely circulated travelogues in seventeenth 
century England.20  
  The travel documents found in his library must be placed in their context of 
voyages sponsored for the purposes of spreading monarchal interest and Christian 
conversion of New World Indigenous peoples. For instance, Father Joseph d’Acosta, 
head of a Jesuit College who Locke quotes in his Two Treatises, states in his own Natural 
and Moral History of the Indies:    
The intention of this Historie is not onely to give knowledge of what hath passed at the 
Indies, but also to continue this knowledge, to the fruite we may gather by it, which is to 
helpe this people for their soules health, and to glorifie the Creator and Redeemer, who 
hath drawne them from the obscure darkenes of their infedelitie and imparted unto them 
the admirable light of his Gospel.21 
 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, Latin Christian theocentric sociogeny 
conceptualized Amerindians as “human” and possible candidates for conversion, while 
simultaneously, candidates for destruction if they impeded the spread of the truth of the 
gospel. The essential point at this juncture is that the travel books found in Locke’s 
library had a unifying discourse concerning the savage non-Christian character of the 
Indigenous subject that must be converted to Christianity in order to enter the domain of 
the theocentric conception of the human. 
 To take another example of a widely circulated travelogue found in Locke’s 
library is by Captain John Smith. Smith was one of the most influential English colonists, 
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his voyage and travel writing pertaining to the New World, particularly Jamestown 
Virginia, was instrumental for encouraging Englishmen to embark to the Americas. 
Smith states in his widely read treatise Advertisements for the Unexperienced Planters of 
New England or Any Where or the Pathway to Erect a Plantation:  
Many good religious devout men have made it a great question, as a matter in conscience, 
by what warrant they might goe to possesse those Countries, which none of theirs, but the 
poore Salvages. Which poore curiosity will answer it selfe; for God did make the world 
to be inhabited with mankind, and to have his name knowne to all Nations, and from 
generation to generation: as the people increased they dispersed themselves into such 
Countries as they found most convenient. And here in Florida, Virginia, New-England, 
and Canada, is more land than all the people in Christendome can manure, and yet more 
to spare than all the natives of those Countries can use and cultivate. And shall we here 
keepe such a coyle for land, and at such great rents, and rates, when there is so much of 
the world uninhabited, and as much more in other places, and as good, or rather better 
than any wee possesse, were it manured and used accordingly. If this be not a reason 
sufficient to such tender consciences; for a copper kettle and a few toyes, as beads and 
hatches, they will sell you a whole Countrey; and for a small matter, their houses and the 
ground they dwell upon; but those of the Massachusets have resigned theirs freely.22  
 
What is significant about Smith’s passage is the co-imbrication between Christian 
theology, land improvement and notions of possession. While Indigenous peoples are 
mentioned widely in this travel document as living in said areas of Florida or Canada, 
paradoxically, land is conceptualized as “uninhabited.” What Smith focuses upon for his 
logic of possession is the notion of terra nullius, that is, the logic of “empty land” that he 
suggests can be “spared” due to its abundance. Moreover, he provides a mocking and 
chimerical logic of consent via exchange for the “tender consciences” of the “poor 
Salvage”: a country in exchange for kettles, beads and other “toyes.” Particular 
conceptions of cultivation can account for this paradox of present-absence – lands are 
held to be possessed when “cultivated” and “manured” by Christian men. He further 
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authorizes the travel of colonists to the New World through theological license because 
God has commanded for his name to be known to all nations.  
For Locke, however, it is not simply a colonial logic of abundant uncultivated 
land, nor a justification of property tenure through consent by way of exchange mediation 
in the form of beads and kettles. Rather than gaining even a rudimentary form of 
fraudulent consent, as Smith does above, Locke enables property to be alienated by the 
labour of the self-owning body (discussed below in further detail). The main point to be 
derived from gleaning some of the texts found in Locke’s library is to emphasize that his 
notions of the New World and its inhabitants were primarily generated from an existing 
discursive tradition of travelogues constituted by a historical colonial archive of 
representations concerning the pagan savage. 
 
 
English Political Economic Debates: Mercantilism and the Plantation Model  
The second major contextual location according to Arneil concern Locke’s 
positions on English colonization of America that emerge through economic debates 
during the latter half of the seventeenth century in England. These debates relate to the 
opposition to plantation settlements from English proprietors and politicians who held 
economic interest would be best served by a colonial model that could yield faster returns 
on investment and not drain vital resources of the empire.23 Locke’s relationship with the 
production of colonial policy took place when various economic pressures weakened 
English interest in the mid seventeenth century. For instance, Britain sought to secure 
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resources in order to finance their ongoing mercantile and maritime rivalries with the 
Dutch, French, Portuguese, and Spanish.  
 Drawing from Mignolo and Dussel one can trace the historical antecedents of the 
English economic pressures vis-à-vis other mercantile rivals within a global-historical 
frame of analysis. For Mignolo, commercial trade circuits were emerging in the incipient 
mercantile economy as far back as between 1250 and 1350. However, he identifies key 
events that index the link between theology, imperialism and the justification for 
possession of space. First, as mentioned in chapter one is the Romanus pontifex bull of 
1455; the bull Inter caetera of 1493; the Tratado de Tordesilla of 1497, which, by papal 
decree authorized “discovered” lands to be allocated to Spain and Portugal. Finally, the 
Spanish Requerimiento of 1512 was read by authorities of the Castilian crown and church 
to Indigenous peoples of the Americas in order to license possession.24 According to 
Mignolo, “These bulls clearly linked the Christian church with mercantilism and added a 
new and important element: the right of Christians to ‘take possession.’”25 These 
proceedings, which link Atlantic commercial circuits with divine papal decree and 
territorial expropriation constitute the grounding for the emerging modern colonial-
capitalist world system and the beginnings of competition for territorial expansion among 
emerging imperial powers. 
Drawing on Giovanni Arrighi’s examination of the rise of the capitalist world 
system along with Mignolo’s analysis of the capitalist-colonial world system, I explore 
the interrelated processes of the subsequent erosion of the Spanish medieval system of 
rule and the simultaneous rise of dynastic states and colonial overseas territorial 
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expansion. According to Arrighi, throughout the sixteenth century Spain had a relative 
preponderance of power over other regional states. Spain unsuccessfully attempted to 
hold onto the eroding medieval system of rule through the Habsburg Imperial House and 
the progressively unscrupulous papacy. Arrighi suggests that Spanish decline led to the 
emergence of “compact mini-empires” such as the French, Swedish and English dynastic 
states through territorialist logic of imperial expansion. He further suggests that increased 
economic pressures resulted from urban and peasant revolts in states such as England and 
France concerning the sixteenth and seventeenth century transitions from medieval 
systems of rule to more “modern systems.” 26 He states,  
This system-wide intensification of social conflict was a direct result of the previous and 
contemporaneous escalation of armed conflicts among the rulers. From about 1550 to 
about 1640, the number of soldiers mobilized by the great powers of Europe more than 
doubled, while from 1530 to 1630 the cost of putting each of these soldiers in the field 
increased on average by a factor of 5. This escalation of protection costs led to a sharp 
increased in the fiscal pressure on subjects which, in turn, triggered many of the 
seventeenth-century revolts.27 
 
Arrighi provides some crucial links concerning the relationship between shifting modes 
of governance, social conflict of urban and rural populations and the resulting economic 
pressures of emerging mini-empires to intensify surplus capital through colonial 
territorial expansion via mercantilism.  
We can read Arrighi with Mignolo who links mercantilism and coloniality in the 
sixteenth century,  
…think of the massive appropriation of land by the Spanish and Portuguese, the would-
be landlords of the Americas during the sixteenth century, and the same by the British, 
French, and Dutch in the extended Caribbean (from Salvador de Bahia in Brazil to 
Charleston in today’s South Carolina, and including the north of Colombia and 
Venezuela in addition to the Caribbean islands). The appropriation of land went hand in 
hand with the exploitation of labor (Indians and African slaves) and the control of finance 
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(the accumulation of capital as a consequence of the appropriation of land and the 
exploitation of labor). Capital concentrated in Europe, in the imperial states, and not in 
the colonies.28  
 
Mignolo allows us to locate English economic pressures, which play a large role in 
shaping Locke’s theory of property, from within a global perspective of coloniality. 
Accordingly, the mercantile rivalries between the Atlantic powers was chiefly over 
control of the emerging global colonial-capitalist world system rather than simply a series 
of internal contestations between the “mini-empires” of England, Spain, Portugal, France 
and Holland over hegemony in the region.  
Placing Arrighi and Mignolo together illustrates that the emergence of the global 
colonial-capitalist world system, which was predicated upon a colonial-mercantile system 
of surplus capital utilization, brought the different rival states under the umbrella of 
imperial mercantilist principals, yet further fragmented any coherent European self-
identity due to the generation of intensive inter-imperial competition. As I will discuss 
below, Arrighi and Mignolo’s deployment of the category of “Europe” as a marker of a 
unified regional identity is problematic due to the intense antagonisms between the 
maritime powers.  
Having located mercantilism within global historical processes of coloniality, let 
us now turn to some particulars of mercantilism itself. Mercantilism, a set of economic 
principles dominated the commercial structure of the various maritime powers during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Mercantilism proposes the regulation of the 
nation’s economy by a centralized state bureaucracy in order to increase its power and 
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capital accumulation while weakening rival states.29 Trade with other nations, under 
mercantilist economic principals, should produce a surplus of precious metals that can be 
used for the depository of national wealth. Also, trade with the colonies must be in total 
control by the metropole and be structured as a monopoly.30   
The main vehicle privileged by mercantilist doctrines was the overseas trading 
company, which was used by the British, French, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese. These 
state owned companies that flourished in the mid seventeenth century were the principle 
entities that British metropolitan economic authorities felt should direct the growth of the 
metropole. The British trading companies were created by private brokers, but were 
closely affiliated to the state through joint stock capital, monopoly privileges granted 
through royal decree and state incorporation. This state-company relationship operated in 
specially selected global zones in order to make sure state power was increased through 
overseas trade for the direct fiscal interest of the metropole.31  
The trading companies and the British state comprised a mutually co-dependent 
relationship: the companies were held to be the most lucrative financial institution while 
the companies relied upon the state for military and political support for the extraction of 
overseas wealth and to gain leverage over other maritime rivals. As Eli Heckscher and 
Partha Chatterjee suggest, the British overseas mercantile trading companies flourished 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth century through a highly regulated fiscal-military 
nexus. As a result, many wars occurred among maritime rivals causing further 
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differentiation between colonial powers and strain upon the financial infrastructure of 
England.32  
This political economic background concerning the dominance of mercantilism 
and the protracted wars of competition between the British, French, Dutch, Spanish and 
Portuguese is important for various reasons. It complicates an assumed notion of a 
unified and coherent European self-identity that was in binary opposition to the New 
World. Rather, in the seventeenth century, “Europe” was only an emerging or nascent 
category and the different maritime powers each attempted to differentiate themselves 
through mutually antagonistic relations. Agnes Heller states, “The sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries were characterized neither by the unification nor by the 
establishment of a common integration termed ‘Europe.’”33 Similarly Seth states, 
“Europe as a confident, self-conscious, self-defining entity is an eighteenth century 
phenomenon, and hence we should be wary…of presuming the presence of such a figure 
in the sixteenth [and seventeenth] century.”34 The highly differentiated and fragmented 
character of the English vis-à-vis French, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese was further 
exacerbated by fractures in Christendom by way of the Reformation and antipathy 
between Protestantism and Catholicism. Theorists such as Seth, Seed and Heller suggest, 
therefore, that these fragmentary historical processes index the problem of representing 
Europe as a monolithic category during the seventeenth century.  
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 Second, due to the intense rivalry between the maritime powers, the political 
economic climate did not allow much space for advancing arguments, such as Locke’s, 
concerning the investment in the plantation colonial model. Arneil suggests that in the 
late seventeenth century it was only a minority that viewed the colonization of the 
Americas via a plantation system as the answer to the economic crisis facing Britain. In 
fact, the majority of Britain’s economic elite saw the prospect of plantations as 
contributing the problem and widely denounced Locke’s arguments. For instance, Mun 
wrote in his widely read England Treasure by Forraign Trade that support for the 
plantation model was a minority view, “This Position is so contrary to the common 
opinion, that it will require many and strong arguments to prove it before it can be 
accepted of the Multitude, who bitterly exclaim when they see any monies carried out of 
the Realm.”35 The main concern that the majority of those who opposed plantation 
colonialism was due to the dominance of mercantile philosophy; consequently, it was 
feared that the colony would become an independent entity and compete with the 
English.  As noted above, England faced protracted wars with the other mercantile states 
and mercantilism’s central tenant was that trade directly benefit the mother country. For 
example, New England was viewed as a renegade colony that was competing with British 
interest.36  
Further, the ability to maintain their military advantage against the Dutch and 
other navel mercantile powers was hampered by the Great Plague of 1665 and the great 
fire of London in 1666 which decimated the British economy. As a result of these 
                                                        
35Arneil, op. cit. “Trade, Plantations, and Property: John Locke and the Economic Defense of Colonialism,” 
593, quoted from, Mun, Thomas, England’s Treasure by Foreign Trade, Oxford, 1994 (1664), pp. 14 
36
 Veracini, Lorenzo, Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 101, 
from Faragher, Mack John, “Americans, Mexicans, Metis,” pp. 94-95 
97 
 
economic pressures, the Americas were conceived by the majority of those with interest 
in the vitality of English empire as an abyss of loss revenue and hazard. During the 
1670s, therefore, the colonization of the New World via the plantation model was 
ridiculed by British political pundits as an unattractive solution to the imperial aspirations 
of the nation, and hardly a solution to immediate fiscal requirements. The plantation 
colonial model was held to be inefficient and draining during a juncture when trade was 
conceptualized as the best model for capital accumulation.37  
However, for a small number, including Locke, the New World held promise for 
the expansion of the empire’s sphere of influence and to increase revenue needed to quell 
its pecuniary problems. Locke’s writing can be located along with English economic 
writers Thomas Mun, Sir Josiah Child, and Charles Davenant, who defended against 
metropole skeptics of the plantation colonial model, “Until the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, most of England’s politicians were opposed to English settlements in 
America, because it was perceived to be a drain on English fortunes.”38 For Arneil, Locke 
used his Two Treatises to support the development of the plantation model in America 
deploying supporting arguments from Child and Davenant in order to launch a robust 
defense of English colonialism in the Americas. Colonial policy was held to have been a 
particularly acute concern for Locke from 1668 to 1675 where colonial records from 
Carolina illustrate that he endorsed most correspondences between the Lord Proprietors 
and the Council in Carolina. Further, specific laws, such as the Temporary Laws of 1674 
                                                        
37Arneil, op. cit. “Trade, Plantations, and Property: John Locke and the Economic Defense of Colonialism,” 
593 
38Arneil, op. cit. John Locke and America: The Defense of English Colonialism, 17 
98 
 
that were hand written by him, and, along with his patron Shaftesbury, he wrote the 
Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina.39  
With competition between the mercantile powers fierce, England lagged behind 
the Dutch in trade with the Americas. As a result, the House of Commons in 1667, the 
House of Lords in 1668, and the King in 1669 erected various committees to examine the 
decline in overseas trade and for possible solutions. Prominent among the figures who 
offered the plantation colony and settlement as the best solution to generating wealth and 
trouncing the Dutch and other maritime constituents were Mun, Davenant and Child.40  
While Mun was the first to propose the plantation model as the most suitable form 
of overseas expansion of British empire, Child provided voluminous expositions aimed at 
combating the hostile majority of public opinion that detracted from the idea. Child 
suggested that the colony was not only economically advantages, but also provided a 
fertile location to deposit the underclass of England such as criminals, unemployed and 
morally defunct.41 Locke echoed Child’s sentiments and added a religious valance 
inscribed by the theological Time of Salvation to the proposition. Accordingly, Locke 
argued that the vast expanses of the Americas could resettle and redeem England’s large 
poor underclass. Arneil states,  
The vacancy of America…was frequently linked to descriptions of an overflowing 
population in England and the desirability for people to move from the latter to the 
former…Filling the land thus takes on mythical proportions in line with exoduses 
described in the first few books of the Old Testament.42  
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This sentiment that juxtaposes English social decay and a bloating underclass 
foregrounds Rousseau’s later discourse concerning the noble savage tradition (I have 
stated in chapter one that this can be traced to Columbus and Las Casas). The Americas 
would come to be increasingly represented as a space of redemption for Europe despite 
paradoxically justifying their imperial incursion, in part, by way of redeeming Indigenous 
souls. 
Child further argued that colonialism based upon agriculture was preferable over 
seeking to expand markets for the distribution of British manufactured goods, capital and 
labour intensive extractive industry, or outright conquest.43 Child’s arguments concerning 
the superiority of English style farming vis-à-vis Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish and French 
forms of colonial practice relates to what Patricia Seed names “rituals of possession.” 
Seed provides an important symbolic dimension to the political economic matrices of 
coloniality and allows us to further situate the emergence of Locke’s theories on property.  
What becomes clear from these debates is that Locke was a key figure in shifting 
global political economy from mercantilism towards the plantation colonial model. 
Moreover, his plantation system did not follow a linear trajectory, but was being 
produced through contestations and negotiations concerning colonial expansion. As 
opposed to a Eurocentric diffusionist account, his plantation model was not fully formed 
within England, in isolation from colonial processes, and simply disseminated outward to 
the New World. In the next section I will examine the third major register identified by 
Arneil, that is, establishing cultivation as the basis for a settler colonial claim of land 
proprietorship over the Americas.  
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Colonial Rituals of Possession and the Enclosure of Common Land via Fixed 
Boundaries  
 
Seed suggests that analyses of empire usually conceptualize the five main powers 
as a single monolith of “Europe” and that each of these nations shared the same imperial 
logic of possession over the New World. However, while the effects of death, 
enslavement, and expropriation carried out through acts of colonial violence can all be 
ascribed to the imperial logics that sustained their actions, they differed and had 
conflicting understandings concerning the discourses of “legitimate possession” over the 
New World. Seed examines the differences in colonial notions of establishing authority 
over the Americas through rituals, ceremonies, and symbolic systems – what we can term 
“rituals of possession.” These rituals included lodging the cross, banners, statements or 
coats of arms in the newly “discovered” land; moreover, there were procession marches, 
speeches, map sketches and handling the soil. Each act corresponded to a symbolic 
process concerning attempts to establish “legitimate authority” in order to acquire land in 
the New World.  She argues these rituals of possession emerge through common national 
traditions related to the shared cultural practices of everyday life; language systems that 
constitute social meaning; and legal codes that provide the basis to authorize colonial 
ownership.44 Because each colonial power had a particular and shifting configuration of 
these national traditions, each colonial power articulated and substantiated the manner in 
which they felt possession could acquire legitimate license. Seed states,  
While all Europeans aimed to establish their right to rule the New World, their means 
differed substantially…What Europeans shared was a common technological and 
ecological platform – trans-Atlantic ships bearing crossbows, cannon, harquebuses, 
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horses, siege warfare, and disease, but they did not share a common understanding of 
even the political objectives of military action.45 
 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, fierce debates and conflicts between each 
power centred on discursive assumptions concerning the validity of their own cultural 
and legal traditions that were used to authorize colonial tenure. By examining some of the 
differences between the English, Dutch, Spanish, French and Portuguese authorizing 
discourses of possession over the Americas, I intend to provide further context 
concerning how English arguments for colonial possession via agriculture espoused by 
Mun, Child, Davinant and Locke emerges as a critique of the competing maritime 
powers. Seed’s notion of the particular systems of enacting colonial possession also adds 
an important dimension to Mignolo and Arrighi’s work mentioned above, who sometimes 
collapse the specificity of colonial notions of possession by their focus upon the 
constitution of the emergence of larger colonial-capitalist world system.  
 The English rituals of possession can be gleaned from reports from Plymouth, 
Massachusetts and Jamestown, Virginia in the early seventeenth century.46 For instance, 
William Bradford and other settler accounts from the English describe the act of gazing 
upon the new land and subsequently deciding where to build a dwelling. This seemingly 
innocuous act of building a house, fence boundary or gardens in addition to planting and 
harvesting crops from cleared landscapes was the means through which the English 
generated their “authority” to possess land in the New World. These acts of establishing 
political license over space through the production of houses and planting are not 
insignificant because it contrasts with the Spanish, French, Portuguese and Dutch 
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methods that deployed distinct symbolic acts of possession such as speeches, written 
pronouncements and symbolic forms of consent.   
 The French, for instance, engaged in an elaborate set of Catholic religious acts 
including the planting of the cross and a carefully choreographed procession marches 
while hymns were chanted. What made the French ritual of possession unique for Seed 
was the emphasis upon gaining some element of “permission” or “consent” from the 
Indigenous inhabitants.47 In order to secure consent, the French would hold their intricate 
participatory ceremonies, drawing Indigenous inhabitants into the production of the 
religious rites in the seventeenth century from the mouth of the Amazon, Brazil, 
Guadeloupe, Martinique Florida, Canada, and so on.48  
For Seed, the emphasis upon elaborate performative acts of possession that 
contrasted with the English rituals of building fixed dwellings and erecting boundaries by 
fence and garden to establish possessive authority are rooted in French understandings of 
the concept of the ceremony. Unlike other European languages, the French word 
ceremony relates directly to the notion of a complex performance of a parade or 
procession. Seed goes onto to link the relationship of the ceremony to French displays of 
power: the entrance of the King through ceremony and monarchical sanctification of the 
powers of ecclesiastical authorities, bureaucratic bodies and to inaugurate new masters of 
guilds.49 Significant to this display of power was the new political ruler gaining tacit 
consent from the gestures, body language and verbal cues from the surrounding crowd. 
Hence, in Seed’s reading, the French assumed that Indigenous consent of French 
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dominion was secured through similar acts of verbal and somatic gestures of 
participation.50 
 The Portuguese, on the other hand, did not seek to gain “consent” of Indigenous 
inhabitants through participatory ritual performances as did the French or arguably the 
Spanish, nor did they focus upon the fixed dwelling and enclosure as did the English. 
Instead, as I alluded to in chapter one, the Portuguese appropriation of Arabic 
navigational knowledge allowed them to produce complex calculations for determining 
sea routes and the precise location of lands “discovered.” For instance, when the 
Portuguese landed upon the coast of Brazil in April 1500, they did not enact any 
performative ritual of possession involving enclosures or Indigenous participation. 
Rather, a letter was penned to the King concerning newly “discovered land” while a 
record was taken of the height of the midday sun as well as the longitudinal and 
latitudinal coordinates.51  
The Portuguese claims, repeatedly voiced in international conflicts, that they had a right 
to a commercial monopoly on the seaborne trade with the new lands was an explicit 
claim that because of their vast expenditures on developing the science and technology of 
high-seas navigation, they had a just right to compensation. 
Other competing powers were unwilling to accept Portuguese claims for a monopoly on 
sea routes in exchange for their discovery.52  
 
While the Portuguese attempted to patent their sea routes via appropriating Arab 
navigational technologies and knowledges, the Dutch followed closely by enacting 
colonial possession via sailing to a location rather than landing there.53 Because much of 
Dutch capital was closely linked to the Portuguese through long established commercial 
business linkages, the Dutch also appropriated navigational expertise and commercial 
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stratagems from the Portuguese.54 Consequently, the Dutch rarely sailed across lands 
untrammeled by other maritime entities; instead, they often sailed to accessible lands 
largely ill defined or poorly understood by others in the seventeenth century. Following 
suit from the Portuguese, the Dutch overseas mercantile companies regarded trading 
routes and navigational circuits as proprietary due to notions of labour and capital 
investment evidenced by Dutch officials prohibiting the disclosure of their navigational 
routes.55  
 Finally, the Spanish ritual acts of possession were distinct from the English, 
French, Portuguese and Dutch. V.Y. Mudimbe outlines various symbolic acts including 
the verbal declaration of the Requirement, which Indigenous peoples were presented with 
a rendition of Castilian Catholic conceptualizations of genesis and history. The end of the 
recitation calls upon the Indian “’pledge allegiance to the pope and the king of Spain.’”56 
If the Natives eschewed this pledge – inevitably they did, as they did not understand the 
language – it was considered legal to gain colonial occupancy over the terra nullius lands 
by force if needed. In addition to the verbal declaration of the Requirement, the Spanish 
also planted crosses, as Columbus did on his third and fourth voyages, others laid stones 
as Balboa did in 1513 upon the Pacific Coast. Further, others proceeded to cut trees or 
inscribed their bark with names, and drank from local water sources.57 Further, Seed 
argues that one of the main forms of physically enacting possession from the Americas 
for the Spanish, unlike the other maritime powers, was extractive mining operations.  
                                                        
54
 Ibid, 150 
55
 Ibid 
56
 Mudimbe, V.Y., Idea of Africa, Indiana University Press, 1994, pp. 35  
57
 Ibid 
105 
 
For Seed, the English act of possession via establishing houses and boundaries is 
related to the geographic typology and demographic registers of the village structure of 
English society that is not found elsewhere in Europe. The island nation is without 
contiguous territory to expand and has a long tradition of the village settlement that can 
be documented in some instances – such as Devon and Lincolnshire – to have established 
habitation for over a thousand years.58 This structure of the village system with fixed 
objects, that is, dwellings and demarcated boundaries established legal right to space 
under English law,  
[i]n addition to houses, another kind of fixed object also created similar rights of 
possession and ownership. By fixing a boundary, such as a hedge around fields, together 
with some kind of activity demonstrating use (or intent to use, i.e., clearing the land), 
anyone could establish a legal right to apparently unused land. As with the house, 
mundane activity rather than permission, ceremonies, written declarations created 
ownership. The ordinary object – house, fence or other boundary marker – signified 
ownership.59 
 
The object boundary was a normative model of enclosure and ownership by English 
colonizers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and comprised some of the first laws 
passed in the colonies. For instance, the Rhode Island Quarter Court in 1639 passed legal 
ordinance for fences, hedges, posts or rails in addition to harvesting corn to establish 
legal boundary. Also, some of the first laws passed in Virginia concerned the production 
of fenced enclosures in the Virginia assembly in 1623 and was reiterated in the legislature 
in 1632, 1642 and 1646 and even included specified heights of four and a half feet. 
Similar legal requirements for fixed objects that established ownership was passed in the 
Connecticut River valley and in the Maryland colony.60 Seed further relates the 
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relationship to planting and sowing crops to theological arguments generated from 
biblical readings – I will discuss the theological registers of Locke’s thought specifically 
below.   
There are some problems with Seed’s thesis. The first is that her account of rituals 
of possession suffers from a Eurocentric form of diffusionism. Consequently, English 
acts of possession become centralized around a logic of “first in Europe and then 
outward”, which is a variation of the linear, progressive temporality of historicism 
(discussed further in chapter four). Historicism positions Europe as the centre and 
presumes that internal events and processes that are unique to Europe – however 
indeterminate the boundaries are conceptualized – are disseminated throughout the world. 
The chronological and geographical logic of the global diffusionist paradigm locates 
Europe as the autonomous centre that encounters, negotiates, and neutralizes difference.61 
Moreover, Eurocentric historicism occludes the constitutive role of the diverse 
knowledges and cosmologies that were appropriated and absorbed into the making of the 
colonial-capitalist world system.62 Seed, therefore, fails to account for the various acts of 
appropriation of Indigenous knowledge systems concerning relationships with land. Seed 
does attempt to illustrate the cross fertilization of knowledge by way of highlighting 
Portuguese appropriation of Arabic navigational knowledges and technologies, but 
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unfortunately produces a very problematic Orientalist reading of Spanish appropriation of 
Islamic notions of Jihad.63 
Second, Seed’s account concerning the English national tradition of the village 
system established through the fixed boundary to establish political authority contrasts 
with Arneil’s account of the fierce opposition towards the plantation system by the 
English establishment. If land ownership established through the English style village 
were part of the dominant cultural ethos and semiotic structure in England, it would seem 
unlikely that the opposition to Mun, Child, Davenant and Locke would be so pronounced. 
However, the two explanations can be reconciled, perhaps, by suggesting that while 
mercantile economic doctrine set the dominant agenda for the method of overseas capital 
accumulation, the fixed dwelling and boundary characterize the particular localized 
rituals of possession. Moreover, the particular English style of establishing authority over 
the New World was assumed to be superior and used by the proponents of the plantation 
against Spanish, French, Dutch and Portuguese discourses of possession. Let us now 
move back to how some of Locke’s contemporaries framed these other ritual acts of 
colonial possession by the rival maritime mercantile powers.  
 Child argued that the methods of possession via trade, mining or conquest were 
inferior to the plantation based upon English style agricultural practices. For instance, he 
criticized the Dutch for their warlike posture and emphasis upon trade and the building of 
castles upon the coast in order to secure exclusive trading rights within the conquered 
space, and, further, for not making any improvements to the land by planting. Moreover, 
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he lambasted the French for not making any discernable progress by planting and sowing 
crops, and, also he attacked the Spanish declaring, “The English…have cleared and 
improved fifty plantations for one, and built as many houses for one the Spaniards have 
built.”64  
The Spanish emphasis upon surveying large areas of land in order to establish 
extractive mining projects was not conceptualized as beneficial to the national interests, 
but rather primarily served private capital gain. Also, grazing large sections of land and 
grazing cattle by was discouraged because it was seen to facilitate inter-colonial trading 
networks within the Americas itself rather than promote trade between the metropole and 
the colony.65 Child and other English merchants employed within the farming sector 
argued that the establishment of export structures between the Americas and England 
would facilitate the growth of the navel and shipping capacities and therefore create more 
jobs and dependency networks than other models of labour. Child states,  
The Spaniards' intense and singular industry in their mines for gold and silver ... doth 
cause them to neglect in great measure cultivating of the earth ... which might give 
employment to a greater navy, as well as sustenance to a far greater number of people by 
sea and land.66  
 
Davenant, who argued that tilling and planting was the only form of securing legitimate 
title of possession, further supported Child’s economic arguments for the plantation. In 
developing his support for the plantation model, he juxtaposed the English with the 
despotic Muslim Turk for establishing title through conquest rather than through “Arts of 
Peace”, and further suggested that the search for gold undermined the vitality of the 
                                                        
64Arneil, op. cit. “Trade, Plantations, and Property: John Locke and the Economic Defense of Colonialism,” 
599 
65
 Ibid 
66
 Ibid, 600, quoted from Child, Josiah, A New Discourse on Trade, London, 1804, pp. 184 
109 
 
empire.67 Moreover, like Child, Davenant argued for the tilling and planting of land as 
the optimal form of labour to insure the dependency of the colony and to limit the colony 
from competing with England. He argued,  
Tis true, if in New England or in other Parts there, they should pretend to set up 
Manufactures, and to cloath, as well as feed their Neighbours, their nearness, and low 
Price, would give 'em such Advantages over this Nation, as might prove of pernicious 
Consequence; but this Fear seems very remote, because new Inhabitants, especially in a 
large Extent of Country, find their Accompt better, in Rearing Cattle, Tilling the Earth, 
clearing it of Woods, making Fences, and by erecting Necessary Buildings, than in 
setting up of Manufacture.68 
 
We see in the later section of the passage Davenant’s conceptual location with English 
discourses of possession, that is, the production of the fixed boundary by fences, erecting 
building and tilling land. Davenant articulated the distinction of English discourses of 
land proprietorship in opposition to other colonial modes of possession and production by 
way of setting up zones of manufacture that do not benefit the mother country. Similarly, 
Locke focused particular attention to Spanish forms of imperial expansion through a 
critique of conquest, railing against the disregard of human life and the failure to 
“improve” the land rendered terra nullius. Along with Child, Locke contests Dutch and 
Spanish forms of conquest that he suggests is based on a “strange Doctrine.” In Locke’s 
Some Considerations Locke states:  
There are but two ways of growing Rich, either Conquest, or Commerce…no body is 
vain enough to entertain a Thought of our reaping the Profits of the World with our 
Swords, and making the Spoil…of Vanquished Nations. Commerce therefore is the only 
way left to us…for this the advantages of our Situation, as well as the Industry and 
Inclination of our People…do Naturally fit us.69  
 
Locke would also write to colonists in Carolina, “Neither doe we thinke it advantageous 
for our people to live by rapin and plunder which we doe not nor will not allow. Planting 
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and Trade is both our designe and your interest and…shall lay a way open to get all the 
Spaniards riches.”70 As Mignolo reminds us, the condemnation for Spanish cruelty and 
greed articulated by the English cannot be separated from their own attempts to secure 
hegemony over the Atlantic, and the emerging capitalist-colonial world system. Mignolo 
states,  
The “Black Legend” of Spanish corruption, which the British initiated to demonize the 
Spanish Empire in a ploy to get a grip on the Atlantic economy during the seventeenth 
century, was part of a European family feud over the economic, political, and intellectual 
(in the general sense of accumulation and control of knowledge, including science and 
technology, of course) riches of the “New World.” Therein originates the imperial 
difference that would become widespread in the eighteenth century and shape the 
conception of “Latin” America.71  
 
Mignolo frames the inter-imperial rivalry as being directly constituted by the attempt to 
generate surplus capital from the expropriation of resources and labour from the overseas 
colonies. This analytical move repositions mercantilism from a narrow materialist 
doctrine of financial accumulation to a global project of coloniality that is also anchored 
by theological political registers supported by papal bulls of the fifteenth century.   
Over the last several pages I have attempted to provide a detailed backdrop of the 
broader political and economic landscape of the seventeenth century that helps us to 
better contextualize Locke’s theory of property within a frame of coloniality. Locke 
generates the right of possession via English notions of agricultural labour. As I have 
argued above, he develops his theory of property rooted in the plantation model in 
opposition to English detractors and in opposition to other colonial rituals of possession. 
Yet a closer reading of Locke’s Two Treatises suggests that his thought cannot be so 
centralized around a constellation of defending the economic viability and profitability of 
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the plantation colonial model. Rather, if we analyze his theory in relation to both the 
Indigenous inhabitants of the Americas and Locke’s religious commitments to Protestant 
Christianity, we can see how both domains inform each other. In the next section I will 
move to the fourth register of Locke’s thought in relation to coloniality, that is, the role of 
Protestant Christian theology in constituting his labour theory of property. 
 
 
Locke, Protestant Theology and De-mediation of Extra-Human Agency  
My argument thus far centered on the broader political context of travel writing, 
maritime colonial powers, mercantilism and the specific rituals of possession that helped 
to constitute Locke’s development and defense of the plantation model. Hence, unlike the 
French, Dutch, Portuguese or Spanish, the English farmer is the “’industrious and 
rational’ being that, Locke claims, God gave the world.”72 However, in the largely 
materialist account offered above, the theological and embodied coordinates of Locke’s 
theory of property is largely subordinated to the economic registers of colonialty. In my 
reading, the limitation of focusing upon the political economic contexts of Locke’s theory 
of property, such as the rituals of English possession via farming and the fixed enclosure, 
is that it does not adequately explain why Locke centralizes the body as the vital category 
for his labour theory of property, nor does it adequately explain the role of theology in 
mediating his notions of the body.  
In this section, I will examine how Locke’s theory of property, which emerged in 
relation to the generation of authorizing discourses of English colonial possession of the 
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Americas, was informed by Protestant Christian notions related to the self-owning body 
and de-mediation of transcendent non-human agency from land vis-à-vis Indigenous 
conceptions. This requires a three-fold process of inquiry into Locke’s embodied theory 
of property. First, for Locke, the acquisition of private property is centralized around the 
labour theory in which property is held to be possessed through what is produced by the 
labour of one’s body. The main ontological assumption within this formulation is that one 
owns one’s body, which, in my reading, is related to Protestant theological notions 
regarding the self-governing and inward looking subject. Second, and also related to 
Protestant Christian reading practices, is that in order to produce a direct relationship with 
the divine, it is necessary to de-mediate extra-human agency from objects – such as land. 
For many peoples, land cannot be separated from immaterial transcendent forms of 
agency related to ancestors and the divine (discussed further in chapter four) – for Locke 
land has no agency. Land was created by God, yes, but can be alienated for private 
ownership by rational individuals. Third, Locke’s production of the self-owing body 
simultaneously constructs a colonial representation that Indigenous people are incapable 
of corporeal self-ownership; they are not self-governing and hence not capable to use 
their body’s labour in order to acquire land. The Amerindian is permanently wedded to 
the state of nature and unable to move out of the past and into the future of civil society. 
 
 
The self-Owning Body and Protestant Theology  
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In this section I will offer an explanation of Locke’s notion of the self-owning 
body, that is, the notion of the body as property. Accordingly, I focus upon the link 
between Christian Protestant theology, the increased inward focus of religious belief, and 
the de-mediation of extra-human agency from land, which for Locke creates the 
conditions for the individuated self to emerge.  
How does Locke arrive at his unique conception of the self-owning body? This 
notion of the body as individual property has its lineage in readings of Platonic, and, 
later, Augustinian notions of inward reflexivity and care for the soul. Further, Locke’s 
notions of the self-owning body relates to Descartes notions of the mind/body split.73 As 
Charles Taylor reminds us, during the juncture of the seventeenth century, a notion of the 
self-owning body represented a significant epistemological departure from the dominant 
theocentric epistemological structure. As such, reason was defined through a schema of 
divine cosmic order, and, ontologically, the human was conceptualized as the property of 
God alone (discussed in chapter two). However, what we find in the work of Locke, and 
other theorists of the seventeenth century, is the emergence of a conception of the human 
that exercises instrumental forms of control over the self and the surrounding world 
through a discourse of partial disengagement from heavenly provenance.74 As I discussed 
in chapter two, before the seventeenth century, the structure of the world was understood 
through divinely mediated relationships between man and society. Consequently, social 
hierarchies in addition to the king’s power, ecclesiastical authority and the natural world 
reflected God’s perfection and harmony. This vision of cosmic order and unity, 
underpinned by the temporal structure of Salvation, underwent profound shifts – Locke’s 
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philosophy is constitutive of this shift. I shall offer a lengthy quote from Seth as she 
captures the magnitude of this juncture,  
What was once ascribed to God became the story of man. Possessed of little other than 
reason, man had to impose meaning…Intricately bound to this changing conceptual 
schema was the gesturing towards two future historical possibilities: the secularization of 
time and the reconceptualization of man as an individualized self. Precisely because the 
ordering of human affairs was estranged from the creation of the cosmos, the transition 
from chaos to meaning is a transition made possible only through the agency of men – it 
is a transition within secular time. Yet in this conceptual schema, man himself is 
transformed from the political animal of Aristotelian thought, which presupposed a 
natural order and meaning in the world, to the a priori individual who is predisposed by 
his natural reason to impose meaning and order on his world.75 
 
For Seth, Locke represents a key theorist in generating epistemological shifts concerning 
individuation and disengagement from divine provenance. However, while Seth suggests 
that these shifts take place within secular time, it is more accurate to emphasize that the 
seventeenth century represents a period of transition, or border zone, towards the future 
possibility of the secularization of time in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
(discussed further in chapter four). Hence, Locke represents a theorist who helps to 
produce a bridge between the theocentric schema of divine order and human centered 
agency – a transition that must take place within shifting and entangled registers of 
secular and non-secular forms of time. While elucidating the transitory temporal schema 
of the seventeenth century is out of the scope of this chapter, I want to emphasize that we 
cannot understand Locke’s theory of epistemology, property and embodiment without 
taking into account the entangled registers of temporality, theocentric conceptions of the 
human and incipient secular ones.  
Accordingly, Locke’s notions concerning the self and embodiment were quite 
radical for his time.  Concerning the body, he states:  
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Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a 
property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his 
body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he 
removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left in, he hath mixed his labour 
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property 
(emphasis original).76  
 
A crucial domain of Locke’s theory of property, therefore, is to be found in his notion of 
embodiment. In my reading, the notion of the self-as-property is derived from two related 
domains of his theory of epistemology and the Protestant notion of having sovereign 
direction over the self in matters of faith. For Locke, the notion of “no body having right 
but to himself” indexes a link between embodiment and Protestant Christian theological 
notions of powers of self-responsibility, individual consciousness, and sincerity in 
matters of faith. 
Charles Taylor argues that Locke is an important thinker in the emergence of 
modern individuated subjectivity through his focus and subsequent development of 
inward reflexivity and disengagement – Taylor examines Locke’s theory of epistemology 
in order to illustrate these processes. In Locke’s Essay, he argues that our knowledge of 
the world is the product of syntheses of ideas we receive from sensation and reflection; 
however, due to our appetites, socially embedded customs and education these syntheses 
are generated without legitimate grounding or conscious awareness. Consequently, the 
ontological grounding of these syntheses appears to be solid and natural, yet, for Locke, 
they have not real validity. Because these conceptions are the mediums of all our 
thoughts, it is difficult to question them and stage a process of radical reflection 
concerning their foundations. Locke states that knowledge, generated by custom and 
reflection often “have, by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and 
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height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak or those 
who hear them, that they are but the covers of ignorance, and hindrance of true 
knowledge.”77 For Locke, therefore, knowledge is not a priori, but rather is contingent 
upon socially produced forms of habituation and institutions such as educational and 
customary authority; however, through individual reflection the mind can suspend, 
detach, and reform them.78 
According to Taylor, Locke proposes a process of “demolition” through a radical 
form of disengagement in order to remove “some of the rubbish that lies in the way to 
knowledge.”79 Put differently, Locke suggests that one can suspend and then disengage 
from invalid forms of knowledge produced through the base passions, customs, and 
education so that true knowledge can be achieved. The significance of Locke’s theory of 
epistemology for Taylor is that he reifies the individual mind in a radical way for his 
time. Locke suggests that the mind has “a power to suspend the execution of any of its 
desires; and so all, one after another; is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine 
then on all sides, and weigh them with other.”80 The emphasis upon the processes of 
suspending, reflecting and demolishing preconceived notions as well as the subsequent 
reassembling of our conceptions of the world upon stable and genuine foundations of 
knowledge establishes the primacy of self-responsibility and individuated self-
consciousness. Taylor states,  
In effecting this double movement of suspension and examination, we wrest control of 
our thinking and outlook away from passion or custom or authority and assume 
responsibility for it ourselves. Locke’s theory generates and also reflects an ideal of 
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independence and self-responsibility, a notion of reason as free from established custom 
and locally dominant authority.81 
 
For Locke authentic knowledge is generated through a process of reflective self-
comprehension. His emphasis upon the role of disengaged reason and self-responsibility 
concerning knowledge emerges, in part, from Protestant theological arguments 
concerning a direct and unmediated relationship to the divine. As such, he was subject to 
the larger theological contestations of his time vis-à-vis perceptions of Catholic clerical 
authority, and their hegemonic grip over truth and knowledge. Seth states Protestant 
theology has a position of the “privileging of individual conscience, which imbued each 
Christian subject, possessed of reason, with the authority to gain access to and interpret 
the Word of God and his natural laws.”82 Consequently, Locke’s thought is constitutive 
of Protestant theological notions of personal adhesion, he states, “I have not made it my 
business, either to quit, or follow any Authority in the ensuing Discourse: Truth has been 
my only aim.”83  
For this reason, Locke often stages his conception of reason in terms of the 
opposition between freedom and bondage. His reading of Protestant theology emphasized 
that one cannot submit the inner spirit to the outward dictates of men – if one does, this 
creates a relation of slavery and not self-authorization. He states, for instance, “faith only 
and inward sincerity are the things that produce acceptance with God” and “liberty of 
conscious is every mans natural right”84 – in order to be truly sincere in matters of faith, 
therefore, one must have liberty of conscious. As we can see from the passages above, 
Locke’s process of individual self-remaking cannot be divorced from theological 
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domains because it remains bound by the limits set out by God through natural law – he 
remains situated in the tradition of theological voluntarism aligned with the natural law 
tradition of Pufendorf and Grotius.85  
 Locke continues to centralize individuated self-consciousness in his use of 
embodied metaphors of detachment. Locke makes use of thought experiments that 
attempt to illustrate that individual self-awareness is separate from the body. He asks the 
reader to consider the idea of a prince awaking in the body of a cobbler in order to index 
his conception of independent self-consciousness and individuated control over the body. 
Taylor states, “The stance of detachment generates the picture of ourselves as pure 
independent self-consciousness, which underpins and justifies this stance and is the basis 
of the radical promise of self-control and remaking it holds out.”86 Crucially, if we trace 
Locke’s theory of knowledge and individual remaking via detachment of self-
consciousness from embodiment, we can trace Locke’s conception of the body as being a 
type of vessel, or property of the person. In other words, the body, because it is separated 
from consciousness, can be conceptualized as the property of the detached self-conscious 
subject. Locke carries this notion of the body as property into his Two Treatises that I 
quoted earlier where he states, “every man has a property in his own person: this no body 
has any right to but himself.” 
Radhika Mohanram reads Locke’s conception of the body as reproducing a set of 
binary oppositions that finds its lineage in Cartesian mind/body split. While Mohanram 
does not deal with the theological dimensions of Locke’s thought concerning self-
consciousness, she, like Taylor, suggests that Locke represents the body as a static form. 
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For Locke, only consciousness has the ability to transmute the self and enact the process 
of self-reform. Accordingly, she notes how Locke represents the body through the use of 
atomizing characteristics: “particles of matter”, “one organization of life”, “an embryo.”87 
These notions serve to generate a hierarchy of the mind over the body, and, as a result 
allows Locke to conceptualize the body as individual property, Mohanram states, “The 
body has no identity on its own except insofar as it is property, functioning as object to 
provide subject status to the individual…It is in function in the interstices of ontology and 
political philosophy that the body becomes property.”88 
For Mohanram, the abject “poor body” without property – and I will suggest 
below the Indigenous subject and other enslaved peoples – is not capable of transcending 
the state of nature through self-conscious transformation into a fully individuated subject. 
Locke produces an ideal conception of comportment that underpins the ontological 
grounding for the ideal subject of civil society, that is, the individuated and detached self-
conscious subject. As I have attempted to argue, this maneuver of conceptualizing the 
body as property is not arbitrary for Locke, it is constitutive of his theories concerning 
knowledge and theologically informed notions of self-reform, and is central to his theory 
concerning the acquisition of private property. 
 
 
De-Mediation of Extra-Human Agency and Indigenous Irrationality    
 In Locke’s Two Treatises, he states that Indigenous peoples are “needy and 
wretched inhabitants” because they fail to improve the “wild woods and uncultivated 
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waste of America” by English methods of tillage and husbandry. The “needy and 
wretched” Indigenous subject is held to be irrational because they cannot undergo the 
aforementioned process of self-reform and achieve the status of pure independent self-
consciousness. Consequently, Indigenous subjects are not self-authorizing, do not own 
their bodies and therefore are incapable of appropriating the product of their labour. For 
Locke, the inability and failure of the Indigenous subject to acquire land allows the 
Americas to be constituted as uncultivated, unenclosed by fence or garden, and, therefore, 
rendered wasteland and common – terra nullius. Locke states,  
…he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen, but increase the 
common stock of mankind: for the provisions serving to support of human life, produced 
by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times 
more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal richness lying waste in 
common. And therefore he that incloses land, and has a greater plenty of the 
conveniencies of life from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred left to nature, 
may truly be said to give ninety acres to mankind.89  
 
The Americas were apprehended through Locke’s ego- and theo-political representational 
schema as terra nullius until the rational, self-authorizing individual appropriates it with 
his labour. As result of this maneuver, the Amerindians failure to cultivate land was 
conceptualized by Locke as a crime against God, because, as mentioned, Genesis 1:28 
was interpreted by Locke as a divine decree to subdue and cultivate land and domesticate 
wild beasts.90 Locke states, “… God, by commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to 
appropriate: and the condition of human life, which requires labour and materials to work 
on, necessarily introduces private possessions.”91 He further states, “God gave the World 
to men in Common; but since he gave it them for their benefit,…it cannot be supposed he 
meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the 
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Industrious and Rational, (and Labour was to be his title to it;) not to the Fancy or 
Covetousness of the Quarrelsome and Contentious.”92 In Seth’s reading, the Amerindians 
failure to cultivate land and leave it as waste indexed their “Quarrelsome and 
Contentious” nature that breached “the Common Law of Reason.”93 As I will argue 
below, this allows Locke to authorize unlimited English settlement of the Americas via 
the plantation model.  
 Indigenous conceptions of land become subsumed by Locke’s English notions of 
colonial possession, which include Protestant reading practices concerning de-mediating 
non-human agency from the material world. For many Indigenous nations, land cannot be 
separated from transcendent forms of immaterial agency (discussed further in chapter 
four). However, due to the ego and theo-politics of knowledge, Locke locates himself 
atop an epistemic hierarchy that privileges Protestant English knowledge and cosmology 
over Amerindian knowledge and cosmologies. Accordingly, Locke completely 
invalidates Indigenous sacred conceptions of time and space in order to render land bereft 
of extra-human forms of agency. Once again we see that while he suggests God created 
the world for common grant, Locke nevertheless conceptualizes uncultivated land as 
“waste” that must be subdued, enclosed, cultivated and ultimately privately owned by 
rational men.  
For Web Keane, “Protestant semiotic ideology” is a key site for exploring the 
invalidation of transcendent Indigenous life-worlds through the entangled domains of 
Protestant reading practices and European colonialism. In his study, Keane argues 
Protestant missionaries attempted to distinguish between the “true faith” of Protestantism 
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from the “false faith” of Indigenous traditions. Protestant semiotic ideology holds that 
rational human beings do not conceptualize land as embodiments of the divine, but only 
stand in for the divine through an act of human encoding and interpretation. Practices that 
encode the material world with extra human agency were contested as external 
constraints on the individual’s path to salvation. Through detaching from forms of 
external spiritual mediation, Protestant missionaries held that this would open up a vastly 
expanded vision for individual inward self-creation.94 For various theorists such as 
Keane, Taylor, Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood, Protestant hermeneutics indexes a 
modern formation of individual agency; however, as Talal Asad suggests, this does not so 
much “free” the individual, but rather put in place new forms of discipline and relations 
of power.95  
Understood in this light, Protestant semiotic ideology facilitated shifts in the 
conception of authentic spiritual life towards practices of detachment and re-signification 
of material mediation. While the genealogy of “Protestant semiotic ideology” can, in part, 
be traced to the Reformation and constitutive arguments of self-adhesion mentioned 
above via Taylor, we must also situate its emergence within the colonial matrix of power. 
For Protestant missionaries, the notion that land indexed transcendent forms of agency 
and as ontological extensions of the self was a false imputation of divine agency upon the 
material world. As missionaries understood it, to ascribe land with supernatural agency 
was a false and confused gesture because signs and symbols are arbitrarily encoded with 
sacred properties. Rather, as mentioned above, Protestant theology emphasizes a personal 
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and inward relationship with God that is not mediated by a clergy, rituals or other 
material mediations such as printed prayer texts, holy water, crosses, so on.96 
Accordingly, Indigenous cosmological practices that link land with ancestral and 
supernatural agency was held to be nothing more than confused and heretical forms of 
primitive fetishism.  
In Kean’s reading, Protestantism does not introduce agency, or individualism into 
a conceptual world that may have lacked them. Rather, he suggests that such a claim 
presupposes a dubious view of subaltern life-worlds before the globalization of Protestant 
semiotic ideology by colonialism. Further, he argues that the effects of Protestant 
semiotic ideology enforced through missionary activity is constitutive of multifarious 
historical processes – as I have argued, Locke’s conceptions of detachment and 
theological voluntarism. Keane suggests, therefore, that Protestantism generated powerful 
arguments for the theological value of agency by generating “correct” imputations of 
transcendent agency informed by self-conscious inward belief. He argues that these 
processes form a moral narrative of modernity, a type of script of theological liberation 
and conversion to authentic forms of spiritual life for both Christian Europeans and non-
Christian peoples globally.97  
 I argue that the aforementioned processes of self-adhesion and the de-mediation 
of extra-human agency from land converge in Locke’s theory of property. The 
entanglement between Protestant semiotic ideology and colonialism reorients land as 
bereft of transcendent agency and represents it as “common” and “waste”, that is, terra 
nullius so it can be cultivated and enclosed by the labour of the rational, self-owning 
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individual. The consequence of Locke’s colonial (miss)representation of land goes 
beyond a mere failure to take into account “the Indian’s perspective.” Rather, it is the 
epistemic violence of invalidating Indigenous forms of worlding and self-understanding 
that emerge through concrete embodied practices and semiotic forms of a given 
community98.  
In the following passage we see that Locke deploys a universal conception of 
reason and industry via cultivation in order to increase life’s “conveniencies”, and in the 
process invalidates Indigenous conceptions of human-land relations,  
…several nations of the Americans…who are rich in land, and poor in all the comforts of 
life; whom nature having furnished as liberally as any other people, with the materials of 
plenty, i.e. a fruitful soil, apt to produce in abundance, what might serve for food, 
raiment, and delight; yet for want of improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part 
of the conveniencies we enjoy: and a king of a large and fruitful territory there, feeds, 
lodges, and is clad worse than a day-labourer in England.99 
 
While Locke seems to leave open the possibility for Indigenous peoples to enter the 
domain of reason and industry by improving land via labour, I have suggested that the 
paradox in his thought is that the Amerindian is unable to do so. As such, the Amerindian 
is permanently held to inhabit the state of nature, unable to achieve pure individuated 
self-consciousness, and, hence, unable to remake the self into a rational individual who 
can accumulate private property and form a civil political community. Having subsumed 
Indigenous conceptions of land within English and Protestant semiotic ideology, the only 
possibility of human-land relations that Locke can image, due to his epistemological 
location within the colonial matrix of power, is subduing nature by accumulating private 
property and “convieniencies” via cultivation.  
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For Locke, the ability to form civil political communities by self-owning rational 
individuals is what allows one to leave the “past” of the state of nature and move into a 
new future horizon. The temporality of the state of nature is void of historical potential, 
because “historical possibilities are created by reason alone.”100 Locke then states history 
is generated by the rational self, “Person is the name for this self…This personality 
extends itself beyond present Existence to what is Past, only by consciousness; whereby it 
becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to itself past actions.”101 
Therefore, history itself is produced by civil political society inhabited by self-conscious 
and morally self-regulating subjects who are able to remake themselves and leave the 
static state of nature in the past.  
In this reading, Locke’s thought emerges through plural points of enunciation of 
coloniality, rather than any singular register. On the one hand, Locke brings together 
Protestant theological notions of detached self-consciousness, private property 
accumulation via labour, and, as a result of these processes, the formation of history 
producing civil political society. On the other hand, the Indigenous subject is put in an 
impossible position; they are represented as irrational by imputing land with false and 
heretical forms of supernatural agency and fetish rituals. Indigenous peoples are then held 
to have committed a crime against God by their inevitable failure to “subdue common 
wasteland”, that is, land rendered terra nullius, and transform it into enclosed and 
cultivated parcels authorized by Genesis and English rituals of possession. As a result, 
they are permanently held to inhabit the static temporality of the state of nature.  
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What emerges in Locke’s thought is theological license for English planters to 
colonize the Americas by rendering Indigenous peoples outside the common law of 
reason and as “Quarrelsome and Contentious” criminal enemies that can be destroyed by 
a just war if they resist settlement. Locke states,  
I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction: for by the 
fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible, when all 
cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred: and one may destroy a 
man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same 
reason that he may kill a wolf or lion; because such men are not under the ties of the 
common law of reason, have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be 
treated as beasts of pretty, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to 
destroy him whenever he falls into their power…Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but 
by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill…102 
 
By universalizing a conception of the human upon the axis of the industrious and rational 
individuated self, Locke enunciates his positions based upon the theo- and ego-politics of 
knowledge, that is, at the epistemology of the zero point that claims for itself truth and 
objectivity.103 Consequently, the Amerindian is not simply excluded from Lockean 
conceptions of the universal individual, rather they are constitutive of it – there is no 
industrious and rational individual without the irrational Amerindian that is incapable of 
industry. In this reading, Locke’s theory of epistemology, Protestant theology and 
economic interests for instituting a plantation model of colonialism in the Americas are 
not reducible to a “secular” economic justification for increasing land and labour 
productivity within the global circuits of capital accumulation. Rather, I argue the 
theological productions of the human partially unhinged from the temporality of the 
Judeo-Christian Time of Salvation were marshaled to organize the colonial expropriation 
of territory and resources from Indigenous peoples. Accordingly, Locke’s attempts to 
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classify, manage and control knowledge regarding human reason place him within the 
tradition of global linear thinking, which is the central logic of imperial designs for global 
domination.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Enlightenment Decadence and Coloniality 
 
  
In the last chapter I discussed the seventeenth century and how the philosophy of 
John Locke emerged through the coloniality of knowledge, that is, how Locke’s 
relationship to colonial institutions, Protestant Christian theology, and his theory of 
property formed plural points of enunciation for the formation of the global colonial-
capitalist world system. Rather than centralize my analysis around a monological 
materialist analysis that subsumed his theory of property to territorial expropriation and 
resource extraction, I argued that Locke’s thought should be understood within a 
constellation of four interrelated and co-produced registers; first, colonial travel literature 
concerning the New World; second, English political economic debates regarding 
mercantilism and the plantation colonial model; third, establishing the labour theory of 
property ownership for legitimizing English rituals of land tenure; fourth, Protestant 
theological arguments for establishing an individuated form of self-ownership in order to 
authorize the colonial plantation model. Hence, a central aim of the last chapter was to 
illustrate the entangled domains of theology, political economy, and philosophy in the 
constitution of coloniality. This chapter seeks to continue this line of inquiry into the 
early Enlightenment period.  
 In this chapter, I will examine the Enlightenment period of the eighteenth century 
through the work of Jean Jacques Rousseau, and locate him within the matrices of 
coloniality. I shall argue that Rousseau is a key figure of the Enlightenment because he 
develops a unique philosophical anthropology, account of history, and philosophy 
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concerning the origin of man and his essential nature. Rousseau does not attempt to trace 
the emergence of political society within the state of nature that was imagined to be 
located outside of Europe, and within the wilderness of the Americas, as Locke does 
before him. Instead, Rousseau concerns himself with a portrait of natural man that is 
devoid of reason and self-conscious reflection in order to generate a conception of the 
origin of man that is to be found within Europe.1   
 I will locate Rousseau within two main co-produced registers that unfold within 
the colonial matrix of power. First, I examine his notion that human nature cannot be 
essentialized, but is contingent upon social and political relations. He suggests, in 
contrast to the dominant positions of his time, that European civilization was decadent 
and morally corrupt due to factors related to (a) profound social, political, economic, 
aesthetic and environmental shifts that transformed Europe due to proto-industrialization, 
which I link to shifts in global political economy, that is, the shift from Dutch to British 
and French market oriented economics; and (b) the introduction of what he deems to be 
the morally corrupting “artificial” city established by the enclosure of common-land via 
contractual property relations and sedentary living. In sum, Rousseau reverses the 
dominant assumption of the time that modernization cultivated human perfection, a view 
that associated this process with complex forms of reasoning and conscious moral 
freedom. Rather, he suggests, these processes led to human degeneration. Rousseau 
juxtaposes a melancholic portrait of moribund European civilization with representations 
of the pristine natural living conditions and uncorrupted virtues of so-called savage 
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Caribs and Hottentots living in the state of nature.2 He relies upon existing colonial 
travelogues and missionary accounts to determine that savage life was a more perfected 
period in human history. I will illustrate that he was able to arrive at this position by 
relying heavily upon travelogues, structured by Platonic philosophy and Christian 
theology, which held that so-called savages of the Americas were derived from an 
originary Chrisitan-Hebrew lineage. Put differently, I will show that Rousseau’s political 
philosophy emerges from a Christian narrative of Biblical monogenesis interwoven with 
Platonic philosophy concerning the deviated copy and the perfected original. Europe 
then, according to Rousseau, stands as a degraded copy in relation to a more authentic 
savage that he represents as natural to the point of being subsumed into pure corporeality.  
Second, I illustrate that Rousseau relies upon Enlightenment natural history that 
was organized by the medieval theocentric Great Chain of Being. I show that Linnaean 
classificatory schemas created the epistemic conditions for Rousseau to examine the 
sovereign location of the human in the Chain vis-à-vis other sentient beings by focusing 
upon the unique capacity of human perfectibility. I illustrate these processes by turning to 
his distinctive literary and musical productions, which introduce a new quality of human 
agency that further dislodges the existing theocentric structure of divine will. Hence, I 
suggest that while Rousseau relies upon the metaphysical Chain, he simultaneously 
undermines it through his philosophical anthropology concerning the moral freedom of 
the detached, inward looking individual.  
 By excavating the historical genesis of Rousseau’s political philosophy, I show 
that he remains indebted to an entangled colonial and Christian theological lineage, while 
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at the same time subverting it. I illustrate that while he offers a criticism of “artificial” 
European society, which he locates as the source of human degeneration rather than being 
the result of inherent human nature, he ends up authorizing European colonialism. This is 
because he paradoxically suggests that the very possibility of generating the conditions to 
fully realize human perfectibility emerges through the artificial processes of 
modernization. Hence, it only when savage man moves through different stages of 
“artifice”, that is, legally sanctioned property enclosures and labour exploitation that 
he/she gains the capacity for perfectibility by willfully exercising agency and future 
oriented consciousness.   
 To date, two main frames of analysis have largely demarcated Rousseau’s 
political philosophy vis-à-vis colonialism. The first is the introspective philosophical 
frame that largely abstracts Rousseau’s thought from coloniality (Ter Ellington, John 
Lyons). Through this perspective Rousseau’s strident critiques of European society are 
shown to have been produced in isolation from colonial processes. Ellington contests 
attributing the “noble savage” tradition to Rousseau on the basis that he does not 
explicitly mention the term. This frame, exemplified by Ellington, suggests that 
Rousseau’s political philosophy was largely an introspective philosophical exercise, or 
“thought experiment”, aimed at revealing that natural man was to be found within 
Rousseau himself.3  
The second frame is a colonial one, which focuses upon how Rousseau’s thought 
is co-produced by colonial processes. This approach explicitly contests reducing his ideas 
of natural man to an abstracted analogue of Rousseau’s own self; instead, this perspective 
suggests that Rousseau relies heavily upon empirical ethnological chronicles, rather than 
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simply dismissing them or subsuming them into an individualized introspective exercise. 
Importantly, this viewpoint emphasizes that his political philosophy stands as an 
authorizing discourse for European colonialism (Jane Gordon, Vanita Seth, Nelson 
Maldonado-Torres). While the first frame is attentive to Rousseau’s engagement with 
travel writing, it largely circumscribes Rousseau’s thought as a contemplative 
philosophical activity. This reading, I suggest, essentially misses the second frame’s 
emphasis upon how Rousseau develops a sophisticated political philosophy that consents 
to colonial expansion and furthers the noble savage tradition – despite his failure to 
explicitly mention the concept.  
 In this chapter, I offer a position that largely builds upon the second frame of 
analysis. While this frame provides a rich and theoretically nuanced reading of 
Rousseau’s relationship to colonialism, it has directed little attention to the constitutive 
role of theology in his thought. This is rather surprising, especially considering how the 
theocentric epistemological tradition of his time demarcated the boundaries of knowledge 
concerning the noble savage tradition, natural history and colonial ethnology. My main 
contribution to the second frame, and existing Rousseau scholarship, is accounting for 
how his notions of human difference and perfectibility imbricate and rearrange elements 
of the metaphysical Great Chain of Being and monogenesis - registers that had already 
been undergoing discursive rearrangements in coloniality as I have argued in the previous 
chapters. As I will suggest, the epistemic conditions that allowed for Rousseau to 
articulate his particular notions of difference were contingent upon the particular ways in 
 133 
which theology was negotiated and became entangled with Enlightenment natural history 
and colonial ethnology.45 
 
 
A Brief Glimpse of Rousseau’s Origin of Natural Man  
 Instead of attempting to outline Rousseau’s whole theory of perfectibility in 
relation to the origins of natural man, this section will outline the basic structure of his 
theory regarding the noble savage and state of nature in order to provide a conceptual 
backdrop for the chapter. According to Rousseau, noble savages in the original state of 
nature are pre-social, self-sufficient and solitary; further, they are characterized as having 
robust physical frames, lots of leisure time and simply defined needs. They also exist 
without industry, fixed households, and are devoid of the capacity for language. He 
remarks: 
But the fact of the matter is that in that primitive state, since nobody had houses or huts 
or property of any kind, each one bedded down in some random spot and often for only 
one night. Males and females came together fortuitously as a result of change encounters, 
occasion, and desire, without there being any great need for words to express what they 
had to say to one another.6  
 
As the physical environment changed and humans multiplied, their posterity formed into 
community units via semi-fixed dwellings and they cooperated in order to procure food 
and other rudimentary living requirements. For Rousseau, language initially formed 
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within islands, bound by limited territory and resources. The resulting growth of complex 
societal arrangements – established through mutual dependence and language – produced 
early forms of love and elementary notions of personal possession.7  
 As a consequence of these early communal relationships, so-called savages 
started to conceptualize their basic relative worth in relation to others and non-human 
animals. In turn, this cultivated the desire of public esteem for the beautiful, the 
physically gifted, and talented artisans. These self-centred inclinations gave rise to other 
iterations of the base passions such as human avarice, vanity, and opulence.8 Rousseau 
observes,  
Having previously wandered about the forests and having assumed a more fixed 
situation, men slowly came together and united into different bands, eventually forming 
in each country a particular nation…people become accustomed to consider different 
objects and to make comparisons…Each one began to look at the others and to want to be 
looked at himself, and public esteem had value. The one who sang or danced the best, the 
handsomest, the strongest, the most adroit or the most eloquent became the most highly 
regarded. And this was the first toward inequality and at the same time, toward vice.9  
 
Nevertheless, empathy remained a feature of these “primitive” social arrangements and 
this established the “beginnings of morality” that were held to underpin human judgment. 
For Rousseau, this original state of nature was represented as the longest lasting and 
happiest epoch in human history. 
The more one reflects on it, the more one finds that this state was the least subject to 
upheavals and the best for man…The example of savages, who have almost always been 
found at this point of development, appears to confirm that the human race was made to 
remain there always; to confirm that this state was the time youth of the world, and that 
all subsequent progress has been so many steps in appearance towards the improvement 
of the individual, but so many steps in reality towards the decrepitude of the species.10  
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For Rousseau then, the emergence of society did not result in the improvement of the 
human condition; rather, it unleashed an arsenal of intellectual and self-centred emotional 
capabilities such as inventiveness, recollection, active reason and dynamism.11 Society, 
for Rousseau, introduced a unique valence of human freedom indexed by self-perfection 
vis-à-vis nature and non-human animals. Rousseau states that the rudimentary forms of 
human cognition and social organization held to characterize the egalitarian original state 
of nature withered into decrepit forms of self-preservation via property enclosure 
supported by slave labour. Hence, the characteristics of social development that were 
commonly assumed to correlate to human improvement were conceived for Rousseau as 
the cause of degeneration of the human into a tyrant – over nature and himself.12  
But as soon as one man needed the help of another, as soon as one man realized that it 
was useful for a single individual to have provisions for two, equality disappeared, 
property came into existence, labor became necessary. Vast forests were transformed into 
smiling fields which had to be watered with men’s sweat, and in which slavery and 
misery were soon seen to germinate and grow with the crops.13 
 
However, I will argue below, as much as Rousseau seemingly critiqued the excesses of 
European modernity and the principal of human enslavement, he did not extend his 
concerns to the reality of enslaved Native and African peoples that suffered as a result of 
these processes. Moreover, he paradoxically ends up endorsing the very model of society 
that he decries as the locus of human decadence and wickedness. I suggest this is due to 
Rousseau’s contradictory location within the colonial matrix of power. I shall now turn 
my attention to the body and ego-politics of knowledge vis-à-vis the Enlightenment and 
Rousseau in order to unpack these complex relationships.   
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Rousseau, Enlightenment and Coloniality 
In this chapter I am concerned with the political thought of the Enlightenment and 
treat it as a temporal category and as a set of practices generated over the eighteenth 
century. The Enlightenment includes a multiplicity of texts, authors, institutions, and 
sensibilities; hence, the Enlightenment is not a singular project, but rather represents 
multiple and often contradictory philosophical and political articulations. For instance, 
there are various Enlightenment projects, including French, Scottish, American and 
German variants. Further, from the multiplicity of political and philosophical thought that 
emerged in the long eighteenth century, there remained contrasting positions ranging 
from atheistic materialism, theological philosophy, romantic nationalism and enlightened 
materialism – each replete with different assumptions and practices.14  
Despite the diversity of discourses generated throughout Enlightenment thought 
and practice I situate it within the frame of coloniality. As I have stated in earlier 
chapters, coloniality is a frame of analysis that examines the constitution of the modern 
colonial-capitalist world system that while made up of heterogeneous ways of life, 
knowledge, and cosmological systems is nevertheless constitutive of a historical structure 
of the colonial matrix of power. Following the decolonial perspective, the colonial matrix 
of power brings together plural points of enunciation over the control of knowledge, of 
jurisdiction, and authority over discourses of gender and sexuality, and over the 
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classificatory schemas concerning people and regions, and over the validity of sacred 
systems and cosmology.15  
A key domain of the colonial matrix of power is the coloniality of knowledge, 
that is, an epistemic hierarchy that privileges Western knowledge and cosmology over 
non-Western knowledge and cosmology. This hierarchy of knowledge has been sustained 
by a formation of power that has a lineage of over five hundred years. As I have argued 
in earlier chapters, what emerged in the late fifteenth century was not simply an 
economic system of capitalism underpinned by the exploitation of labour and territorial 
expropriation for material interests. While this is a vital domain of coloniality, the 
constitution of the global system was generated though the colonial matrix of power, 
which by the late nineteenth century engulfed the entire planet, and is the foundation of 
the variety of historical colonialisms that emerged thereafter.16  
 In agreement with Mignolo, I suggest that the historical antecedents for the 
colonial matrix of power are to be found in theology. In chapter one I argued that 
Christian theology provided a theological grid of intelligibility to organize difference by a 
structure of similitude through the temporal structure of the Time of Salvation. Through 
this structure differences were assimilated into redemptive genealogical maps whereby 
the “pagan Indian” was brought into an incorporative Christian temporal structure of 
salvation. Subsequently, since 1492 with the fall of Muslim Spain and the expulsion as 
well as forced conversion of Muslims and Jews, the theological domains of the colonial-
capitalist world system has persisted and has been rearticulated; for instance, the 
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melancholia of coloniality indexed the representation of Indigenous and African peoples 
as paradoxically both redeemable and destroyable.  
The seventeenth and early eighteenth century marked an epoch of transition in 
which the conceptual schema of similitude underwent transformations to its conceptual 
architecture towards universality via the incipient emergence of individual autonomy 
partially delinked from divine provenance. Hence, this epoch marked a significant 
epistemological restructuring of the Time of Salvation towards the modern horizon of a 
universalized and generalized temporal arrangement marked by the increasing 
secularization of time and space. For Mignolo, theology was transformed via secular 
philosophy and the sciences by the Linnaean system of classificatory schemas and 
organizational principals.17 While Mignolo suggests that theology was “displaced” by 
secular philosophy and science, I argue that Christian theology was reconfigured and 
rearranged throughout the Enlightenment into new configurations of knowledge and 
points of articulation within the colonial matrix of power.  
One of the major consequences of the rise of secular and scientific rationalism 
was the ego-politics of knowledge, which takes a point-zero standpoint to knowledge 
production. In an attempt to contest the ego-politics of knowledge, decolonial thought 
shifts the discussion to the body-politics of knowledge, that is, the biographical locations 
of the agents and institutions that produced knowledge through the particular 
configurations and epistemic desires of mostly white, European, Christian males that 
were hidden and articulated in a universal language of Reason as opposed to theology. In 
other words, decolonial thought argues that Western epistemology generated through the 
frame of coloniality occludes the gendered, sexual, religious, ethnic, class and linguistic 
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domains that underpin its universalist articulations.18 As Maldonado-Torres observes, 
reflecting upon the spatial and geopolitical contexts through which knowledge is 
produced exposes the falsity of the neutral epistemic subject that speaks from the space-
less location of the universal.19 Conversely, failure to consider the spatial registers of 
Western philosophy does not simply reproduce conceptual blindness to the history of 
Enlightenment theory’s generative categories. Rather, it reinscribes a typology of value 
regarding European knowledge, cosmology and spirituality over non-European forms 
through the coloniality of knowledge.20  
Working within the framework of decolonial thought, I seek to situate Rousseau 
within the geopolitical and epistemic points of articulation with attention paid to the 
theological filiations of his thought. By doing so, this decouples his thought from the 
notion that he is beyond the body politics of knowledge, and, hence, outside the colonial 
matrix of power.  Locating Rousseau within the larger structure of coloniality highlights 
the ways in which his thought was produced through a theocentric Latin Christian system 
of apprehending difference vis-à-vis the New World and its inhabitants. The sources he 
relied upon were largely generated from several interrelated locations; first, a series of 
widely disseminated travelogues of explorers and missionary accounts from figures such 
as Sir Walter Raleigh, Captain John Smith, Captain Cook, Father Joseph d’Acosta, Father 
Labat, Michel de Montaigne, and Baron Lahontan, among others.21 Consequently, I argue 
that the intertextual citational practices concerning the New World were produced 
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through an entangled configuration from both theological and material domains. As Jane 
Gordon observes,  
Rousseau was himself fascinated by travel writings. He took from them profound 
instances of refusal; moments when narratives of the inevitable desirability of French 
models were clearly and publicly rejected by people who faced being or already were 
colonized. Still Rousseau was not able to move (at this stage) beyond critical refusal. 
Trapped in a singular Christianized classical teleology, the further one moved from 
originary moments, in this case ones that were only basically social, the further one 
moved toward decay.22  
 
Second, Rousseau was heavily influenced by the discourse of Enlightenment 
natural history through figures such as Carl Linnaeus and Comte de Buffon. These 
thinkers produced voluminous and complex classificatory schemas for locating all 
creatures (from sea-mermaids to angels) within the vertical scale of the Chain of Being 
that reached God at its highest and most perfected point (discussed in chapter 1). 
Rousseau remained embedded within the taxonomies of the Chain and within the 
accepted eighteenth-century system of thought regarding natural history largely derived 
from medieval theological categories.23  
For Rousseau, however, rather than deploying a discourse of human evolution 
through developmental temporal sequences, which would not emerge until the nineteenth 
century, he reversed the eighteenth century temporal schema of progressivism by arguing 
that “development” and “progress” were related to a future characterized by human 
decay. In doing so, he located “natural man” within a static temporality, a timeless zone 
of perpetual youth and happiness, in order to construct his political philosophy 
concerning civilizational degeneration. Rousseau located “natural man” above animals 
and below “full human-man” within the incorporative conceptual grid of the Chain of 
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Being. However, during this juncture, the Chain is simultaneously undermined and 
rearranged by the incipient emergence of ideas concerning human centred agency that is 
linked to shifts in Christian theology influenced by Protestantism (discussed in chapter 2) 
and Rousseau’s notion of the potentiality of human perfectibility.24 As such, I examine 
how travel literature and Enlightenment natural history, which are both indebted to a 
medieval Christian theological conceptual universe (discussed in chapter one), were 
rearranged and reinscribed within the thought of Rousseau via notions of human 
perfectibility.  
 
 
Political Economic Context: From Dutch to British and French Hegemony 
Before tracing the philosophical and theological underpinnings of Rousseau’s 
thought within the domains of travel literature and natural history, I want to provide a 
brief backdrop to the politico-economic climate of the long eighteenth century from a 
global perspective. My intention in this brief section is to foreground the structure of 
coloniality vis-à-vis global political economy. In the last section of the chapter, I will 
illustrate that the registers of political economy, political philosophy and theology link to 
Rousseau’s conception of human perfectibility.  
As I suggested in chapter one, European sovereign possession over the Americas 
was established by the notions of terra nullius; that is, the lands of the New World were 
rendered empty through a combination of theological license initiated by papal bulls in 
order to secure the spread of Christianity and ideas of jus gentium authorizing Spanish 
colonization. Further in chapter two, I illustrated how Locke was a key figure in helping 
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shift European political economy and European colonial possession over the Americas 
via the plantation colonial model. Rousseau does not play a similar role in shaping 
colonial political economy as an actor within key bureaucratic posts as Locke did before 
him. Rather, Rousseau emerges as a philosophical and political critic embedded within 
major shifts of the epoch, as I will argue, he shapes the coloniality of knowledge through 
his criticisms and support of the colonial power matrix.  
The eighteenth century marked a shift from Dutch maritime mercantile hegemony 
towards the dominance of market oriented economic models of coloniality by the British 
and French.25 This process began in 1651, when Britain challenged the Dutch in several 
naval battles that resulted in British domination of Europe and the global colonial-
capitalist world system.26 As I argued in the previous chapters, European interstate 
competition, intensified by the so-called “discoveries” of the New World and 
mercantilism, produced what Giovanni Arrighi named a “vicious/virtuous cycle” of 
imperial expansion. For Arrighi, three interrelated processes of settler colonialism, 
capitalist slavery, and economic nationalism characterize the decline of the Dutch and 
introduce British and French colonial-capitalist dominance beginning in the seventeenth 
century. He states, “All three components were essential to the reorganization of world-
economic space, but settler colonialism was probably the leading element in the 
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combination.”27 He further argues that capitalist slavery was in part a condition and result 
of settler colonialism because the “industriousness” of British colonists were continually 
challenged by limitations of labour-power, “This chronic labour shortage enhanced the 
profitability of capitalist enterprises engaged in the procurement (primarily in Africa), 
transport and productive use (primarily in the Americas) of slave labour.”28 
Over the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the “virtuous/vicious” cycle of 
empire, spearheaded by the British victory of the Seven Years War (1756-63), placed 
Britain as the world leader of the European balance of power.29 As Partha Chatterjee 
explains, while Britain (earlier understood as England) gained colonial control over 
extensive settlements throughout the Americas and the Caribbean for over two centuries, 
the terminology of the “British Empire” only entered the public lexicon during the Seven 
Years War when Britain gained significant overseas territories from the French.30   
J.M Blaut argues that it is difficult to determine the exact impact of colonialism in 
the eighteenth century vis-à-vis the volume of production, labour forces and capital 
accumulation due to limitations in quantitative data.31 However, like Arrighi, he suggests 
that the combination of settler colonialism and slavery underpins shifts in global political 
economy. And, importantly, he suggests the antecedents of this expansion are rooted in 
processes following 1492 (discussed in chapter one). For instance, over a fifty-year 
period after 1640 the West Indian plantation system expanded rapidly and over fifty 
thousand enslaved people were forcibly brought to Barbados alone. Moreover, over two 
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million enslaved peoples were brought to the Americas over the course of the seventeenth 
century.32 Key to this expansion was the sugar plantation economy, often referred to as 
the “Atlantic economy.” As Susan Buck-Morss explains, sugar radically altered the West 
Indian colonial plantations,  
Both capital and labor intensive, sugar production was protoindustrial, causing a 
precipitous rise in the importation of African slaves and a brutal intensification of their 
labour exploitation in order to meet a new and seemingly insatiable European demand for 
the addictive sweetness of sugar. Leading the Caribbean-wide sugar boom was the 
French colony of Saint-Domingue that in 1767 produced 63,000 tons of sugar. Sugar 
production led to a seemingly infinite demand for slaves as well, whose number in Saint-
Domingue increased tenfold over the eighteenth century to over five hundred thousand 
human beings. Within France, more than 20 percent of the bourgeoisie was dependent 
upon slave-connected commercial activity.33  
 
Caribbean theorists, C.L.R. James and Eric Williams are notable for suggesting that the 
West Indian slave-based plantation colonial model in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries was vital for the rise of British and French protoindustrialization. For instance, 
they argue that both European imperial powers developed the most advanced system of 
industrial capacity through a complex network of capitalization, international business 
institutions, and technology in the form of milling, rum manufacture, and transportation. 
Moreover, the immense labour force in the sugar producing factories and fields created a 
complex infrastructure of indentured labourers, slaves and plantation supervisors. These 
processes formed astonishing profits from sugar and the slave economy itself – what 
Williams refers to as “the triangular trade” in his book Capitalism and Slavery.34 Hence, 
both James and Williams suggest the slave-based plantation system provided most of the 
capital required for the genesis of the Industrial Revolution.35  
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Finally, Jason Moore suggests that in order to understand the qualitative shift to 
protoindustrialization, and the rise of the British and French, one must take into account 
the coproduced registers between land and labour, production, and power.36 He states, 
“any adequate explanation of this qualitative shift must recognize that there was a 
transition from control of land as a direct relation of surplus appropriation to control of 
land as a condition for rising labor productivity within commodity production.”37 
Through an approach of “capitalist world-ecology”, Moore provides an astonishing 
catalogue of the environmental impacts of imperial expansion, which he traces to the 
fifteenth century – from deforestation due to shipbuilding and the rise of fishing 
industries, for instance – in order to index the coproduced relationship between power 
and production in relation to the environment.38 As I shall argue below, these massive 
environmental shifts would deeply impact Rousseau and many of the thinkers that 
influenced him. These transformations in the natural landscape played a large role in 
Rousseau’s articulations of the perceived decadence of Europe and the degradation of the 
natural environment abroad. I shall quote Moore at length in order to provide a glimpse 
of the magnitude of some of these shifts,  
[T]he emergence of major shipbuilding centers and significant frontiers for timber and 
naval stores in North America during the 18th century; the relentless geographical 
expansion of forest product and shipbuilding frontiers were bound up, in no small 
measure, with the increasingly vast fleets of herring, cod, and whaling vessels that 
searched and devoured the North Atlantic’s sources of maritime protein; the search for 
fish was complemented by the search for furs, which had only a modest economic weight 
in world accumulation, but whose steady advance (and serialized exhaustion of fur-
bearing animals) across North America (Siberia too), stretching by the 18th century into 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Notably, Robert Brenner argues that unfree labour is not an essential feature to the emergence of capitalism 
through what Blaut refers to as a Eurocentric-diffusionist framework. For further reading refer to Blaut, 
Eight Eurocentric Historians (2000); The Colonizers Model of the World (1993), Guilford Press.  
36
 Moore, Jason W., “The Capitalocene Part 1: On the Nature & Origins of Our Ecological Crisis,” Fernand 
Braudel Centre, pp. 20 
37
 Ibid 
38
 Ibid, 11 
 146 
the expansive Great Lakes region, encouraged significant infrastructure of colonial 
power; the steady expansion of sugar demand and the exhaustion of Bahia’s sugar 
complex by the mid-17th century favored successive sugar revolutions of the West 
Indies, from Barbados in the 1640s to Jamaica and St. Domingue in the 18th century, 
leaving a trail of African graves and denuded landscapes in its wake; human ecologies 
too were transformed in many ways, not least through the sharply uneven “cerealization” 
of peasant diets – and the “meatification” of aristocratic and bourgeois diets – within 
Europe after 1550; the resurgence of Mexican silver production in the 18th century and 
the attendant deforestation of already-thin Mexican forests; the revolution in English coal 
production from 1530 and, perhaps most significantly, the epoch-making “Columbian 
exchange,” as Old World diseases, animals, and crops flowed into the New World, and 
New World crops, such as potatoes and maize, flowed into the Old World .39  
 
This analysis of global political economy is not attentive to the constitutive registers of 
theology, such as the fifteenth century papal bulls that authorized the colonial ownership 
over the New World and the souls of its inhabitants. Nevertheless, we can tie together the 
work of Arrighi, Blaut, Buck-Morss and Moore in order to capture the magnitude of the 
transformations that took place throughout the long eighteenth century and its 
relationship to the unfolding of coloniality from the fifteenth century.  
These dramatic shifts were not lost upon the Enlightenment thinkers of the time; 
thinkers such as Rousseau valorized indigenous peoples of the New World for their 
natural purity and natural landscapes in the midst of these social, political, economic and 
environmental transformations that were taking place. However, as Buck-Morss suggests, 
“the economic lifeblood of slave labor was not their concern.”40 Rousseau would 
passionately state in the opening lines of On the Social Contract (1762) that “Man is born 
free, and everywhere he is chains”, yet he would fail to address the reality of millions of 
European-owned slaves despite his attacks on the institution.41 Buck-Morss draws from 
Louis Sala-Molins and suggests that Rousseau often referred to travelogues concerning 
“Hottentots” and “Indians”, but never does he address the violence of European slavery,  
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Rousseau referred to human beings everywhere but omitted Africans; spoke of 
Greenland's people transported to Denmark who die of sadness-but not of the sadness of 
Africans transported to the Indies that resulted in suicides, mutinies, and maroonings. He 
declared all men equal and saw private property as the source of inequality, but he never 
put two and two together to discuss French slavery for economic profit as central to 
arguments of both equality and property.42  
 
Buck-Morss refers to Sala-Molins in order to suggest that Rousseau was both racist and 
revolting, and criticizes attempts to disregard such charges as anachronistic, or as 
relativistic readings of modern race thinking imposed on earlier epochs due to a variety of 
disciplinary and moral reasons. She argues Rousseau’s racism is omitted from historical 
and philosophical accounts: “the embarrassing facts are quietly allowed to disappear.”43 
While I am mostly in agreement with Buck-Morss’s and Sala-Molins’s excellent 
analyses, I would suggest that accounting for the epistemological structure of the 
eighteenth century (that Rousseau was embedded within), did not include the possibility 
for bio-evolutionary racial schemas. Rather, the main conceptual architecture for 
conceptualizing human difference remained a theocentric mode of similitude. This can 
still be understood as revolting. Attending to the epistemological structure of the long 
eighteenth century does not necessarily evacuate an analysis of “embarrassing facts” 
instead, it provides an opportunity to better trace the genesis of the colonial-capitalist 
world system in its complex and contradictory formation, and, vitally, allows us to better 
understand the traces of incorporative theology that remain a constitutive feature of the 
colonial power matrix – including modern race thinking. 
 It is from this intervention concerning the epistemological structure of the long 
eighteenth century that I shall now turn in order to better trace the complex assumptions 
that inform Rousseau’s thought, in particular, his notion of human perfectibility that are 
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key to his ideas of human difference, and his omissions concerning slavery including his 
contradictory endorsement of European colonialism. In the next section I will explore the 
tradition of travelogues that influenced Rousseau’s thought, and I pay particular attention 
to the often-neglected domains of Christian theology and Platonic philosophy that are 
constitutive of the noble savage tradition.  
 
 
Travel Writing, Natural Humans and Medieval Christian Theology 
In previous chapters I have discussed the importance of travel writing and 
missionary accounts in the production of the coloniality of knowledge. From Antiquity to 
the Middle Ages various marvelous creatures were said to exist, such as dog-faced men 
with tails, Cyclopes with one-eye, and giants for instance.44 Nevertheless, these 
depictions of the marvelous and fantastic gave way to a theologically authorized 
conceptual schema of similitude and resemblances that came to structure the logic human 
difference. Hence, in the centuries preceding the Enlightenment, there is a long tradition 
of travelogues and accounts of human difference apprehended by Biblical exegesis, and 
as I have suggested in previous chapters, these theological traces remain a constitutive 
feature of coloniality, and, as I argue here, Rousseau’s thought.  
In the following section I will examine some of the philosophical and moral 
assumptions that formed the conceptual matrix of Rousseau’s conceptions of human 
forms of difference via the coloniality of knowledge. I shall focus upon the notion of 
“natural man” that underpins the noble savage discourse found in the work of Montaigne 
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who heavily influenced the work of Rousseau – particularly his notions of human 
perfectibility.45 
 Centuries of travel writing and missionary accounts cannot be reduced to any 
singular logic or simplistic narrative of exclusion. Rather, the accounts of so-called noble 
savagery was heterodox, and, in fact, attempts to humanize and valorize the figure of 
natural man through characteristics such as intrinsic benevolence and pacifism 
paradoxically had the result of dehumanization. This paradoxical representation of 
natural man as so close to nature as to make them animalistic would feature as prominent 
themes in Montaigne’s articulations of New World inhabitants.46 Muthu states:  
The accounts of many of the earliest encounters between Europeans and Amerindians 
contain reactions toward New World peoples that implied, or more directly offered, 
praise for what was perceived to be their ‘natural’ manner of living. Idealized portrayals 
of Amerindians in these writings reflect the varied, and at times conflicting, fables about 
faraway lands and peoples across the seas that shaped the expectations of the late-
fifteenth- and early-sixteenth-century explorers, missionaries, and soldiers who travelled 
to the Americas.47  
 
Montaigne’s widely read Des Cannibales (Of Cannibals) provided a significant source 
for the dissemination of a conceptual vocabulary for juxtaposing French decadence with 
New World purity. The resulting representation of an “artificial” French lifestyle, 
attributed to an increasingly corrupted set of virtues, was evinced for Montaigne by the 
altering of the physical environment that were held to be the result of moral corruption. 
Conversely, the New World and its inhabitants was cast as pristine and uncorrupted while 
the natural environment was valorized for its originary purity.48 
 For Montaigne, the so-called savage condition of the Indigenous subject was not 
due to intrinsic inferiority or what we can understand as biological racial difference by 
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evolutionary temporal schemas. Rather, his savage condition was held to be a result of his 
natural condition, and thereby being closer to an idealized original state that has not been 
exposed to the debasement of the modern condition. Montaigne states that, “[t]hese 
nations, then, seem to me barbarous only in this sense, that they have been fashioned very 
little by the human mind, and are still very close to their original naturalness.”49 His 
inspiration for this discourse of natural barbarity can be found from Greek philosophy 
and various sixteenth century dispatches from expeditions and travelogues, including 
Amerigo Vespucci’s popular Mundus Novus.  
According to Montaigne, the natural life of Amerindians was exemplified by their 
lack of attachment to any extraneous physical or psychological extravagance that is held 
to be the result of layers of moribund culture such as art and innovation. Instead, the 
Amerindian is held to happily flourish as a result of living by a natural code of simplicity. 
Montaigne remarks:  
These nations then seem to me to be so far barbarous, as having received but very little 
form and fashion from art and human invention, and consequently to be not much remote 
from their original simplicity…no clothing, no agriculture, no metal, no use of corn or 
wine; the very words that signify lying, treachery, dissimulation, avarice, envy, 
detraction, pardon, never heard of.50 
 
Montaigne maintains that the natural state of barbarous people, ostensibly lacking in what 
can be understood as culture, in the form of mastery over craft and ingenuity, produces an 
egalitarian social structure that results in high levels of moral well-being, and, as a result 
optimal physical health, “'tis rare to hear of a sick person, and they moreover assure me, 
that they never saw any of the natives, either paralytic, bleareyed, toothless, or crooked 
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with age.”51 Rousseau would follow Montaigne in suggesting that physical decrepitudes 
found in Europe were a manifestation of the perils of the artificial human penchant for 
luxury, and a result of poverty underpinned by social, legal and political hierarchies.52 
Rousseau would declare that, “When one thinks about the stout constitutions of the 
savages, at least of those whom we have not ruined with our strong liquors; when one 
becomes aware of the fact that they know almost no illness but wounds and old age, one 
is strongly inclined to believe that someone could easily write the history of human 
maladies by following the history of civil societies.”53 
 The conception of the New World, structured by the “original simplicity” of 
natural life and embodied in the authentic purity of the savage Amerindian was in part 
generated for Montaigne by Platonic schemas of aligning the categories of “natural” and 
“original” with the perfected form.54 Conversely, the artificial creation is an imperfect 
analogue to the original. Montaigne observes: “All things, says Plato, – [Laws, 10.] –  are 
produced either by nature, by fortune, or by art; the greatest and most beautiful by the one 
or the other of the former, the least and the most imperfect by the last.”55 For Montaigne, 
French society was the imperfect copy, while Amerindian peoples were seen to be closest 
to the original; moreover, he goes further to challenge the perfected representation of the 
Republic by lamenting that Plato never was able to observe the natural state of the New 
World and its inhabitants,  
I am sorry that Lycurgus and Plato had no knowledge of them; for to my apprehension, 
what we now see in those nations, does not only surpass all the pictures with which the 
poets have adorned the golden age, and all their inventions in feigning a happy state of 
man, but, moreover, the fancy and even the wish and desire of philosophy itself; so native 
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and so pure a simplicity, as we by experience see to be in them, could never enter into 
their imagination, nor could they ever believe that human society could have been 
maintained with so little artifice and human patchwork. I should tell Plato that it is a 
nation wherein there is no manner of traffic, no knowledge of letters, no science of 
numbers, no name of magistrate or political superiority; no use of service, riches or 
poverty, no contracts, no successions, no dividends, no properties, no employments… 
How much would he find his imaginary Republic short of his perfection?56 
 
We observe in Montaigne’s passionate remarks the paradox of noble savage discourse, 
that is, the so-called savage is represented as so uncontaminated, uncorrupted and 
therefore so authentically human that they are in fact dehumanized and subsumed into 
nature itself. Amerindians are cast as being automatons that mechanistically follow the 
laws of nature; as such, they are devoid of science, numbers and all forms of creative 
human capacity and dynamism. Additionally, they follow no political structure of a 
magistrate or political superior, nor do they use contract to enter into property relations 
and employment. The Amerindian, for Montaigne, is part of an organic natural formation 
that is more perfect and originary than Plato’s Republic to the point that almost all traces 
of human faculty and reason were evacuated from them.  
 In a similar vein, Rousseau argues that natural savage man degenerated into an 
undomesticated animal due to being habituated by society’s excesses,  
The horse, the cat, the bull, even the ass, are usually taller, and all of them have a more 
robust constitution, more vigor, more strength, and more courage in the forests than in 
our homes. They lose half of these advantages in becoming domesticated, it might be said 
that all our efforts at feeding them and treating well only end in their degeneration. It is 
the same for man himself.57 
 
He further states, making comparisons between the orangutan, dogs and savage-man, that  
 
Alone, idle, and always near danger, savage man must like to sleep and be a light sleeper 
like animals which do little thinking and, as it were, sleep the entire time they are not 
thinking…the orangs that are perfected only by softness and sensuality must remain in a 
state of crudeness that excludes any kind of refinement in him….Such is the state of 
animals in general, and, according to the reports of traveller, such also is that of the 
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majority of savage peoples. Thus we should not be surprised that the Hottentots of the 
Cape of Good Hope can sight ships with the naked eye as far out as sea as the Dutch can 
with telescopes; or that the savages of America were as capable of trailing Spaniards by 
smell as the best dogs could have done…58 
 
A significant question that arises in Montaigne’s On Cannibals is the category of reason 
for New World inhabitants. As I mentioned above, those who subscribed and 
disseminated noble savage discourse cast Amerindian rationality as mechanistically 
following the prescriptions of natural law and natural base instinctual capacities of the 
sensual body.59 Paradoxically, savage “natural man” was held to have the capacity for 
future improvement and to exercise reason through cultural agency60 if they were brought 
into the fold of colonial institutions, knowledge and cosmology that was seen as 
“corrupting” and “artificial.” Put differently, New World inhabitants were held to have 
reason, but it remained beholden to and operational by the dictates of natural law and the 
corporeal proclivities. However, for both Montaigne and Rousseau, modern forms of 
reason that would unleash cultural agency could only emerge through the same 
institutions and knowledge systems cast as the very source of worldly abasement and sin. 
As I will argue, this paradox is key to Rousseau’s conception of natural human 
perfectibility, and his political philosophy.  
While Muthu traces Montaigne’s ethnological observations of noble savagery to 
the Platonic notion of imperfect forms, he fails to take into account its constitutive 
                                                        
58
 Ibid, 43 
59Muthu, op. cit. 18 
60 Muthu describes cultural agency as the Enlightenment notion that the human was characterized by 
cultural difference. He states Enlightenment thinkers, “believed that human beings are fundamentally 
cultural creatures, that is, they possess and exercise, simply by virtue of being human, a range of rational, 
emotive, aesthetic, and imaginative capacities that create, sustain and transform diverse practices and 
institutions over time” (8). As I argue in this chapter, Enlightenment conceptions of the human were 
circumscribed by the coloniality of knowledge. For instance, the “savage” was not accorded full human 
status coeval with that of European man as they were held to lack features of “cultural agency” such as 
reason, emotive, esthetic and imaginative capacities.   
 154 
theological registers. Montaigne, a product of Renaissance theocentric conceptions of the 
world, saw New World human and cultural difference through the frame of redemptive 
similitude. Montaigne agonized over how to explain the origins of New World peoples 
and their cultural differences, and, as Hodgen explains, he relied upon assimilating those 
differences back into familiar conceptual frames in complex and often contradictory 
ways.  
 As discussed in chapter one, sixteenth century thinkers relied upon the theological 
notion of monogenesis and its corollary hypothesis of an original Adamic culture that had 
broken its divine covenant by willful acts of disobedience to God’s plan. In the reading of 
the Adamic Fall, Renaissance thinkers held that man descended into corruption and evil, 
while change was largely conceived as a negative consequence of man’s disobedience. 
The idea that original Adamic man had fallen from the grace of God and descended into 
evil was by supported by Biblical narratives of Noachian dispersal, the exile of Cain and 
the spread of his mischievous offspring throughout the world, and importantly, these 
Biblical notions of dispersal formed the conceptual structure to apprehend human 
difference across vast geographical areas.  
 Rousseau does not depart from this theological narrative of the Adamic fall and 
Noachian dispersal, even as he rebukes other philosophers such as Hobbes that ascribe 
avarice and caprice as characterizing the state of natural man. 
It did not even occur to most of our philosophers to doubt that the state of nature had 
existed, even though it is evident from reading the Holy Scriptures that the first man, 
having received enlightenment and precepts immediately from God, was not himself in 
that state; and if we give the writings of Moses the credence that every Christian owes 
them, we must deny that, even before the flood, men were ever in a pure state of nature, 
unless they had fallen back into it because of some extraordinary event: a paradox that is 
quiet awkward to defend and utterly impossible to prove.61 
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Returning to Montaigne, he fused these widely held Biblical understandings of human 
diversity and the Adamic Fall with Platonic notions of the derivative copy of an ideal 
original. The resulting pessimism of French moral and cultural decay juxtaposed with 
Amerindian purity is a product of this theologico-Platonic historical structure of human 
sin, decline, resemblances and imitation. Hodgen states, “The monogenetic theory of 
social origins, with its melancholic philosophy of history and its rejection of the positive 
values of human movement, cultural contact, borrowing, or diffusion, was the 
conventional Renaissance answer to the problem of cultural differences.”62 This 
particular Renaissance Christian reading of monogenesis is central to the production of 
Montaigne’s notion of noble savagery, and, I will suggest, is constitutive of Rousseau’s 
philosophy of natural man that underpins his theories of human perfection and the 
political. 
 For Montaigne, human diffusion and the transmission of religious and cultural 
practices from peoples divided by large geographical distances and time was 
conceptualized as a largely negative phenomenon. However, as I have suggested, this 
gloomy Renaissance notion of historical decline was modified in order to explain the 
cultural and religious differences found in the New World. In other words, the main 
problem for Montaigne and other thinkers of the sixteenth century was accounting for 
competing religious articulations and cultural practices of pagan idolaters, heathens, and 
savages. The plurality of religious and sacred rites, including those of the Greeks, 
Romans and other civilizations of antiquity in addition to New World religions were held 
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to be derivative articulations of an originary and pure faith understood as a Hebrew-
Christian synthesis.63  
Montaigne, in his Essayes illustrates the Renaissance sensibility of seeing 
Indigenous religious practices as resembling Christian ones.  
I have often wondered to see in so vast a distance of places and times such a concurrence 
of so great a number of popular and wild opinions, and of savage manners and beliefs, 
which by no means seem to proceed from our natural meditation…they were made use of 
to honour and adorn their sepultures, there they were erected, and particularly that of St 
Andrew, to protect themselves from nocturnal visions, and to lay upon the cradles of 
infants against enchantments; elsewhere there was found one of wood, of very great 
height, which was adored for the god of rain, and this a great way in the interior; there 
was seen an express image of our penance priests, the use of mitres, the celibacy of 
priests, the art of divination by the entrails of sacrificed beasts, abstinence from all sorts 
of flesh and fish in their diet, the manner of priests officiating in a particular and not a 
vulgar language…64 
 
Amerindian religious practices were seen as imitative shadows of the original Hebrew 
Christian faith, even their language was held to be a form of pre-Babel Hebrew in order 
to remain consistent with the Old Testament.65 These ethnological statements concerning 
resemblances and imitation was generated from the Christian notion of monogenesis; 
hence, we observe in Montaigne’s ideas that Indigenous sacred practices were reminders 
of the original Christian-Hebrew message, while Old World religions such as Islam was 
seen as a heretical and infidel imitation of it.66 We see this conceptual grid clearly 
articulated in Montaigne’s comparisons of New World sacred practices with the 
degenerate imitations of Old World religious forms vis-à-vis Indigenous peoples, 
The vain shadows of our religion, which are observable in some of these examples, are 
testimonies of its dignity and divinity. It is not only in some sort insinuated into all the 
infidel nations on this side of the world, by a certain imitation, but in these barbarians 
also, as by a common and supernatural inspiration; for we find there the belief of 
purgatory, but of a new form; that which we give to the fire they give to the cold, and 
imagine that souls are purged and punished by the rigour of an excessive coldness… 
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there were there some people who delighted to unmuffle the ends of their instruments, 
and clipped off the prepuce after the Mahometan and Jewish manner.67 
 
Thus, while Muthu is correct in identifying the importance of Platonic notions of the 
imperfect copy, Christian theology is a vital component in understanding Montaigne’s 
noble savage discourse. We get a clearer picture of the epistemological universe of 
Montaigne if we examine how Platonic ideas of the corrupted form and Christian notions 
of similitude, imitation, and the fall of Adamic man were interwoven.  
 The medieval belief in decline and commensurability, therefore, were viable 
explanations for Renaissance thinkers who attempted to account for human difference. 
From peoples “discovered” in Africa to the Americas, the “savage” condition was 
conceptualized as a corollary of progressive decay, this theme was consistently found in 
the work of various prominent works, from Johann Boemus’s Omnium gentium mores 
(1541), William Cunynghams’s Cosmographical glasse (1559), Louis Le Roy’s Thevet’s 
Singularitez (1576), Samuel Purchas’s his Pilgrimes; or, Relations of the world and the 
Religions observed in all Ages (1613), Sir Mathew Hale’s Primitive origination of 
mankind (1677), and various others. In all of these works, “Differences of degree of 
savagery or barbarism among New World tribes were explained by the fact that 
migrations had occurred at successive intervals since the Flood, and hence some groups 
had more time in which to degenerate and forget the ‘Original’ from which they were 
derived.”68  
For Montaigne, and what we will see in Rousseau, is the idea that the process of 
change was conceptualized as decline, degeneration and corruption, while the so-called 
savage Amerindian lifestyle, language and sacred practices were valorized for being the 
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most authentic expression of the deviated Hebrew-Christian heritage. However, as I have 
stated, paradoxically, the Amerindian was seen as such a clear example of originary 
natural purity that they would be represented as virtually static and incapable of 
innovation as well as indistinguishable from nature to the point of being dehumanized 
into pure corporeality – animal like beings that exercised no agency, but rather 
instinctually followed the laws of nature.   
What is key to this discussion is that, for Rousseau, the notion of decline that is 
generated from the fusing of Platonism and Christian theology remains a constitutive 
trace of his ideas of human perfectibility and his theory of the political, despite his 
critiques of religious orthodoxy. In the next section I will examine key shifts from this 
Christian theological and Platonic historical schema of similitude, decline, and imitation 
and how it relates to the natural philosophy of Linnaeus and Buffon who mobilize the 
Chain of Being in order to account for human difference. I argue that Rousseau retains 
both Christian and Platonic notions of decline, corruption and imitation as well as 
classificatory schemas of the natural philosophers in order to articulate his ideas of noble 
savagery and political philosophy.  
 
 
Natural Philosophy, Classification and the Chain of Being  
 In the above section, I outlined the connection between medieval and Renaissance 
Christian theology, Platonic philosophy, travel literature and the discourse of similitude 
in relation to the New World and its inhabitants. While there are many elements of 
medieval and Renaissance thought that were constitutive of eighteenth century noble 
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savage narratives, there are important transformations and departures that take place in 
the Enlightenment; namely, augmentations to the theologically inscribed Chain of Being 
by the natural historians. 
 Despite the widely held belief that there were societies of authentic “savages” 
dwelling in far-off locations, it is through the proliferation of the natural sciences that 
these “discoveries” take on particular importance in the Enlightenment.69 Robert Wokler 
states, “Naturalists in the eighteenth century often contrasted the flora and fauna of the 
New World unfavorably with related species in the Old, and so, too, they regarded non-
European men and women as generally inferior copies of an older race.”70 According to 
Seth, it is due to the rise of natural science that the so-called savage transforms from an 
exceptional figure marked by degeneration via theologically authorized notions of 
monogenesis into a model of universal man understood as pre-social man.71 Put 
differently, the rise of natural science transforms savage man into a point of origin for all 
of humanity, rather than as a departure from an originary Hebrew-Christian stock.  
 Rousseau held deep admiration for Linnaeus and corresponded with Buffon – 
both of whom influenced Rousseau’s conceptualization of natural man and his political 
philosophy. For instance, Buffon’s Natural History is frequently cited in Rousseau’s 
Second Discourse, despite Buffon’s criticisms of his romanticism. As Wokler observes, 
Rousseau transformed “some of Buffon’s arguments from the domain of natural history 
into that of civil history.”72  
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 The rise of natural sciences is rooted in Renaissance thought and the proliferation 
of ethnological taxonomies within the Chain of Being – discussed in chapter one. Hodgen 
states that from the middle ages and the Renaissance and into the modern period, nearly 
all attempts to produce a philosophy of human nature utilized the hierarchical or 
“architectonic” principal in the arrangement of categories and forms.73 She suggests that 
Scholastic, Renaissance and Enlightenment philosophers and theologians attempted to 
analyze and classify forms according to three main steps; first, they searched for 
similarities and correspondences between groups and the totally of forms they examined. 
Second, they searched for principals that separated group from group and between forms. 
Third, they looked for a principal of unity within the diversity of groups and forms.74 As 
such, the “discovery” of the African and Amerindian took on particular importance as it 
related to the rise of the natural sciences and the assimilation of differences into the 
tripartite principal of taxonomies within the hierarchical Chain. 
 For over four hundred years, between the thirteenth century and the seventeenth 
century, little was remarked concerning the prospect of a semi-animal link between man 
and other forms – such as animals – in the chain of being, nor was it proposed that the so-
called savage represented a transitional figure between human and animal. As suggested, 
this would breach the Christian theocentric epistemological structure of the epoch. 
Indeed, many were reluctant to include the Amerindian and African into the category of 
the human; for instance, the Puritan mind regarded the Indigenous inhabitants of the 
North American colonies as satanic creatures, “Satan had possessed the Indian until he 
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had become virtually a beast.”75 Sir Thomas Herbert observed the so-called Hottentots of 
South Africa in 1626 and noted, “their words are sounded rather like that of Apes, than 
Men…And comparing their imitations, speech, and visages, I doubt many of them have 
no better Predecessors than Monkeys”76  
However, the implications of these ethnological observations vis-à-vis the scale of 
being were not investigated, that is, the so-called savage was not considered a transitional 
figure that could bridge the gap between animal and human, as Francis Moran states that 
these claims “would probably have been read as an allusion to the chain of being rather 
than as an indication of human descent…Instead, their claims were meant to establish the 
relative position of each in the chain of being.”77 Similarly, Hodgen suggests that these 
attitudes and assessments of human difference did not result in any radical breach of the 
architectonic principal, “There were no suggested amendments to the human section of 
the scale of being. The logical implications of these attitudes and observations with 
respect to the hierarchical position of the savage were not pursued.”78 
 The epistemological shift with the given order took place in the late seventeenth 
century and early eighteenth century with the works of Sir William Petty, in his essay 
entitled The Scale of creatures (1676-77), Sir William Tyson’s Orang-outang, sive homo 
silvestris; or, the anatomy of the pygmie (1708), Linnaeus’ System of nature (1735), and 
Buffon’s thirty-six volume Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière (1749-1788). The 
significance of these publications concerning natural history was the discursive 
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rearrangement of the position of the human in the Chain. The human was no longer seen 
as a unique and perfected form, that is, man was no longer simply conceptualized as an 
indivisible whole at the center of the hierarchical chain with animals ranked below and 
angels positioned above. Instead, the naturalist’s main task was to inquire into both 
biology and ethnology in order to discover the gaps or missing categories between the 
human and other forms – particularly the ape, which represented the closest human 
resemblance.  
For the natural historians of the Enlightenment, namely Linnaeus and Buffon, 
they concerned themselves with generating social and cultural hierarchies as an extension 
of the biological.79 However, we must not lose sight that the gradation of order 
established by the natural historians was still authorized by divine decree. According to 
Eze, one must emphasize that Linnaeus  
articulates an idea pervasive in the eighteenth century: that an underlying hierarchical 
order in nature was established by God, or providence by itself, and that it is the duty of 
human was to discover this order and to classify everything that exists – from human to 
fauna and flora…”80  
 
Natural historians were not seeking an evolutionary history of human biology in the 
modern sense as initiated by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck and Charles Darwin. The discourse 
of evolutionary biology would not emerge until the late eighteenth century and early 
nineteenth century – Rousseau’s Second Discourse was written in 1754. In none of 
Rousseau’s writing does he argue that the human descends from orangutans through 
biological evolutionary sequences. For instance, when Rousseau does remark upon the 
problem that so-called wild-men and Carib children had in walking upon two legs, as 
opposed to assuming their natural quadruped movement, he suggests this is due to neglect 
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and lack of socialization. Rousseau does not attribute these curiosities in posture and 
mobility to evolutionary biological schemas.81  
The shift towards evolutionary biology would only emerge through further 
transformations in the quality of time itself; namely, the shift from Judeo-Christian time 
towards modern, secular forms of time. Put differently, evolutionary biology is made 
possible by techniques of temporal distancing that subsume Judeo-Christian notions of 
time into a secularized developmental schema. Evolutionary schemas only emerge 
through the transformation of sacred time into a generalized and universalized secular 
structure that enables the modern production of Others that can be conceived as being in 
a lessor stage of historical development (discussed in chapter four). The temporal 
universe for Buffon and Linnaeus as well as Rousseau would not transform until much 
later.  
The essential point to make in this discussion on temporality and the 
epistemological structure of Rousseau and his contemporaries in relation to cultural 
difference is that it took place with the divinely ordained hierarchical Chain that was 
structured vertically with God positioned at the apex.82 It is important to note that 
Rousseau and the natural historians each played a role in the production of Enlightenment 
shifts towards the secularization and universalization of time, and, therefore, can be seen 
as forbearers of modern evolutionary developmental schemas that would later emerge.  
While there should be no confusion that Rousseau articulated his notions of 
human difference through a discourse of biological evolutionism, I would argue he is a 
vital figure in the later development of it by helping to transform examinations of the 
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human by building upon a synthesis of travel writing, colonial ethnology and natural 
history. In short, he augments the Chain by bringing together Renaissance and 
Enlightenment thought in relation to apprehending human difference. One of the main 
shifts we see from the work of Montaigne to the natural historians of Linnaeus and 
Buffon is that while the Chain of Being remained the main conceptual grid for 
assimilating human and cultural difference back into theologically authorized 
genealogical maps, the category of change was no longer exclusively conceptualized as a 
negative phenomenon, but as more fluid. He retained elements from Montaigne, that is, a 
largely Renaissance inspired pessimism for change by way of a particular reading of the 
Adamic Fall and Platonic philosophy, while modifying this narrative with Linnaeus and 
Buffon via Enlightenment natural history. This opened up the possibility for Rousseau to 
examine what characteristics made humans unique in relation to other animals. These 
shifts created the possibility for Rousseau to focus upon the issue of human perfectibility 
within the conceptual grid of continuity and gradation.  
For the natural historians of the eighteenth century, as mentioned above, the 
vertical and ascending gradation of the Chain established social and cultural hierarchies 
vis-à-vis biology while still structured by divine provenance. For instance, Linnaeus 
states,  
Man, when he enters the world, in naturally led to enquire who he is; whence he comes; 
whither he is going; for what purpose he is created; and by whose benevolence he is 
preserved. He finds himself descended from the remotest creation; journeying to a life of 
perfection and happiness, and led by his endowments to a contemplation of the works of 
nature…It is therefore the business of a thinking being, to look forward to the purposes of 
all things; and to remember that the end of creation is, that God may be glorified in all his 
works.83  
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While Linnaeus’s System of Nature was intended to locate the vast amount of flora within 
the chain, as he was primarily a botanist, his classificatory system also attempted to 
catalogue every conceivable geological structure, herb, plant, quadruped, and human – in 
total over ten thousand organisms were categorized. For Linnaeus, cataloguing every 
known creature and mineral formation was meant to confirm nature’s hierarchical 
gradation according to the immutable design of God.84  
The decision of Linnaeus to locate man within the graduated Chain represented a 
significant moment in the production of ethnology, and, for later generations, indexes the 
antecedents of modern biological schemas of evolutionary race thinking. Linnaeus 
proceeded not only to locate man within his vast arrangement of forms, but also divided 
man into two different sub-species and further into numerous assortments. The criteria 
for Linnaeus included pigmentation, cultural difference, political organization and 
clothing. Below is a section taken from his System of Nature:  
Mammalia  
Order I. Primates 
Foreteeth cutting: upper 4; parallel teats 2, pectoral  
HOMO 
sapiens. Diurnal; varying by education and situation  
1. Four-footed, mute, hairy. Wild man  
2. Copper-coloured, choleric, erect. American.  
Hair black, straight, thick; nostrils wide; face harsh; beard scanty; obstinate, 
content, free. Paints himself with fine red lines. Regulated by customs.  
3. Fair, sanguine, brawny. European.  
Hair yellow, brown, flowing; eyes blue; gentle, acute, inventive. Covered 
with close vestments. Governed by laws.  
4. Sooty, melancholy, rigid. Asiatic  
Hair black; eyes dark; fevere, haughty, covetous. Covered with loose 
garments. Governed by opinions.  
5. Black, phlegmatic, relaxed. African  
Hair black, frizzled; skin silky; nose flat; lips tumid; crafty, indolent, 
negligent. Anoints himself with grease. Governed by caprice.  
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Monstrosus. Varying by climate or art  
1. Small, active, timid. Mountaineer  
2. Large, indolent. Patagonian  
3. Less fertile. Hottentot  
4. Beardless. American  
5. Head conic. Chinese  
6. Head flattened. Canadian85  
 
For Linnaeus, homo ferus and homo monstruosus was the transitional figure between 
pure man and pure ape.86 Despite the organization of the human according to varieties in 
what looks like a racial typology of biological evolutionism, Linnaeus remained within 
the tradition of medieval resemblances that utilized a discourse of progressivism and the 
marvellous within a hierarchical structure of the Chain.87 In other words, the American 
and African were still considered God’s creatures, and not as racial Others ordered by 
evolutionary temporal sequences.  
 This epistemological shift in the apprehension of human difference is important 
because organizing organisms through the structure of the Chain had the simultaneous 
effect of undermining its religious underpinnings. The effect of attempting to uncover the 
missing links between the human and other forms had the effect of introducing a new 
quality of human sovereignty, superiority and uniqueness vis-à-vis other sentient 
animals.88 Importantly, the Chain was no longer conceptualized as solely reflecting 
divine purpose and meaning, but shifted towards issues concerning the consequences of 
human inspiration and inward purpose.  
 As I noted in chapter two, this process of increased inward reflection and the 
notion of the self-owning body was already being developed by figures such as John 
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Locke who generated his theories via the co-produced registers of Protestant Christian 
theology and coloniality. The forces of the Reformation, Counter-Reformation and 
colonialism had the effect of making religion an issue of intense inward and personal 
decision. Charles Taylor observes the paradox: the increased personalization and 
detached inward reflexivity of religious belief is connected to processes of 
disenchantment and the rise of the individuated self, “Disenchantment, Reform, and 
personal religion went together…This involved the growth and entrenchment of a new 
self-understanding of our social existence, one which gave an unprecedented primacy to 
the individual.”89 Rousseau is a key thinker in this process because he further develops 
this conception of the individuated self through his reliance on the entangled registers of 
Christian theology, travel writing, natural history and colonial ethnology.  
For Rousseau and other thinkers of the early Enlightenment there was an intensive 
shift towards the issue of human nature as opposed to the hierarchical order. Put 
differently, while Rousseau was heavily influenced by the natural historian’s focus upon 
the position of the human vis-à-vis other creatures in the Chain, Rousseau was a crucial 
figure in shifting the focus of inquiry towards the nature of the human being, and what 
qualities and characteristics distinguish the human from other beasts despite the fact he 
never departs from its structure. Thus, human agency begins to take a more central stage 
in eighteenth century, and, as I will discuss later, the so-called savage become a key site 
for him to engage these questions. This shift in inquiry for Rousseau is only made 
possible, I argue, by the transformations in conceptualization of the ontology of the 
human brought about by successive shifts in relation to theology and coloniality.   
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 According to Taylor the major shift in the eighteenth century with regards to 
human agency was no longer what activities reflected the structure of natural hierarchy, 
but rather what concerned thinkers such as Rousseau were the activities and purpose of 
human creation.90 Taylor:  
So in spite of the similarity of language with the ancients, we have an ethic based no 
longer on inherent hierarchy but rather on marked activities. Reason is still important, 
and those beings who possess it are still ranked higher in the chain of being…Knowing 
the good isn’t just a matter of apprehending a hierarchical order. It requires rather that I 
come to know my own inclinations.91  
 
The result of the shift away from the focus of plotting man in the hierarchy vis-à-vis 
divine provenance and towards human activity and inward inspiration opened the doors 
for Rousseau to question what human activities and sensibilities raised the human above 
all other creatures. For Rousseau, it was the human potential for perfectibility, “a faculty 
which with the help of circumstance progressively develops all our other faculties and 
which in man is inherent in the species as much as in the individual.”92 
 According to Taylor, the seventeenth and eighteenth century emergence of the 
novel indexes the new importance accorded to inward sentiment and purpose reflected in 
disengaged reason: a modern form of reason indexed by individuation partially delinked 
from divine purpose.93 He suggests that the novel had the effect of increasing the 
importance of individuated purpose in three main registers. First, it affirmed a new 
consciousness of ordinary life and dealt with moralistic themes of love and marriage. 
Second, the novel was distinguished from previous forms of literature in its emphasis 
upon the particular as opposed to what Taylor refers to as “ontic logos”, that is, 
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traditional archetypical themes, such as the general and universal message of divine 
provenance and salvation. Taylor states the novel “narrates the lives of particular people 
in their detail”, and he further states “…what it is to exist in time is undermined by the 
decline of an ontic logos and by the new self-understanding as disengaged reason.”94  
He observes that the quality of time shifts further towards a disenchanted “empty” and 
“homogenous” structure via the increase in human centered agency; however, he cautions 
that this is not to suggest that novel evacuated larger themes of archetypes. Rather, the 
form of the eighteenth century novel reflected the general archetypal myths through 
reliance upon the particular. For instance, deeper themes of salvation and divine concord 
would be expressed, but through narrations of individual characters and details of their 
personal lives and experiences. Third, the novel introduces a new focus upon individual 
sentiment through categories of love, affection, personal feelings and singular needs. 
 For Taylor, the eighteenth century shift in focus upon life-narration and particular 
experiences of the disengaged self was, in part, reflected in the modern form of the 
autobiography that was initiated by the novels of Rousseau; namely, his 1761 Julie, ou la 
Nouvelle Heloise (Julie, or the new Heloise) – the most wildly sold novel of his 
century.95 Taylor states that “…the novel which helped more than any other to define and 
spread the new outlook there was undoubtedly Rousseau’s La Nouvelle Heloise.”96 In this 
novel Rousseau emphasizes the role of personal autonomy and voluntary ties through a 
particular theme of rebellion against the traditional family and its petition for ascriptive 
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authority.97 Rousseau narrates the story of St. Preux, tutor of Julie, who rebels against the 
wishes of her father in order to affirm his personal devotion and the rights of love:  
How despotic soever may be the empire you assume my rights are infinitely more sacred. 
The chain by which we are united marks the extent of paternal domination, even in the 
estimation of human law, and whilst you appeal to the law of nature, you yourself are 
trampling upon its institutions.98  
 
We see from the introduction of Rousseau’s unique form of the novel the dissemination 
of the particular themes of individual autonomy and personal choice via inward 
sentiments. This affirms a major shift from earlier literature that sought to affirm the 
individual’s place within a larger theocentric universe aimed at developing ontic logos 
via messages of providential order and salvation. Taylor observes the influence of 
Rousseau’s novel,  
The impact of La nouvelle Heloise when it came out in 1761 is hard to imagine in this 
more jaded age. Copies were snapped up, and many of those who read it were literally 
overpowered with emotion. Rousseau received a flood of letters from readers who were 
“ravished”, “in transports”, in “ecstasy”, moved to “delices inexprimbales” and “larmes 
delicieuses”. Baron Thiebault came to the end of the book, …(no longer weeping, but 
crying out, howling like a beast”). Francois, a cornet in the vacalry, was so moved by his 
reading [that he said] (“I believe in the moment I would have looked upon death with 
pleasure”).99  
 
For Taylor, Rousseau’s novel aroused feelings of personal sentiment and not the broader 
Christian theme of self-transcendence. Consequently, we observe in Rousseau the 
introduction of a major shift towards individuation through an inward focus upon feeling 
and duty to personal autonomy that defies duty to authority.  
 It is not only with the autobiographical and romantic novel that we can examine 
the shift towards human centred agency indexed by Rousseau, but also in his capacity as 
a composer of music, opera and theatre. I suggest his relationship to music and drama 
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also are key sites in order to explore what Taylor refers to as the transformation in self-
understanding as disengaged reason. While the impact of Rousseau’s musical exploits as 
a composer and theorist is debated, he was a celebrated figure in a diversity of artistic 
forms. At thirty, when Rousseau arrived in Paris, he presented his paper “Project 
Concernant de Nouveaux Signes pour la Music” to the Academie des Sciences in 1742. 
The Academie considered Rousseau’s idea for a new system of musical notation unusable 
and underdeveloped; however, he eventually published an expanded version of it as his 
“Dissertation sur la music modern” in 1743.100 Further, in 1745 he attempted to attract 
attention to his opera Les Muses Galantes, but it was not met with a favourable response 
and failed.101  
Despite these challenges, Eric Taylor suggests that Rousseau continued to 
develop his interest in music and by the middle of the eighteenth century he garnered 
considerable standing as a musical writer. Denis Diderot, acting as chief editor of the 
Encyclopaedia, assigned Rousseau with its musical section – he would provide several 
hundred entries and also compile a two-volume Dictionnaire de Musique.102 Finally, 
three years after his death, in 1781 over one hundred compositions of Rousseau’s were 
compiled in a volume, Les Consolations des Misères de ma Vie, ou Recueil d’Airs, 
Romances et Duos de Jean-Jacques Rousseau.103  
 During the Bouffons’ War, Rousseau produced his most famous opera: Le Devin 
du Village (The Village Soothsayer), which ran for over four hundred showings over a 
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seventy-year period.104 In Eli Friedlander’s reading of the opera, Rousseau’s musical 
work should be placed in relation to philosophical work, namely, his Essay on the Origin 
of Languages. For Friedlander, Rousseau’s theory on music and language proposes that 
operatic voice is an embodied manifestation of deep passion and extravagant 
vocalization. Friedlander states, “The voice in opera emerges out of passion, as a vocal 
extension of passion. It is an embodied voice that does not dissociate between the 
representation and the body that emits it. It is, as it were, a voice that one cannot hide 
behind.”105 As Charles Taylor similarly argues, Rousseau concerned himself intensely 
with the issue of personal sentiment and passion that further disrupts and rearranges the 
theological themes of self-transcendence. Furthermore, Rousseau elaborated upon 
Locke’s introduction of the self-owning body, as discussed in chapter two.  
 In The Village Soothsayer, akin to his later novel La Nouvelle Heloise, Rousseau 
narrates a tale of Colette, the village shepherdess, who lives in a state of personal turmoil 
because she is estranged from her lover Colin who pursues women in the city. She offers 
the village soothsayer (Le Devin du Village) her money in exchange for disclosing the 
fate of her love. The soothsayer instructs Colette to keep her money and promises to 
remedy the situation. When Colin arrives in the village, the soothsayer hides Colette and 
cautions Colin that she is considering the courting efforts from city men. As a result, 
Colin is overcome with jealously and pride and ensures the soothsayer that he will desist 
his sojourns to the city if Colette returns to him. Colette emerges from hiding and the two 
lovers embrace and marry. At the end of the opera, a village festival takes place with 
song and dance in order to celebrate the triumph of love. Importantly, Rousseau ends the 
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opera with a chorus that valorizes the virtues of the simple and pastoral life of the city 
and juxtaposes this with the artificial love and decadence of the city106, 
Art in Love is favorable,  
Artless Love knows how to charm;  
In the city, we are kinder,  
In the village we know better love.  
Ah! to the ordinary  
Love knows little  
What it does, what he stands for;  
This is a child is a child. (scene V111).  
The play continues, and they sing out, 
Here the simple nature  
Love follows naivety;  
In other places, the ornament  
It seeks borrowed radiance.  
Ah! For the ordinary  
Love knows little  
What it does, what he stands for;  
This is a child is a child.107 
 
Three main themes are revealed in Rousseau’s artistic works. First, the particular subject 
of individual choice and personal sentiments of love that are elevated above the Christian 
virtue of subordinating the personal passions to religious and familial authority. As 
Taylor and Seth suggest, Rousseau is a vital Enlightenment figure because he undermines 
the religious foundations of the Chain by shifting the inquiry from the place of the human 
in it towards individual choice and particular sentiment as disengaged reason. In 
Rousseau’s Second Discourse, he continues to work within the theologically inscribed 
hierarchies; however, with the shift towards human purpose and away from a purposeful, 
divinely authorized cosmology, he opens the possibility to claim that the wild man, the 
Carib, and the Hottentot are corresponding examples of the origin of humanity.108  
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The second theme that is reflected in Rousseau’s musical productions and is a 
pillar of his political philosophy is the valorization of the authenticity, simplicity and 
purity of “natural living” vis-à-vis the European city. In the Village Soothsayer, the 
expression of personal choice and love are represented as authentic virtues that emerge in 
relation to the corrupted virtues that are cultivated in the artificial setting of the city. 
Colin is unable to nurture the authentic personal sentiment of love in the city; instead, he 
fosters the artificial and corrupted sensibility of infidelity. Rousseau’s attempt to 
juxtapose the city and village is non-other than a reflection of the valorization of the 
purity and innocence of the natural living of the so-called savage Amerindian.  
The discourse of natural authenticity reflects the influence of Montaigne and the 
notion that the city is an imperfect and degraded copy of the original form of the village 
and where authentic human virtue cannot emerge. Taylor suggests that Rousseau 
valorizes the ordinary life of “simple, rustic people”109 and affirms their virtue and 
personal satisfaction as opposed to the decadent existence of city living. Importantly 
Rousseau’s narrations of village life were generated through colonial ethnology 
influenced by the aforementioned work of Montaigne who deployed Christian theology 
and Platonism in order to juxtapose the purity of savage life with that of corrupt modern 
existence. I want to emphasize that while Rousseau undermined the theocentric structure 
of natural hierarchy, his narratives of cultivating personal sentiment were co-produced by 
Montaigne’s theological and colonial travel writing. Hence, Rousseau retains traces of 
Christian theology and Platonism in his work.  
The third theme is the paradox that is retained from Montaigne, that is, that the 
very artificial institutions and ways of being that are identified as unnatural and 
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corrupting are rearticulated as necessary for human perfectibility. For instance, it is only 
by moving through the artificial inward feelings of jealousy and pride that Colin is able to 
generate the authentic love for Colette. This idea is further reflected in Rousseau’s novel 
Emile, where he observes, “Much artifice is required to prevent man from becoming 
entirely artificial.”110 As I will discuss below, this paradoxical feature of Rousseau’s 
political philosophy is reflected in his conception of human perfectibility that is 
coproduced by the tradition of travel writing and his own colonial ethnology.  
 
 
Colonial Ethnology and the Natural Human 
Rousseau’s various novels, musical compositions and political philosophy; 
namely, his two Discourses, inscribed man with a new sense of individuation. As a result, 
he decoupled the human from the prescriptive license of the Chain. As I argued above, he 
created the conditions to interrogate man as a unique creature with the particular capacity 
of disengaged reason and the potential for perfectibility, thereby distinguishing man from 
all other sentient beings. For Rousseau, human perfectibility distinguishes man from 
brute. He states that,  
[T]here is another very specific quality which distinguishes [man from brute], and which 
will admit of no dispute. This is the faculty of self-improvement, which, by the help of 
circumstances, gradually develops all the rest of our faculties, and is inherent in the 
species as in the individual: whereas a brute is, at the end of a few months, all he will 
ever be during his whole life, and his species, at the end of a thousand years, exactly what 
it was the first year of that thousand.111  
 
Rousseau conceptualizes the human with the potential of perfectibility that is contingent 
upon the passage of time; consequently, he introduces “temporally varied portraits of the 
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individual self.”112 As a result Rousseau is able to provide a series of stages in which the 
savage/ wild man/ ape, exist within the forests of Lithuania and jungles of Malaysia, are 
at a different state of nature as opposed to the noble savage that he recognizes as the 
Amerindian and African.  
What makes Rousseau’s conception of human stages different from John Locke’s 
identification of the state of nature that moves from a savage hunter-gatherer stage to 
civil society characterized by the enclosure of private property and monetary exchange, 
or Thomas Hobbes’ notion of natural egoism and war that establishes civil society by the 
institution of law and governance, is that Rousseau suggests that human nature is 
malleable over time. Put differently, he suggests that the human is both prone to decline 
over time and has the potential for perfectibility.113 In Rousseau’s Discourses, he 
distinguishes his political philosophy from that of Locke and Hobbes by suggesting that 
civil society introduces external social and political developments that lie at the heart of 
human degradation and perfectibility.  
 Still operating within a theocentric structure, or despite his concept of 
individuation as disengaged reason, he seeks to index the series of socially produced 
transformations within the human soul:  
the human soul modified in society by a thousand ever-recurring causes, by the 
acquisition of a mass of knowledge and errors, by mutations taking place in the 
constitution of the body, and by the constant impact of the passions, has changed in 
appearance to the point of becoming almost unrecognizable, and is no longer found.114  
 
Rousseau constructs a philosophical anthropology that is contingent upon the malleability 
of the human vis-à-vis shifts in forms of social organization over time rather than upon 
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changes in the human condition due to “developments” in natural scientific knowledge.115 
This leads Maldonado-Torres to observe that in principal the so-called savage has the 
potential for perfectibility just as the European can degrade into a “savage” condition if 
they are raised and socialized within a “savage” environment.116  
Rousseau stages his temporally contingent, malleable conception of human 
perfectibility by examining the origins of the human itself via colonial ethnology.117 In 
his Second Discourse, Rousseau observes that “[a]lthough the inhabitants of Europe have 
the past three or four hundred years overrun the other parts of the world, and are 
constantly publishing new collections of travels and reports, I am convinced that the only 
men we know are the Europeans.”118 He argues that the only way to truly understand the 
self is to understand human difference, “When one proposes to study men, one has to 
look close by; but in order to study man one has to learn to cast one’s glance afar; one has 
to begin by observing the differences in order to discover the properties.”119  
Despite the vast amount of travel literature available, Rousseau argues that the 
true significance of travelogues were circumscribed by ignorance; for instance, “Sailors, 
Merchants, and Soldiers” were held to be ill equipped to produce any relevant 
philosophical inquiries because they remained prejudiced to a narrow European 
perspective. Moreover, he argues that missionary accounts are “too absorbed by the 
sublime vocation” of Christian conversion to appreciate the intellectual relevance of their 
chronicles.120 Rousseau then states that,  
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What is even more cruel is that, since all the progress of the human species continually 
moves away from its primitive state, the more we accumulate new knowledge, the more 
we deprive ourselves of the means of acquiring the most important knowledge of all. 
Thus, in a sense, it is by dint of studying man that we have rendered ourselves incapable 
of knowing him.121  
 
While Rousseau decries the lack of genuine knowledge acquired from the diversity of 
studies regarding human and cultural difference, he nevertheless appropriates and 
reinscribes elements of them in order to offer empirical support for his own philosophical 
anthropology and political writings.122 As Muthu observes, Rousseau frequently drew 
from the very travel accounts that he identified as limited and distorted; further, he 
generated a conception of human nature that drew heavily from the noble savage tradition 
and natural history as I have demonstrated above.123 
 While Rousseau often contrasts “savage” and “civilized” life he introduces 
several stages of human organization over time. He constructs a conjectural history in 
which he maps the transformation of bestial seclusion to family organization and settled 
societies. This ushers in the decay of artistic autonomy due to the invention of metallurgy 
and agriculture that is responsible for the “great revolution” of property relations, and, 
therefore the introduction of social inequality, despotic laws and corrupt political 
institutions.124 For him, the “savages of America” do not practice metallurgy and 
agriculture and remain in a “savage” state for this reason, while “barbarians” are those 
that practice either one form of metallurgy or agriculture. Passing from savage or 
barbarian to civilized man is the result of practicing both artistic forms. For Europeans, 
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their “civilized” form of human organization is characterized by their ability to develop 
“iron and wheat.”125  
However, as Maldonado-Torres observes, there is more to this typology of social 
organization in which civilized society is ostensibly presented as the apex. Rousseau 
holds that these transformations are a reflection of the degradation of the human, which is 
established by their separation from the state of nature and pure natural faculties. In other 
words, the procurement of iron and wheat that is held to characterize civilization also 
unleashes the base passions. For Rousseau, civilization produces pejorative human 
qualities such as narcissism, artificial attachments and the unjust accumulation of 
property.126 Hence, the incipient emergence of civil society is moulded by “incipient 
inequality.”127 He states,  
For their part, the wealthy had no sooner known the pleasure of domination, than before 
long they disdained all others, and using their old slaves to subdue new ones, they 
thought of nothing but the subjugation and enslavement of their neighbors, like those 
ravenous wolves which, on having once tasted human flesh, reject all other food and 
desire to devour only men.128  
 
He continues, and observes that “the usurpation of the rich, the brigandage of the poor 
and the unbridled passions of everyone, shifting natural pity and the as yet feeble voice of 
justice, made men greedy, ambitious and bad.”129 As a result of these environmental, 
political and economic transformations, a Hobbesian state of war emerges and results in 
the disfigurement of the human soul: “nascent society gave way to the most horrible state 
of war.”130 As Seth and Maldonado-Torres suggest, what is important to note from 
Rousseau’s conjectural history is that these external transformations in the environment, 
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economics and politics are successive through the passage of time and not the result of 
any inherent properties of human nature; rather, these gradual social shifts transform the 
human as an individuated, subjective being.131  
 After Rousseau establishes the origins of inequality among men, he then 
examines three “revolutions” that result from it. First is the state of constant war. 
Rousseau suggests that the rich recognize the need for mutual agreements with the weak 
and poor in order to protect the latter’s private property, “to protect the weak from 
oppression, to restrain the ambitious, and ensure for each the possession of what belongs 
to him.”132 Subsequently, he suggests that laws were established through submission to 
“one supreme power” in order to govern all people. The enactment of laws underpins 
society by eroding natural liberty through legitimizing usurpation as an inviolable right, 
“and for the benefit of a few ambitious men subjected the human race thenceforth to 
labor, servitude, and misery.”133 
The second “revolution” emerges through the establishment of magistrates. 
According to Rousseau, the institution of magistrates crumbles due to conflict, and out of 
this social discord “ambitious leaders” arise helping to promote social stability. However, 
these leaders come to conceptualize themselves as equivalent to gods and see the 
magistrates as possessions and fellow citizens as slaves.134  
This leads to the third “revolution” of despotism. It is through the division 
between the strong and weak that a relationship of master and slave is established in 
society. In this state, the foundations of individualism are evacuated and people are 
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reduced to “nothing.” However, this stage itself leads to new revolutions that “dissolve 
the government altogether or bring it back to legitimacy.”135 In Maldonado-Torres’s 
reading, Rousseau ostensibly argues that the state of despotism yields itself to a new 
condition of equilibrium in which an originary “happy and long lasting” state of nature 
emerges, and human caprice and differentiation disappear from society. This, however, is 
not the case. For Rousseau, we cannot observe the original state of nature, but we can 
examine the so-called savage in order to discern how he is different than civilized man. 
Rousseau refers to empirical observation and the same travelogues that he locates as 
inadequate in order to glean the distinctions.136 Seth suggests the three “revolutions” that 
have come to constitute civilized man makes it so he cannot “return to the forests with the 
bears.”137 For Seth and Gordon, the Second Discourse is a melancholic expression of the 
decrepitude of contemporary European society and its inhabitants. Seth states, “The 
knowledge of his own perfectibility ensures that he will not want to return to the forests, 
while conscious agency, that expression of perfectibility, offers the optimism for change, 
for moral renewal.”138 Therefore, Rousseau does not suggest a return to the state of 
nature, nor to the valorized Enlightenment notions of individualism, and even less so to a 
state of despotism. Rather, he seeks to establish a vision of the political that is based upon 
a timeless freedom and balances the requirements of individual freedom with the social 
compact.139  
It is only when savage man moves through the three “revolutions” that he adapts 
to the changing environment and gains the capacity for perfectibility and agency. Before 
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this, the “savage” lacks any capacity for future oriented consciousness and fully formed 
agency, Rousseau observes: “Such is even today, the extent of the Carib’s foresight. In 
the morning he sells his bed of cotton and in the evening he returns in tears to buy it back, 
for want of having foreseen that he would need it that night.”140 Also he remarks, “they 
eventually die without anyone being aware that they are ceasing to exist, and almost 
without being aware of it themselves.”141 Drawing from thinkers such as Montaigne and 
empirical observation, Rousseau states that natural man is guided by instinct, and is void 
of the dynamic human capacity to command the power of his will. After having to adapt 
to the transformations in the environment and property relations, the so-called “savage” is 
only then endowed with complex forms of reasoning. Rousseau remarks, “the first man 
who, having enclosed a piece of land, thought of saying ‘This is mine’ and found people 
simple enough to believe him.”142 Thus, it is through the establishment of private 
property enclosures and legally sanctioned usurpation that conscious agency, human will 
and future oriented consciousness emerge, as Seth remarks, “Agency is the twin of 
bourgeois man.”143  
As man passes through the three “revolutions” he activates the capacity of human 
perfectibility by developing the mental and moral faculties such as reason, memory, 
imagination, and pride.144 Hence, paradoxically, Rousseau ends up endorsing the very 
processes that produce degenerate European bourgeois culture in order for the human to 
realize perfectibility associated with human agency and future oriented consciousness.145  
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 All in the name of political formations that are perfect, these themes are reflected 
in Rousseau’s political philosophy in addition to his novels and musical productions. 
Rousseau produces an account of human organization that moves from a speechless and 
isolated self towards familial and social relationships that engender emotional bonds, and, 
with them, an egoistic surrender to the perceptions of others. Through the development of 
individuation as disengaged reason, man recognizes love and inward purpose while also 
becoming imprisoned by the base passions of envy, jealously and pride.146 For instance, 
this narrative is clearly demonstrated in his opera The Village Soothsayer, in which his 
narrative of Colin and Colette reflects the malleability of the human through a narrative 
of their potential of perfectibility characterized by love and empathy cultivated in the 
pastoral village; however, their potential for deprivation is also illustrated by jealousy, 
pride and infidelity generated in the “civilized” yet corrupt city. However, as stated 
above, Rousseau then paradoxically illustrates that it is only by passing through the 
artificial domains of the city, which are held to be the cause of perverting their love, that 
they are able to fully exercise the capacity for authentic feeling and affection.   
Rousseau ends up in a position that Maldonado-Torres describes as “anti-
Eurocentric Eurocentrism” because Europe is the location where reason and agency have 
been cultivated the most, and also the location that is tied to processes of human 
degeneration. Consequently, “This opens the door for anyone to argue that while it might 
not be a good idea to colonize with the intent of civilizing the ‘savage,’ it is still a good 
idea to colonize in order to allow ‘savages’ to realize their humanity.”147 Maldonado-
Torres further observes that Rousseau does not entertain the possibility that “savages”, 
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who he suggests are examples of those living in an originary state of nature, live in 
dynamic societies with varying visions of the past, present and future.148 In short, 
Rousseau fails to acknowledge the full humanity of the “savage” he examines. 
Maldonado-Torres remarks,  
Rousseau searches for “savage” man, but does not consider that the “savage” have 
turned, for the most part, into the “colonized.” The “colonized provide a much better 
access to understanding his own self, inequality, and the European than do his 
hypothesized or the presumably historical savage.149  
 
This leads us back to Buck-Morss and Sala-Molins who argue that Rousseau is both 
racist and revolting. As Maldonado-Torres suggests, Rousseau does not ever consider 
that the so-called “savage” have been turned into the colonized. As Buck-Morss and Sala-
Molins illustrate, Rousseau was more concerned with slavery as an abstract philosophical 
principal, but not as a concrete practice. For instance, the French legal code, Le Code 
Noir (1684) that applied to black slaves in the colonies – and was not abolished until 
1848 – codified slavery as well as branding, torture, mutilation and killing enslaved 
people for objecting to their enslaved status.150 In his Social Contract, Rousseau remarks 
that “The right of slavery is null, not simply because it is illegitimate, but because it is 
absurd and meaningless.” 151 Rather than referring to slavery as a practice legislated in Le 
Code Noir, which Rousseau was no doubt aware of, he was referring to the third 
“revolution” of despotism.  
Rousseau passionately argued that all men were equal and conceptualized private 
property as a key institution of inequality; however, he never mentions French slavery as 
a nefarious institution of economic profit in his articulations of equality and property. 
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Sala-Molins states, Rousseau most certainly have known “that there are boudoirs in Paris 
where one amuses oneself indiscriminately with a monkey and a young black boy.”152 
Buck-Morss states,  
It took years of bloodshed before slavery – really – existing slavery, not merely its 
metaphorical analogy was abolished in the French colonies, and even then the gains were 
only temporary. Although the abolition of slavery was the only possible logical outcome 
of the idea of universal freedom, it did not come about through the revolutionary ideas or 
even the revolutionary actions of the French; it came about through the actions of the 
slaves themselves.153  
 
Contrasting Buck-Morss and Sala-Molins, I suggest that Rousseau was not deploying 
biological evolutionary notions of race organized by physiognomic differences. I argue 
that there are various political and ethical implications for thinking about Rousseau’s 
thought beyond the limited frame of racism. Besides running the risk of conceptualizing 
racism as an individualized form of bigoted expression, I read Rousseau’s failure to 
mention French slavery as indexical of the contingent knowledge structures and 
particular historical forms of reasoning available to him. Reading modern forms of race 
thinking into the eighteenth century, without the attendant nineteenth century 
epistemological structure of bio-evolutionism and historicism, can risk the suggestion 
that racism is simply an intrinsic feature of human and social relations. Instead, I argue 
racism is not congenital to human experience, but the product of historically bounded 
traditions of knowledge and thought. If race is simply reduced to a synonym for any 
articulation of human alterity then the possibility for examining the conditions for its 
emergence in addition to thinking about the conditions for its de-naturalization are 
foreclosed. Finally, anachronistically reading race into Rousseau’s thought could 
potentially lead us away from examining the historically grounded features and 
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theological inscriptions of his universal conception of the human; namely, the production 
of the savage figure that is denied the full capacities of human perfectibility. I am in 
agreement with Maldonado-Torres who suggests that Rousseau is better understood as 
espousing a form of anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism – this, again, can certainly be 
understood as revolting.   
 In this chapter I examined the Enlightenment period of the long eighteenth 
century through the work of Jean Jacques Rousseau, and located him within the frame of 
coloniality. I argued that his theory of human perfectibility is essential to his political 
theory of the social compact and his critiques of European civil society. I suggested that 
his theory of human perfectibility was generated through four interrelated domains of the 
coloniality of knowledge. First, his philosophy concerning the origins of natural human 
and his essential nature was indebted to a lineage of colonial travelogues and missionary 
accounts that fused Christian theological notions of monogenesis and Platonism. Second, 
natural history classificatory schemas concerning the location of the human in the 
theologically inscribed Great Chain of Being created the epistemic conditions for 
Rousseau to examine the unique nature of human agency vis-à-vis other sentient beings. 
Third, Rousseau extends the Protestant Christian focus upon the inward, detached subject 
through his unique novel structure and musical productions; consequently, this furthers 
the processes of disenchantment and the constitution of the universal, individuated self. 
Fourth, Rousseau introduces temporally varied stages of the individual self in order to 
suggest that civil society, characterized by law and property relations, underpin human 
degeneration and perfectibility, rather than being the result of an essentialized human 
nature. Paradoxically, while he does provide a critique of Eurocentrism, Rousseau ends 
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up endorsing the very processes of human degeneration via decadent European civil 
society, and by extension European colonialism, which was in part structured by the 
institution of slavery. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Charles Darwin: Bio-Evolution, Religious Cognition, and Coloniality 
 
 
In the previous chapter I examined the Enlightenment period of the eighteenth 
century through the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I argued that his critiques of 
European civil society emerged in relation to colonial representations of the so-called 
noble savage. I illustrated how his philosophies concerning malleable human nature and 
human perfectibility were generated through a theological and philosophical heritage that 
fused Biblical monogenesis with Platonic discourses concerning perfected forms within 
the classificatory structure of Enlightenment natural history. While offering an account of 
human degeneration brought about by “artificial” European civil society, Rousseau 
paradoxically suggested that human perfection was attained through the very processes 
and institutions he decried as “artificial.” That Rousseau relied upon a Christian 
theological lineage of human difference via Genesis and the Chain of Being did not 
preclude him from further engendering notions of human centred agency and inward 
focused forms of individuated subjectivity via his philosophy, novels and musical 
productions.  
In this chapter I examine the Victorian period of the nineteenth century through 
the work of Charles Darwin (1809-1882). More than a century after his death, the record 
of Darwin’s life remains an emerging field study: Darwin himself produced an 
autobiography written privately for his family, his son Francis edited a five-volume 
collection of his personal letters, and the University of Cambridge has untaken the task of 
transcribing over 13,000 of his correspondence letters. It has been well documented that 
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Darwin was exposed to a variety of world views from an early age, he was the son of a 
doctor and grandson of the celebrated speculative evolutionist Erasmus Darwin, while his 
mother was the daughter of the famous industrial potter and Unitarian abolitionist Josiah 
Wedgwood.1  
Darwin attended Edinburgh University for medical school, but eventually left this 
ambition to attend Cambridge in order to become an Anglican priest – the only university 
degree Darwin attained in his three years of study was in theology.2 While at Cambridge, 
he became well acquainted with the professor of botany, John Stevens Henslow, and 
subsequently developed a stronger interest in science and the classificatory principals of 
natural history. It was from Henslow’s advocacy that the twenty-two year Darwin was 
chosen to partake in a surveying voyage as a naturalist upon the HMS Beagle, which was 
commissioned by the British Admiralty.3 As I will discuss in further detail, the Beagle’s 
circumnavigation of the globe lasted five years (1831-1836), and in his autobiography, 
Darwin recalled that the voyage of the Beagle was the most important experience in his 
entire life and determined the trajectory of his career. Perhaps no other moment during 
his voyage had impacted him more than what he witnessed upon the shores of Tierra del 
Fuego, “The sight of a naked savage in his native land is an event which can never be 
forgotten.”4 Not to be forgotten, Darwin’s encounters with naked savages would later 
punctuate the notion of intra-species continuity in his bio-evolutionary history.  
Darwin returned from the Beagle voyage as a competent geologist and naturalist. 
However, what is often missed in biographical accounts is that he also came back as a 
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burgeoning anthropologist as evidenced by his detailed ethnological observations of the 
Indigenous peoples he encountered globally. Shortly removed from the Beagle voyage, 
Darwin produced his entire theory of evolution in about nine hundred pages of private 
notes from 1837 to 1839. Darwin continued to produce written material at a prolific rate, 
and in 1839 he published the Journal of Researchers based upon his meticulous 
descriptions and colourful experiences upon the Beagle – this text subsequently became 
one of the most widely read travel accounts of the nineteenth century.5  
This brief portrait is meant index some of the influences upon Darwin’s life and 
scientific career that I elaborate upon further in subsequent sections. That Darwin was a 
wealthy Victorian European male from a celebrated family lineage highlights the 
geopolitical and body-political location of his thought and this serves to counter the 
Western philosophical myth regarding the objective, neutral and non-situated “Ego.”6 He 
was indeed situated within a variety of traditions, including his family’s abolitionist 
positions, that were anchored by a monogenetic and evolutionary portrait of man, his 
Cambridge training in natural theology, and his encounters with Indigenous peoples 
circumnavigating the globe upon the Beagle. I suggest that these geo and body-political 
domains cannot be disassociated from his speculative evolutionism.  
I organize this chapter by staging an examination of Darwin’s bio-evolutionary 
structure of history through four co-produced registers of coloniality. First, I locate 
Darwin within Enlightenment epistemological transformations regarding time and space, 
and the emergence of colonial historiography. I suggest that the progressive 
chronological structure of world-history was dependent upon the anthropological 
                                                        
5
 Howard, op. cit. 6 
6
 Grosfogel, Ramon, “World-Systems Analysis in the Context of Transmodernity, Border Thinking, and 
Global Coloniality,” Review (Fernand Braudel Centre), 29(2), 2006, pp. 168-169 
191 
 
invention of the category of religion as a cognitive feature of “primitive” superstition and 
myth. In other words, the emergence of world-history as a modern discipline and practice 
emerged through the coloniality of knowledge, that is, separating empirically verifiable 
events from the myths of superstitious primitive cognition.  
Second, I explore Darwin’s notebook entries from his Beagle voyages. I situate 
his entries within the larger epistemological temporal structure of progressive world-
history, naturalist science, and colonial travelogues related to the global expansion of 
British empire. Consequently, I argue that Darwin conceptualized Indigenous peoples as 
Europe’s ancestors through a historicist frame anchored by notions of superstitious 
primitivism.  
Third, I illustrate that the Enlightenment conception of religion as a quantifiable 
object of knowledge underpinned Darwin’s distinctive theory concerning the origin of 
religious cognition. I show that he initially depended upon dominant Victorian 
anthropological approaches to the study of the origin of religion, but ultimately 
challenged them. Specifically, I illustrate that Darwin attempted to reconcile the problem 
of inter-species variation while maintaining the structure of intra-species continuity 
within a bio-evolutionary structure by appealing to religion. Put directly, the simplistic 
religious expressions of primitive savages were evidence, according to Darwin, that 
humans descended from beasts.   
Fourth, I will illustrate that Darwin promoted the colonizing project of developing 
the mental and moral faculties of the primitive non-European by extending missionary 
governance through his anti-slavery humanitarianism. Put directly, the vintage of 
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Darwin’s humanitarianism emerged through the production of colonial difference – the 
potential for human perfectibility depended upon the primitive subject being colonized.  
As a scientist, author, correspondent and humanitarian activist, Darwin’s 
influence across a myriad of academic and non-academic disciplines over the last century 
has congealed into what has been called “Darwin studies” or what others have called the 
“Darwin Industry.”7 Plunging into the capacious field of “Darwinism”, I seek to 
differentiate my approach by locating his thought in relation to coloniality. Briefly, I will 
illustrate how this examination departs from the literary and cultural studies frame, which 
has examined Darwin through a diverse set of registers well beyond the scope of his 
scientific writings. For instance, Gillian Beer's Darwin’s Plots (1983) and George 
Levine’s Darwin and the Novelists (1988) represent influential studies that have 
examined the narratological implications of Darwin’s bio-evolutionary theory of 
transmutation.8  
Various other literary and cultural theorists (Endersby 2009; Choi 2009; Richards 
2002; Johnson 2015; Desmond and Moore 2009) have examined a wide range of 
Victorian social and cultural influences upon Darwin’s thought including gender, natural 
science, medicine, botany, theology, emotional and aesthetic sensibilities, and the 
proliferation of dynamic literary forms for instance.9 These thinkers have offered a rich 
account of contextualizing Darwin’s thought within the matrices of English social and 
cultural relations. In many cases, however, I suggest that these attempts to radically 
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decentre Darwin’s thought, and dislodge it from the narrow parameters of science, have 
in fact distanced him from the epistemic locations from which his thought arose – 
specifically, the constitutive registers of coloniality.  
For instance, Levine argues that attempts to position Darwin within the genesis of 
capitalist, sexist, or racist ideologies fail to recognize the wider implications of his 
thinking because, simply, his theory of evolution was “right”,  
One need not become a passionate Darwinian, of the sort I feel myself to be, to recognize 
Darwin's significance for our own hyperactive and confused moment. Current 
Darwinizing is being done in a world in which, stupefyingly, the theory of evolution by 
natural selection is often treated as though it were still controversial.10  
 
Levine continues,   
 
Perhaps ironically, no humanist critics I have encountered, not even those who leave 
Darwin out or condemn his ideology, would express doubt about the validity of the 
theory of evolution by natural selection. The theory may simply be capitalism writ large; 
sexual selection may simply give scientific authority to sexism (it doesn't); The Descent 
of Man (1871) may embody a racist orientation (that is far too simple…) but Darwin was 
right about evolution, right about sexual selection, and hostile to slavery, and it makes 
sense to try to figure out what the implications of these facts are.11 
 
Darwin, according to Levine, was simply “right” so much, in fact, that his theory of 
evolution should not be abridged to any one vector, be it capitalism, sexism, racism, 
science, or imaginative literary expression for instance. This reading, however, can have 
the effect of circumscribing the disquieting features of Darwin’s thought into “simple” 
reductionisms that are held to be reactionary, anachronistic and intellectually immature 
expressions that fail to see grander import of his work. Levine’s paternalistic treatment of 
those who refuse to enter the gates of Darwin studies based upon the prescriptive truth 
claim of evolution by natural selection, therefore, can quickly be dismissed as harbingers 
of, in his words, “stupefying” approaches that pervert the “facts.”  
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Nevertheless, no matter how “hyperactive” and “confused” a moment Levine 
believes we may be living in, I do find the constitution of Darwin’s theory of bio-
evolution controversial precisely because of its presumed universal, neutral and objective 
status as “fact.” The problem with Levine’s universalistic presentation of evolution is that 
it has the effect of delinking Darwin’s epistemic location in structures of power. This 
Eurocentric “point zero” perspective places Darwin’s theory of evolution beyond the 
particular and local contingencies of knowledge – that Darwin could potentially be read 
as capitalist, sexist, or racist for instance is subsumed into the universal validity of his 
thought. This is not to make the banal observation that all knowledge is partial and 
situated, but rather to place Western philosophical and scientific knowledge production 
within the context of Eurocentric epistemology that has anchored the global colonial-
capitalist world system for the last five hundred years. This chapter stands as an attempt 
to try to figure out the implications of Darwin’s thought without concealing its 
constitutive “dark side” by celebrating its factual nature in universality through the ego-
politics of knowledge.  
 
 
Brief Outline of Darwin’s Theory of Descent with Modification by Means of Natural 
Selection  
  
In Darwin’s The Origins of Species (1859), he outlined his systematic theory of 
descent by natural selection. Rather than detailing the entirety of his biological 
evolutionary history, I will outline its basic structure in order to provide a theoretical 
context to the broader aims of the chapter. 
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I highlight four interrelated processes that capture the main tenants of his theory 
of descent with variation by natural selection. First, variation: all organisms that 
reproduce – either sexually or asexually – will generate progeny that marginally vary. No 
offspring is a duplicate of their parents; they may have variations in limb size, hair 
length, or other slight differences in features thereby illustrating creature variation. For 
Darwin, he did not suggest why or how these variations took place, that is, the slight 
variations that occur over time are not able to be projected in by any consistent model or 
mechanism – they are based upon chance12. Darwin maintained throughout his life that 
the exact reasons for variations that occur through reproduction were limited by human 
ignorance.13 That Darwin did not explicitly link variability to a specific mechanism, most 
notably environmental changes, is where he departed most from the constructivist 
evolutionary philosophy his grandfather Erasmus. For Erasmus, transformations in 
external conditions correlated to adaptive change, that is, variability was not 
unpredictable.14  
 Second, heritability: variations between parents and their offspring are often 
handed down through reproduction. Put another way, variations are often preserved 
throughout successive generations. For instance, creatures with longer limbs or hair will 
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likely produce offspring with similar features and these variations can become more 
prominent through generations.15  
Third, competition for survival: there are more organisms produced in every 
species than will survive. This notion was established through the natural theology of the 
Anglican cleric Thomas Malthus in his Essay on Population (1798). Disillusioned with 
the Enlightenment doctrine of human perfectibility, Malthus suggested that the law of 
nature dictated the intrinsic struggle for survival brought upon by the universal tendency 
for creatures to multiply in a geometrical progression, and to deplete the resources of the 
environment.16 In short, Malthus’s philosophical theodicy suggested that a large portion 
of humankind was characterized by degeneration as a result of the imbalance between 
productive and reproductive capabilities.17  
Reversing the Malthusian structure of degeneration while maintaining its 
quantitative analytical principals, Darwin read the sixth edition of Malthus’s essay and 
recast the struggle for survival within a framework of human perfectibility by biological 
evolution.18 For Darwin, creatures produced offspring at a faster pace than the resources 
available for their survival, and, as a result, only a limited number would remain alive. 
Herbert Spencer coined the term to illustrate this process as “survival of the fittest” and 
this was subsequently appropriated by Darwin after the co-discoverer of natural selection 
A.R. Wallace informed him the fact.19  
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 Fourth, natural selection: if the above three processes occur, as Darwin theorized, 
then the technique of natural selection would create the conditions for evolution to occur. 
Organisms that have inherited variations that could be considered advantageous are most 
likely to live and flourish rather than those who varied in disadvantageous ways. For 
instance, a creature born with longer hair in an environment that was best suited for this 
type of variation, such as colder conditions, would then be said to have a heritable 
variation of advantage thereby being “selected” by nature to survive and pass along the 
advantageous variant. For Darwin, why or how some creatures inherited variation, as 
mentioned above, was unknown and based upon chance, rather than dependent upon 
external conditions according to the constructivist model of Erasmus Darwin or Jean-
Baptiste Lamarck. Hence, if creatures did by chance inherit advantageous variation they 
were more likely to be selected to survive over those who did not adequately vary.20  
The four main postulates of Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection in 
the Origins had little to say concerning the common biological origin of humanity and 
relational bonds between human and non-human animals except that “light will be 
thrown on the origin of man and his history.”21 This subject was broached in his later 
work The Descent of Man (1871) and Expressions of Emotions (1872). Man, according to 
Darwin, was subject to heritability through marginal variations over time while his 
reproductive capacity largely exceeded the availability of natural resources to support his 
offspring; therefore, man was subject to natural selection.22  
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Physically, Darwin suggested, man shared similar features to animals, however, 
the main register of difference was to be found in the mental faculties. Concerning mental 
capacity, he suggested, “man and lower animals do not differ in kind, although 
immensely in degree. A difference in degree, however great, does not justify us in 
placing man in a different kingdom.”23 In sum, Darwin argued that a) human beings 
constituted a distinct monogenetic species; b) humans varied in degrees vis-à-vis mental 
and moral faculties, known as inter-species variation; c) humans and animals shared an 
evolutionary link, known as intra-species continuity. A central tension that Darwin faced 
when developing his theory of bio-evolution, consequently, was accounting for inter-
species variation while maintaining the structure of intra-species continuity.  
Man, for Darwin, was an animal species that was unique most centrally in his 
intellectual powers – differences in intellect, therefore, correlated to differences in human 
“degrees.” As such, despite the notion that all humans descended from a common stock, 
they seemed to vary quite radically in what Darwin perceived to be their degrees in 
intellect. For instance, Indigenous peoples and other so-called “primitive” non-Europeans 
he encountered globally during his Beagle voyages ranked amongst the lowest degree of 
human in his estimation. Nevertheless, Darwin could not simply suggest the primitive 
native was a transitional species between human and beast as this would justify placing 
them in a “different kingdom” and confirm polygenesis.  
Crucially, therefore, Darwin’s notion of intra-species continuity between humans 
and animals was staged through the register of mental cognition. Put differently, the main 
category that he used to form a link between human and animals was conceived through 
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the differences in intellectual faculties. Not departing from Enlightenment notions of 
progress, Darwin concerned himself with one of the central categories held to distinguish 
the unique intellectual and moral characteristics of European man in relation to the 
primitive savage – that is, religion. Remarkably, Darwin suggested that the rudimentary 
origins of religiosity were to be found in dogs as well as primitive non-European savages. 
Consequently, religious cognition was used as the main marker of intellectual and moral 
development in order to generate a bio-evolutionary history. In Darwin’s Descent of Man, 
for instance, he provides portraits of animal mental and moral forms of cognition and 
resignifies human behavior through a series of animal analogies.24 As I will discuss in 
further detail below, primitive non-Europeans were located as an intermediate stage – not 
in terms of a separate species, but in terms of mental and moral capacity via the category 
of religion – between non-human animals and civilized man.  
In this landscape, Darwin is a crucial figure in the production of the coloniality of 
knowledge because he reorganized the dominant eighteenth century comparative 
classificatory schema of natural history into a bio-evolutionary schema. While natural 
historians and political philosophers relied upon the Chain of Being in order to compare 
the distinctive nature of the human in relation to non-human animals, Darwin created a 
bio-evolutionary structure to suggest that the human, in fact, descended from non-human 
animals. Put directly, Darwin helped to usher forth the reorganization and transformation 
of the eighteenth century comparative diagram of differences into a progressive scale of 
biological evolution through the category of religious cognition.25  
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In the next section I illustrate in greater detail how eighteenth and nineteenth 
century construction of religion, understood as an index for mental and moral progress, 
was constituted through shifts in epistemological registers concerning temporality, space 
and superstitious cognition. Specifically, I will examine the rise of historicism and the 
conception of progress in relation to further transformations concerning evolutionary 
notions of human difference. I suggest that the rise of progressive chronology, organized 
through world-history, helped create the epistemic conditions for Darwin to make his 
intervention of bio-evolutionary history supported by religious gradation.26  
 
 
Enlightenment Transformations: From Natural History to Progressive Historicism  
Attempting to locate the emergence of “progress” and secular chronological forms 
of world history is a formidable task that cannot possibly be captured in all its 
contingencies and complex transformations in one chapter – let alone a single section. 
Nevertheless, I feel it necessary to attempt to provide a general diagram concerning the 
rise of historicism and how the category of progress impacted European representational 
schemas of difference. I decided not to approach the rise of historicism and the rise of 
modern time consciousness by accounting for unique processes internal to Europe within 
a diffusionist historical framework via capital and the work of Moshe Postone, or E.P 
Thompson for instance; or solely through the generalization and universalization of 
Biblical chronology via Johannes Fabian for instance. Rather, I will trace the emergence 
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of progressive historicism by examining the registers of coloniality through the invention 
of religion and myth. 
By the end of the Enlightenment profound shifts occurred in temporality with the 
rise of Newtonian mechanics and the production of primitive tradition. These processes 
helped to give rise to new studies in anthropology based upon a new quality of duration 
and progress – both temporal registers that retain theological traces of Biblical 
chronology while exceeding it through its secular dissemination. Darwin inherited these 
Enlightenment discourses of primitive traditionalism and forms of temporality and 
located them within a bio-evolutionary history.  
 I suggest that it was through the invention of the non-European superstitious 
figure where progressive chronology, sequenced through the grid of world-historical 
taxonomies, took on its “modern” form. On the one hand, Europe would represent itself 
as the space of self-determining and autonomous historical agents of “progress.” Its 
constitutive underside, on the other hand, was non-Europe. The perceived space of 
superstition, tradition and myth: a space inhabited by primitive subjects incapable of 
abstract thought and unable to become subjects of history. In order to contextualize 
Darwin’s thought in relation to the rise of historicism, I will situate my analysis within 
two interrelated processes of coloniality. First, through colonial expansion and the 
emergence of new types of anthropological discourse, the category of “religion” was 
invented to index “false” psychological projections of reality via superstition and myth. 
Second, time was spatialized, that is, European historical subjectivity was invented 
through the production of the primitive condition of historical inertia.  
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As discussed in previous chapters, the theological Time of Salvation was 
inclusive because the pagan, infidel or apostate were conceived as candidates for 
salvation via similitude. The secularization of time, conceived as natural history, marked 
a qualitative shift in time during the Enlightenment – secular as opposed to sacred – and a 
crucial shift in temporal relations structured by the notion of progressive taxonomies. 
Difference was no longer marked by the theological register of non-believer, but by the 
evolutionary register of the primitive and savage, Fabian states: “The naturalization of 
Time which succeeded to that view defines temporal relations as exclusive and 
expansive. The pagan was always already marked for salvation, the savage is not yet 
ready for civilization.”27 As I will suggest, Darwin projects the primitive figure through 
this temporal grid; consequently they were represented as lacking the mental and moral 
faculties to transform social and material domains in order to become subjects of history 
as civilized humans.   
According to Bernard McGrane one of the major shifts that occurs through the 
eighteenth century is the rise of new anthropological and philosophical techniques of 
apprehending human difference. For him, demonological anthropology, which 
constituted human difference through theological coordinates of the non-Christian 
“pagan”, was reorganized into a post-demonology discourse of the non-European 
“primitive.”28 Europe transformed its self-understanding as moving beyond the ignorant 
and illusory parochialism of a theocentric epistemological universe through constructing 
the category of “religion” as a transparent and measurable object of knowledge. Through 
this very process, the primitive non-European figure would come to embody myth, 
                                                        
27
 Fabian, Johannes, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002 (1983), pp. 26 
28
 McGrane, op. cit. 55-56 
203 
 
superstition and tradition. I argue that it was through the invention of the superstitious 
“primitive” figure incapable of abstract thought that represents a key moment regarding 
the split between authentic “scientific” history and inauthentic mythological accounts of 
duration.   
Significantly, a key process in the colonial production of human difference 
concerns how “Christianity” became “religion” and how “religion” became an object of 
study by anthropology. McGrane offers a broad account of how Europe transformed its 
self-understanding and circumscribed Christianity as a psychological category. Religion 
was transformed into mythological narratives, or, more precisely, as psychological forms 
of distortion, moral weakness and ignorance. It was through constructing religion as a 
psychological category that myopically pursues false explanations of existence that the 
non-European primitive subject would come to embody in its most extreme forms.29  
Throughout the eighteenth century, the works of Bayle, Fontenelle, Newton, 
Hume, de Brosses, Boulanger, Dupis and de Gebelin undertook the complex process of 
re-conceptualizing theological metaphysics into anthropological categories, that is, as 
psychological projections of the human mind.30 Similarly, Charles Taylor observes that a 
typological ordering of “bad religion” was produced through three main vectors: 
superstition, fanaticism and enthusiasm. For Taylor, the construction of “superstition” 
was an extension of Protestant conceptual grammars of condemning Catholicism for 
mediating the transcendent through its liturgical worship cycles and ritual observances 
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(explored in Chapter two). 31  Taylor, however, does not adequately account for the 
production of “bad religion” through colonial historiography. 
Talal Asad offers an account of the typological ordering of religion through 
imperialism. He argues that the production of “religion” and “nature” emerge as universal 
categories through European colonial expansion and their regulation of overseas colonies. 
He suggests that into the nineteenth century, the Enlightenment reformulated 
demonological categories of “idolatry” and “devil-worship” into the secular concept of 
“superstition.” Hence, the devotional activities of savage “nature folk” became regarded 
as notions given the false status of truth through primitive “fetish” and “taboo.”32 For 
Asad, it was through Enlightenment notions of reason that superstitious fetish rituals and 
sensibilities became constituted as categories of false thinking, illusion and oppression. 
He states,  
Reason requires that false things be either proscribed and eliminated, or transcribed and 
re-sited as objects to be seen, heard, and touched by the properly education senses. By 
successfully unmasking pretended power (profaning it) universal reason displays its own 
status as legitimate power.33  
 
According to Asad, it was Christian anxiety and doubt that drove skeptical biblical 
scholars towards constituting Christianity as an object to be studied as a form of cognitive 
belief – as stated above. As a result, secular forms of historiography emerged.  
As forms of secular critique emerged, Christianity was increasingly understood as an 
unviable set of traditional practices out of which emerged a split between “scientific” 
history as the pursuit of unknown causes (also understood as causality, or contingency) 
and “imaginative” religious literature and arts. It is at this moment, according to Asad, 
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that the category of “myth”, “sacred discourse” and “symbolism” took shape. He states 
convincingly, “The rereading of the scriptures through the grid of myth has not only 
separated the sacred from the secular, it has helped to constitute the secular as the 
epistemological domain in which history exists as history – as anthropology.”34 Hence, 
Asad illustrates that it was through reconstituting biblical exegesis into traditional 
mythological literature and arts, in addition to the rise of anthropological conceptual 
vocabularies concerning primitive fetishism and superstition, that helped give rise to a 
new quality of time – that is, scientific accounts of “what really happened” as opposed to 
the false psychological projections of superstition and myth.35  
I suggest that the main shift witnessed vis-à-vis human difference in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries from “pagan” to “primitive” takes place through the 
transformation of religion into a category of cognitive belief. Consequently, the 
anthropological invention of religion as a knowable object of study and as a mode of 
determining intelligence and rationality was the space through which new meaning was 
inscribed upon the mental faculties of peoples associated with the categories of 
superstition, myth, taboo and fetish rituals. In other words, it was through the 
construction of “religion” as a psychological form of oppressive superstition, exemplified 
in the non-European, that Europe’s self-conception of itself as progressing further 
towards “Enlightenment” was produced.  
These processes are exemplified in the work of Auguste Comte (1798 – 1857). He 
suggested that historical phases were distinguished by their particular intellectual system, 
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and, therefore, ideas represented the primary moving force of history.36 After having 
considered Charles de Brosses’s De Culte des Dieux Fetiches (1760), Comte appealed to 
the category of fetish to produce his theory of religious development through an 
evolutionary schema in his two primary works, the Cours de Philosophie Positive (1830-
42) and the Système de Politique Positive (1851-54). For Comte, primitive man – such as 
“the humble thinkers of central Africa”37 – venerated fetishes in the belief that they 
exercised immaterial transcendent agency over the material world. In a series of 
developmental sequences, according to Comte, fetishism transmuted into polytheistic 
forms of worship, most notably through the ancient Greeks, who introduced unique forms 
of abstraction into complex devotional cycles. These atavistic expressions of fetish ritual 
and polytheism were then located as the antecedents to the most complex and abstract 
form of religious dispensation: Christian monotheism.38 Hence, Comte’s signification of 
religion as an expression of intellectual development located contemporaneous primitives 
and bygone ancients within an evolutionary structure, to study primitive fetish was to 
glimpse into Europe’s past.  
Thinkers from the Age of reason aligned the religious rites of the ancient pagans and 
the fetish rituals of primitive non-European as evidence of anthropocentrism – the 
“primitive mind” did not distinguish between objects, supernaturalisms and themselves. 
Accordingly, the superstitious primitive intellectual projections of transcendent forces 
were held to illustrate their inability to form abstract, mechanistic conceptions of the 
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universe.39 European ethnological accounts concerning the inability of the “primitive” 
intellect to form abstract forms of thought were often staged by counting exercises. The 
failure to count objects past a few digits was used to prove the savages inability to 
transform their material surroundings through the self-conscious capacity to differentiate 
between subject and object.  
Newtonian mechanistic notions characterized by abstract visions of reality were held 
to be absent from the superstitious psychology of the non-European. McGrane states the 
“primitive mentality is that which lacks Newtonian mechanism, which is ignorant of 
Newtonian mechanistic vision of the general operation of the cosmos.”40 On the one 
hand, the “enlightened” European subject was held to be capable of unhinging their 
consciousness from the provincialism of religious authority – they may observe 
traditional rituals as a matter of personal choice, or, equally, choose to leave them.41 On 
the other hand, the primitive subject was held to be largely incapable of separating their 
consciousness from supernaturalisms; they were therefore unable to transform the 
external world and understand progress via abstract notions of reality. It is within these 
capabilities that the Western subject’s ontological status was located; unlike the 
primitive, they were a self-determining individual, capable of separating tradition and 
myth from “reality.” This was where self-conscious transcendentalism took on its modern 
form.  
Immanuel Kant, for example, in his “Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and 
the Sublime” considered David Hume’s observations in his essay “Of National 
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Characters” regarding the inability of the African to produce any abstract scientific 
principles, art or other dynamic productions of manufacture. Kant suggests,  
The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the ridiculous. Mr. Hume 
challenges anyone to adduce a single example where a Negro has demonstrated talents, and 
asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who have been transported elsewhere 
from their countries, although very many of them have been set free, nevertheless not a single 
one has ever been found who has accomplished something great in art or science or shown 
any other praiseworthy quality…42 
 
For Kant, one of the primary reasons for this intellectual lethargy was due to their 
atavistic religious devotions,  
The religion of fetishes which is widespread among them is perhaps a sort of idolatry, which 
sinks so deeply into the ridiculous as ever seems to be possible for human nature. A bird’s 
feather, a cow’s horn, a shell, or any other common thing, as soon as it is consecrated with 
some words, is an object of veneration and of invocation in swearing oaths. The blacks are 
very vain, but in the Negro’s way, and so talkative that they must be driven apart from each 
other by blows.43 
 
Drawing upon Linnaeus’s typological ordering of four national types – Asiaticus, 
Africanus, Europeaus, and Amaricanus – via Enlightenment natural history (discussed in 
chapter three), Kant located the origins of the beautiful, sublime and pure reason in 
Europe.44 Shortly thereafter, Hegel would locate the geographical typology of national 
character types within a temporalized historical schema. 
According to Prathama Banerjee, the relationship between the invention of the 
“primitive” and the invention of time as chronology was most clearly illustrated in the 
work of Hegel and his Philosophy of History (1837). Hegel suggested that the colonial 
world, encompassing, for instance, the Oriental and the savage, were held to be incapable 
of mechanistic, abstract conceptions of reality – they lacked self-consciousness 
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transcendentalism. For Hegel, the primitive condition was characterized by their inability 
to acquire the requisite self-consciousness of the historical nation.45 In Banerjee’s 
reading, the significance of Hegel is not only that he invented modern historical 
subjectivity through the production of the primitive condition, but how he 
reconceptualized the very essence of temporality. Hegel accomplished this by spatializing 
time. As Seth observes, “Hegel sought to rank particular cultures within a graduated, 
teleological history.”46  
Hegel suggested that “history” was the advance of the Sprit in time to the full 
consciousness of its very being through the realization of freedom and reason – it is at 
this point of realization that marks the emergence of the modern subject.47 As Zubairu 
Wai argues, the Spirit emerges as the actual embodiment in cultures, peoples and nations 
thereby indexing those who participate as “World-historical people”, that is, those who 
partake in the movement of history. By spatializing time, Hegel held that those in Frigid 
and Torrid zones were bereft of World-historical potential, whereas the temperate zones 
of Europe – which housed the Christian German Spirit – were the very locations of 
historical progress.48 Speaking of Africa, Hegel argued the entire continent was irrelevant 
to the movement of history, “At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it 
is no historical part of the world; it has no movement or development to exhibit.”49 
Further, in Hegel’s Reason in History, the “Negro” and Africa are represented as spaces 
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of energy and sensual corporeality, and represented motionless stagnation that is fixed in 
time.50  
It was through the spatialization of temporality, organized through colonial cultural 
typologies, that Hegel was able to produce a progressive chronological history. As 
Reinhardt Koselleck suggests, it was through colonial expansion where comparison 
became organized both spatially and temporally, and, consequently, is one of the defining 
characteristics of the modern sensibility of history: “The geographical opening up of the 
globe brought to light various but coexisting cultural levels which were, through the 
process of synchronous comparison, then ordered diachronically. Looking from civilized 
Europe to a barbaric America was a glance backward.”51 As a result, for Koselleck, 
comparative world history emerged as the universal structure of time that locates some 
peoples and cultures as advanced and others as backward. He calls this type of discourse 
the “contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous” 52 – the process of translating social, 
cultural and religious difference, into a single homogeneous progressive notion of world 
history. He states, “The contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous, initially a result of 
overseas expansion, became a basic framework for the progressive construction of a 
world history increasingly unified since the eighteenth century.”53 Koselleck rightly 
observes that comparative world history is dependent upon the conception of comparison: 
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“the nonsimultaneity of diverse, but, in a chronological sense, simultaneous histories.”54 
In other words, progressive time depends upon representing different “histories” indexed 
by non-European forms of religious and cultural difference as coexisting at the same 
chronological simultaneous present; however, some are conceptualized as 
nonsimultaneous, or in a lessor stage of development. 
Whereas as India could be represented by Hegel to be a zone of despotic caprice, and 
Africa as demonic malevolence, this is not to disregard their conceptual value among 
historians and anthropologists in relation the constitution of historicism. Put another way, 
while non-Europe was held to be inconsequential to history, or as the negation of history, 
their relevance to historicism is that their “primitive” traditions would come to represent 
Europe’s past that it had long surpassed.55 As Seth states,  
Tradition ceased to be posited in opposition to history because it had gradually come to be 
historicized in its own right. Societies governed by tradition (primitive societies that in a later 
age were to be redesignated “traditional”) were societies that continued to reside in a 
particular stage of history that non-traditional societies had once experienced but had since 
surpassed.56  
 
The representation of the inert superstitious-primitive figure, therefore, was the very 
condition for the genesis of a progressive world historical schema. The colonial 
production of Europe’s history as continually unfolding towards “enlightened” progress 
underpinned Darwin’s thought. Specifically, this spatio-temporal arrangement provided 
the epistemological coordinates for Darwin’s confident perception of a civilizational gap 
between himself and the primitive Indigenous people that he transformed into objects of 
knowledge for a bio-evolutionary history. 
Modern civilized subjects, those freed from the parochial manacles of tradition, were 
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held to transform social and material relations via abstract, Newtonian conceptions of the 
universe. Importantly, through the spatializaton of time assembled in relation to national 
types, most notably via Kant and Hegel, Europe became the location of historical agents 
of progress while leaving behind a stagnant past. It was within the matrices of the 
reordering of the theological through the production of superstition and myth that 
duration would help find its linear cadence along with the help of geology.  
Various Enlightenment thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth century produced 
works concerned with dating the earth via geological chronology. The discipline of 
geology had profound effects upon the study of religion as their durational estimates far 
exceeded the six thousand years indexed by Biblical Genesis. Prominent studies included 
George Buffon’s Epochs of Nature (1778), which dated the earth at a minimum of 75,000 
years – he resisted a longer time frame due to scriptural authority. Immanuel Kant 
suggested the earth was part of an infinite unfolding system in which millions of 
centuries produced new worlds in his Universal Natural History and Theory of the 
Heavens (1755). The most ridiculed account was from Lamarck in his Hydrogeology 
(1802), which suggested that the earth was in fact billions of years old and that humans 
descended from fish.57 Despite these works, however, Biblical chronology still influenced 
geological history in the first years of the nineteenth century, most notably from Georges 
Cuvier’s Researches on Quadruped Fossil Bones (1811) and William Buckland’s 
Reliquiae Diluvianae (1823).58 
Charles Lyell, however, proved to be most influential to Darwin. Lyell produced a 
widely read manuscript entitled the Principals of Geology (1830), which Darwin brought 
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with him on his Beagle voyages. It remains a prime example of a distinct form of travel 
writing aimed at recording an authentic “scientific” geological account of history through 
the collection of data concerning physical geography while still holding faithful to 
elements of theological metaphysics.59  Significantly, the preoccupation with physical 
geography for scientific explanations of the world, rather than superstitious mythological 
ones, helped open the horizons of time beyond the limiting vectors of Biblical chronology 
mediated by the events of salvation and eschatology.  
According to Koselleck, it was only when time broke with conceiving and 
experiencing duration as the temporalization of expectation of inevitable apocalypse that 
temporality was opened up to different vistas. He argues that sacred Christian time 
consciousness limited the scope of “human ambition and hope” while modern time 
consciousness, understood as a secular experience, opened society to unknown futurity.60 
Progressive and evolutionary forms of time, therefore, emerged as key vectors for 
shifting the experience of time from “superstitious” past expectation (what he names the 
“space of expectation”) to future possibility (“the horizon of expectation”) – this helped 
give time a new directional quality towards “advancement” in relation to chronology that 
far exceeded the Mosaic chronicle.61 This is not to suggest, however, that progressive 
secular forms of evolutionary time severed with its theological filiations – rather, what I 
have suggested is that the secular and religious entangled into complex post-
Enlightenment formations – I will continue to examine this theme throughout the 
following sections.  
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Judeo-Christian time, therefore, had to be reconceptualised, not only because 
geological time extended into the past over millions of years, well beyond Biblical 
accounts, but because it did not allow time to be conceptualized independent of events. 
Time needed to be separated from events in order for various “non-eventful” data to be 
recorded by scientists like Lyell and Darwin. Importantly, travel writing and scientific 
data collection of foreign lands was directly linked to a new interest in the non-religious 
explanation for the origin of humankind.62 
Geological time, therefore, provided anthropology a temporal grammar of “pre-
history” in order for new studies to emerge for accounting for the incremental, 
progressive advancement of the human condition from its primitive past to the future 
vicissitudes of civilization. It is within the emergence of new studies of anthropology 
constituted through the vectors of religion and colonial ethnology, underpinned by the 
“deep-time” of geology, which provided Darwin with the epistemological space to 
consider the origins of humankind through a bio-evolutionary history.63  
I suggest that these plural points of enunciation for the emergence of Darwinian 
evolutionary history illustrate several crucial points. One is the emergence of the 
nineteenth century autonomous, rational individual – unhinged from superstition – who 
did not simply separate themself from religious domains, but rather was constituted 
through epistemological transformations in theology, that is, the invention of religion as a 
cognitive category of belief through the grid of myth. Another is the way Indigenous 
sacred belief systems and ways of being, exposed through colonial expansion, were 
represented as being ruled by oppressive forms of myth, superstition, taboo and fetish 
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rituals, with Christianity being considered as a constitutive phase in the history of 
abstract, scientific forms of thought. Thus, the third point which is that the emergence of 
secular forms of progressive world-history cannot be separated from the co-produced 
registers of theology and coloniality.  
I suggest, therefore, that the theological was not simply evacuated from Darwin’s 
thought. Rather, as I will suggest in the next section, his concern with religion as a 
cognitive feature of belief marks a significant reordering and subversion of theological 
grammars and concepts.  
 
 
Darwin and Coloniality: Global Travels, Wretched Primitives, and Religious Dogs 
 In this section I will examine Darwin’s conceptualization of religion as central 
category for demonstrating an evolutionary link between human and non-human animals. 
For him, “primitive” forms of superstitious religion resembled those found among of 
non-human animals, such as dogs. Arguing against the common notion that Darwin 
ushered in an epistemological “break” with the theological, I argue he reorganized 
theological grammars through “primitive” superstition and myth. Consequently, I will 
show that Darwin helped to entangle progressive chronology with a bio-evolutionary 
history through the matrices of the theological.   
While the nineteenth century is often framed as disenchanted, because of how it 
allows a scientific evolutionary schema to organize human difference through “secular” 
positivist approaches, I will build a different structure. Debates between proponents of 
monogenesis and polygenesis – both inflected by religious and secular concepts and 
citations – created the space for Darwin to suggest that humanity shared a common origin 
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via evolutionary history. However, an evolutionary schema alone did not allow Darwin to 
attend to the problem of inter-species variation and intra-species continuity. If all humans 
descended from a common origin, Darwin struggled to explain how the “primitive” 
Indigenous groups of Tierra del Fuego and other Native peoples he observed during his 
Beagle voyages remained so radically different from the “civilized” European like 
himself. In order to negotiate the tension between continuity and variation within an 
evolutionary account of history, Darwin deployed the category of religion, through a 
progressive gradient map.64  
A central function that the category of religion played in Darwin’s theory of 
evolution is that it illustrated the level of “civility” between humans. However, religion, 
expressed in its superstitious and primitive form, also demonstrated link at the level of 
cognition between human and non-human animals. Put directly, the primitive, 
characterized by their superstition and taboo is what made them different from the 
“civilized” European, while simultaneously, primitive superstition marked their 
resemblance with non-human animals. Mediated by the cognitive schema of religious 
gradients, Indigenous peoples and animals would come to share an intimate link in 
Darwin’s bio-evolutionary history.   
 In an attempt to solve the tension between species continuity and variation within 
an evolutionary framework supported by a religious gradient diagram, Darwin made an 
important assertion. Religion, he said, was not a uniquely human characteristic assumed 
by natural theologians and anthropologists. Superstitious forms of religion observed 
among primitive Indigenous peoples indexed the cognitive resemblance between human 
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and non-human animals. Through the categories of religion and progressive chronology, 
therefore, human and non-human animals shared an evolutionary link.  
I shall now turn to exploring Darwin’s examination of bio-evolutionism and 
religion through three principal sections. In the first, I will situate Darwin within the 
entangled registers of naturalist science, colonial travel writing and British empire via his 
Beagle travels. The second section examines how Darwin’s conception of religious 
cognition departed from dominant Victorian anthropological approaches to the study of 
the origin of religion. In the third, I illustrate that Darwin’s unique theory of religious 
cognition entangled with coloniality and configured into his bio-evolutionary history.  
 
 
Darwin’s Beagle Voyage (27 December 1831 - 2 October 1836)  
 Darwin spent nearly five years on his voyage upon the H.M.S. Beagle – eighteen 
months at sea, and three years and three months on land. His voyage has commonly been 
framed as a “scientific” voyage for the further examination of natural history, geology, 
geography and zoology. In this reading, on the one hand, Darwin is cast as an extending 
Alexander von Humboldt’s German romantic naturalist tradition, which expressed the 
sublime guiding forces that provided structure and direction to the unfolding of natural 
processes. In this frame, romantic naturalism is held to underpin Darwin’s philosophy of 
nature and his theory of natural selection developed after the Beagle voyages.65 On the 
other hand, Darwin’s Beagle years have been cast as an example of autobiographical 
literary metaphor for life’s journey. For instance, John D. Rosenberg describes Darwin’s 
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Beagle years with tender sentiment as “a voyage of discovery in which the old self gives 
birth to the new”66 While not discounting the constitutive role of Humboldt’s German 
romanticism, or the extent to which his voyages can act as literary metaphor for the 
journey of life, these accounts remain separated from any its constitutive political, let 
alone, colonial processes.  
 The Beagle voyages reveal the complex international networks constituting 
European empire in the Victorian period. Commissioned by the British Admiralty, the 
Beagle expedition and its surveying duties aimed at increasing Britain’s colonial 
influence in South America. Spanish colonial rule was being eroded, in large part, by the 
example set out by the Haitian anti-slave rebellion and the independence movements of 
Venezuela, New Granada, Ecuador, Argentina, Chile, and Perú for instance. As such, 
Britain’s incursions into South America sought to consolidate colonial control over the 
area through export and import trade networks as opposed to the moribund slave trade 
that was proving economically and morally unviable (I discuss slavery in the last 
section). Consequently, the Beagle voyages link the industrial revolution of Britain to 
domestic agrarian and financial capitalism that was underpinned by coloniality – that is, 
territorial expropriation, resource extraction, labour exploitation, and, as I will examine in 
the last section: slavery. Therefore, when cast in the frame of colonial power matrix, the 
Beagle voyages constitute the extension of geology, zoology and ethnology to Britain’s 
imperial aspirations in South America.67  
 The captain of the Beagle, Robert FitzRoy arose from the British imperial 
                                                        
66
 Ibid, quoted from Rosenberg, John D. "Mr. Darwin collects himself." Nineteenth-Century Lives. 
Lawrence S. Lockridge, John Maynard, and Donald D. Stone Eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989, pp. 85 
67
 Hodge, M.J.S., “Capitalist Contexts for Darwinian Theory: Land, Finance, Industry and Empire,” 
Journal of the History of Biology, 42(3), Fall, 2009, pp. 406 
219 
 
dynasty; he traced his lineage to Charles II, was the grandson of the 3rd Duke of Grafton 
and was the nephew of Viscount Castlereagh. A proud aristocrat, FitzRoy was a naval 
officer and academic pupil of British empire having served its colonial interests in South 
American waters since 1822.68 Beyond his official naval duties, FitzRoy was a 
physiognomist and phrenologist and regarded his own “Roman-nose” – deriving from 
Latin aquiline, or aquilinus, “eagle-like” – as indexing the profundity of his soul in 
addition to the exceptional capacity of his brain and mental faculties.69 Committed to 
Mosaic chronicle supported by philological evidence of shared language groups, FitzRoy 
held that “Negro blackness” was the result of Noachean dispersal, that is, the curse set on 
recalcitrant Cain for his wicked earthly exploits (discussed in chapter one).70  
 At the age of twenty-three, FitzRoy abducted four Indigenous Fuegians on a 
previous expedition – three were children, the youngest being a nine year old girl the 
crew named with brazen malice, “Fuegia Basket”. With remarkable hubris, FitzRoy did 
not hesitate to express his “firm belief in the most debasing trait of their character” and 
regarded the captives as “specimens” capable of the most “diabolical atrocity.”71 York 
Minster, the oldest twenty-six year old Fuegian prisoner was, according to FitzRoy, 
“certainly a displeasing specimen of uncivilized human nature.”72 However, the three 
younger captives displayed the potential to be civilized, that is, he placed them with the 
Church Missionary Society in England where they were converted, and taught Victorian 
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sensibilities as well as the use of cutlery, buttons, and so on.73  
In his Descent of Man, Darwin would reflect upon these moments,  
The Fuegians rank amongst the lowest barbarians; but I was continually struck with 
surprise how closely the three natives on board H.M.S.; Beagle, who had lived some 
years in England and could talk a little English, resembled us in disposition and in most 
of our mental faculties.74  
 
One child, however, subsequently died of small pox, while the others remained captive 
and were eventually paraded as specimens in London at Court. FitzRoy sought to extend 
his colonial civilizational mission through their return to Tierra del Fuego, and brought 
along a twenty-two year old Anglican missionary by the name of Richard Mathews to aid 
in the conversion of the “horrible cannibals.” Once they returned home, however, they 
rejected their European attire and returned to their own way of life.75 
In this reading, the Beagle voyages are not reducible to either a) a scientific 
expedition for geological, zoological and ethnological observation; b) a capitalist mission 
for the establishment of laissez fair British imperialist economic principals; or c) the 
evangelical dissemination of Protestant forms of Christianity. Rather, the Beagle voyages 
form an entangled constellation of plural points of enunciation for the spread of 
coloniality, that is, there is the convergence of the interests of natural science to extend 
geological and zoological observations; for the British via the imperial Admiralty to 
extend colonial trade circuits; and for the London Missionary Society to steadily 
Christianize South America. These three co-constituted domains of coloniality can be 
seen functioning through the Beagle voyages.  
Significantly, Darwin’s representation of Indigenous Fugeians affirms the 
colonial structure of progressive chronological world history: civilizing the superstitious 
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primitive Fuegian, held to be a figure of Europe’s past, was made possible by 
representing them through the colonial vectors of ethnological observation. For instance 
Darwin would state in the Descent of Man,  
The main conclusion arrived at in this work, namely that man is descended from some 
lowly-organised form, will, I regret to think, be highly distasteful to many persons. But 
there can hardly be a doubt that we are descended from barbarians. The astonishment 
which I felt on first seeing a party of Fuegians on a wild and broken shore will never be 
forgotten by me, for the reflection at once rushed into my mind—such were our 
ancestors.76 
 
For Darwin, the Indigenous Fuegian was represented as a lower barbaric form of human 
organization through which European’s past was assembled. Significantly, the historicist 
grid of progressive chronology was co-produced through the figure of the Indigenous 
Fuegian.  
As I will illustrate below, the Beagle voyages are central to his bio-evolutionary 
history, as it through the representation of primitive superstition that Darwin would 
consider the evolutionary link between human and non-human animals. For instance, 
Gillian Beer states, “Darwin’s encounters with Fuegians in their native place gave him a 
way of closing the gap between the human and other primates, a move necessary to the 
theories he was in the processes of reaching”77 Darwin’s approach to closing the gap 
between human and non-human animals would not be produced through physiognomic 
differences, but rather through a gradient schema of religiosity that located rudimentary 
forms of religious cognition in “primitive” Indigenous superstition as well as non-human 
animals. 
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 Darwin’s encounters with Indigenous peoples of Tierra del Fuego would border 
between discourses of the marvellous and resemblance. When one examines Darwin’ 
diary entries, the Fuegian’s are repeatedly represented as both spectacle and as troubling 
likeness of Europe’s own bygone past. Darwin provided detailed observations of the 
native Fuegians in his personal travel diaries and questioned the characteristics that could 
provide reason to include the them in the category of the human,  
Whilst going on shore, we pulled alongside a canoe with 6 Fuegians. I never saw more 
miserable creatures; stunted in their growth, their hideous faces bedaubed with white 
paint & quite naked. – One full aged woman absolutely so, the rain & spray were 
dripping from her body; their red skins filthy & greasy, their hair entangled, their voices 
discordant, their gesticulation violent & without any dignity…viewing such men, one can 
hardly make oneself believe that they are fellow creatures placed in the same world.78 
 
As much as Darwin found the Indigenous inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego unintelligible, 
however, he remained committed to a monogenetic discourse of similitude as opposed to 
a polygenetic one. Moreover, epistemologically, Darwin reproduced the historicist 
assumption that the primitive state represented the antecedent to his own present, 
civilized state: Indigenous Fuegians existed in the flesh, for Darwin, as part of Europe’s 
ancestral heritage.  
The Indigenous Fuegian’s, therefore, were significant for Darwin because of what 
they signified for Europe’s own self-identity. In other words, the “primitive” was an 
anachronism that Darwin could observe as an example of Europe’s own past – a past that 
Europe has moved beyond into a future free from superstition, cannibalism (which 
Darwin never witnessed, but assumed via European travelogues) childlike simplicity, and 
savage appearance. In the next section I consider how Darwin created a cognitive link 
between human and non-human animals through a gradient diagram of religiosity.   
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Darwin’s Theory of Religious Cognition  
Natural philosophers and proponents of natural religion claimed the main 
characteristic that distinguished human from non-humans was the unique capacity for 
religious devotion. This position held that some savages lacked any expression of 
religious faith, while others held that the religious practices of the so-called savage could 
be traced to a pre-Babel Christian-Hebrew synthesis implanted into the human species 
through individual acts of God. For instance, in Notebook M, Darwin would state,   
… the same mistake, more apparent however to us, as does that philosopher who says the 
innate knowledge of creator has been implanted in us (individually or in race?) by a 
separate act of God, and not as necessary integrant part of his most magnificent laws of 
which we profane degnen in thinking not capable to produce every effect, of every kind 
which surrounds us. Moreover it would be difficult to prove that this innate idea of God 
in civilized nations has not been improved by culture who feel the most implicit faith that 
through the goodness of God knowledge has been communicat to us.— and that it does 
exist in different degrees in races.— whether in Ancient Greeks, with their mystical but 
sublime views, or the wretched fears & strange superstitions of an Australian savage or 
one of Tierra del Fuego.79 
 
In this confusing passage, Darwin rejects the philosophical position that religion was 
implanted into individuals or the human race through separate acts of God. Darwin then 
affirmed the Victorian anthropological conception of religion as a psychological 
cognitive category that humans deployed in order to make sense of existence – that is, 
“every effect of every kind which surrounds us.” Through the interpretive grid of 
progressive historicism, the ancient Greeks in addition to the contemporaneous 
Indigenous Fuegian and Australian were held as resembling Europe’s past through the 
categories of myth and superstition. However, while the ancient Greeks are valorized for 
their sublime conceptions, the Indigenous figure was debased for their “wretched fear” 
and “strange superstition”. The most significant part of the passage, in my reading, 
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concerns how Darwin conceptualized religion as serving a psychological function for 
explaining causality and in locating religiosity through degrees, or gradients.  
According to Matthew Day, Darwin would not merely conceptualize religion as a 
“switch” that could be turned on or off; instead, he envisioned a gradient map of religious 
cognition. For instance, Darwin wrote, “Hensleigh [Wedgwood] says the love of the deity 
and thought of him or eternity, only difference between the mind of man & animals,” 
however, in Notebook C, he would state, “yet how faint in the Fuegian or Australian! 
Why not gradation” (emphasis mine).80 Moreover, he would remark, in relation to his 
Beagle voyages, that gradation was a key organizing principal in order to determine 
difference: “Differences…between the highest men of the highest races and the lowest 
savages, are connected by the finest gradations.”81 Locating religion through a 
progressive gradient diagram, Day rightly argues, would preserve the monogenetic 
lineage of the human.82 
In this way, Darwin’s conception of gradients resembled a reorganized notion of 
Biblical Genesis and the Chain of Being, retaining their theological filiations, rather than 
breaking with them. According to McGrane, the Scale of Creatures was not contested by 
Darwin, but rather was collapsed and subsequently traced upon the Origin of Creatures. 
The challenge of classification became, for Darwin, the problem of particularity; he 
argued that classification “must be strictly genealogical in order to be natural.”83 Sylvia 
Wynter argues that Darwin’s paradigm emerged through the deconstruction of the Chain 
of Being; consequently, the human was no long conceptualized through an Adamic 
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degenerative logic where the “Negroid” was held to have fallen to the status of the ape, 
but rather to have barely evolved from it.84 Put differently, by reorganizing theological 
citations, Darwin subverted the structure of monogenesis and reorganised its conceptual 
grammar into a biological framework. In doing so, he was able to stage an examination 
regarding the possible cognitive links between human and non-human animals. Day 
states, “Darwin's solution…was to narrow the gap between humans and non-humans by 
locating the rudiments of religion in animal cognition.”85 By conceptualizing the origins 
of religion in animal cognition, Darwin could position Indigenous peoples – whether they 
be Feugian or Australian – as representing Europe’s own past through the temporal grid 
of historicist progressive chronology as well as through a bio-evolutionary diagram.  
One of Darwin’s main contributions to the study of religion as an object of study 
– more specifically as a psychological category of cognitive belief through a bio-
evolutionary framework – was that though he initially relied upon the dominant Victorian 
anthropological approaches to religion, he ultimately subverted them. Specifically, 
Victorian perspectives conceptualized religion as a cognitive category of belief in spirits 
and supernaturalisms; and they located the origins of religious cognition in primitive 
experience of dreams and visions. Further, they presumed lower forms of primitive 
superstition, fetish and taboo would develop into a monotheistic Christian form through 
improvements in the mental faculties – namely, reason. For Darwin, these approaches 
located religious cognition as a unique feature of the human intellect, and, as a result, 
they were unsuccessful in producing an evolutionary schema of religion that linked 
human and non-human mental and moral faculties.  
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In order to illustrate how Darwin depended upon and reconceptualized dominant 
Victorian approaches to the study of religion and the primitive non-European, I examine 
the meeting of the Ethnological Society of London that took place on April 26, 1870. 
Two papers were presented by phrenologist Dr. Cornelius Donovan (1820-1872), and 
anthropologist E.B. Tylor (1832-1917), while the meeting was chaired by Professor 
Thomas Huxley – a vociferous proponent of evolutionary theory also known as 
“Darwin’s bulldog.”86  
Donovan, a fellow of the Ethnological Society, doctor of philosophy and 
professional phrenologist read his paper entitled “On the Brain in the Study of 
Ethnology”. Donovan’s focus was the differences between races of men and he turned to 
phrenology in order to explore mental capacity through the size, shape, and weight of 
human skulls as well as the configuration of its sutures. His methodology centred on 
examining the qualitative and quantitative form of the brain in order to prove the 
comparatively inferior state of mental and moral aptitude of the most “uncivilized 
races.”87 His abstract would state, “The author urged upon travellers who wished to 
advance ethnological science, the importance of analyzing the mental constitution of each 
race, and of determining the relation which it bears to that of the normal European.”88 
Hence, through colonial ethnology, Donovan would advance phrenology as the main 
scientific tool to compare the distance between uncivilized and civilized people. In this 
way, the temporal coordinates of progressive chronology took shape through the mental 
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and moral capacity of the uncivilized non-European – indexed by cranial skeletal 
measurement –vis-à-vis the civilized, normal European.  
Not drifting away from nineteenth century focus upon the inability of the 
primitive subject to form Newtonian conceptions of reality, Donovan remarked upon the 
use of numbers as evidence for mental faculty of abstraction. He would state in his A 
Handbook of Phrenology,  
But few, if any, of the lower creatures seem to have any notion of Number, nor any 
Faculty of this kind. In order to count anything there must be a power of abstraction – 
power to withdraw the Intellect from any difference between the objects counted, and to 
regard them solely as units. The savage tribes are remarkable for deficiency in Number. 
But few of them can count beyond ten or twenty, and some have no words to express any 
Number beyond five.89 
 
However, rather than locate the faculty of abstraction as diametrically opposed to 
religious metaphysics, Donovan attempted to measure the quality of religious devotion 
through a gradient schema. Religious adoration was, for Donovan, an innate human 
impulse. The capacity for religious veneration correlated to developed mental faculty, he 
would remark that “‘Veneration’ gives respect for age, for parents, and persons in 
authority, and for ancient institutions.”90 Religiosity, for Donovan, could be measured by 
the length of the head; remarkably he would claim that even long heads could be 
“deficient in the length at the top, leaving no room for ‘Veneration’ to develop fully.”91 
Through phrenology and the schema of religious gradation, he would take the 
opportunity to suggest that Protestantism was the most developed form of religious 
worship. On the one hand, the “humanity” of Martin Luther and Philip Melanchthon was 
evidenced by the particular dimensions of their skulls. On the other hand, Catholicism 
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was correlated to “inhumanity” evidenced by the skull of Pope Alexander VI – the 
capacity of religious veneration among the uncivilized primitive figure would be virtually 
absent for Donovan.92  
What is important about Donovan’s contribution to the anthropology of religion 
was not the ludicrous approach of phrenology, but how he conceptualized “religion” as a 
mental faculty and quantifiable category through a scientific gradient diagram. Whereas 
Donovan correlated the capacity for religious veneration to developed mental and moral 
faculties through measuring the head and form of the brain, it would be E.B. Tylor who 
produced a concise “scientific” definition of “religion” as well as an influential account 
concerning its origins.  
Tylor’s paper, entitled “The Philosophy of Religion among the Lower Races of 
Mankind” was based upon anthropological “evidence” primarily generated from travel 
literature, missionary accounts, colonial administrative dispatches, and his own 
ethnological accounts from his visit to Mexico.93 Tylor located the category of “religion” 
to the domain of cognition as “animism”, that is, religion was simply defined as the belief 
in spiritual beings. These spiritual beings, for Tylor, included belief in souls, demons, 
spirits, ghosts, gods and other invented superstitious categories of the human intellect.94  
For Tylor, the study lower animism indexed by “savagery” in relation to 
“civilized life” formed the basis for producing a philosophy of religion. While Tylor did 
not generate a coherent structural sequence of “lower” animism to “higher” Christianity, 
Marvin Harris suggests that Tylor presumed a gradual progressive movement to Christian 
monotheism through the “removal of the pantheon of high gods from direct human 
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appeal.”95 Hence, Tylor did not depart from the progressive chronological schema of 
Eurocentric historicism; consequently, lower animist savagery was represented as the 
antecedent to Christian Europe – indeed it is through the cognitive domain of savage 
religion that progressive chronology generated its modern cadence. 
Countering the claim that “savage tribes” were bereft of religion, as this would 
breach his notions of religious philosophy, Tylor situated animism as a psychological 
category found in every religious enunciation. Animism, therefore, manifests in the 
universal subjective experience of dreams and visions in which phantom duplicates of 
man remove themselves from the materiality of the physical world, including their 
bodies, in the form of shadows or vapor.96 For him, the savage was characterized by their 
belief in the apparitional soul, or ghost-soul: “He considers that what causes death and 
what causes visions and dreams are one and the same…the generally received connextion 
of the life with the phantom in to a soul-ghost is the very key to savage psychology.” 
(371). Appreciating Tylor’s theory of animism, Darwin would remark, 
It is probable, as Mr. Tylor has clearly shewn, that dreams may have first given rise to the 
notion of spirits; for savages do not readily distinguish between subjective and objective 
impressions. When a savage dreams, the figures which appear before him are believed to 
have come from a distance and to stand over him; or “the soul of the dreamer goes out on 
its travels, and comes home with a remembrance of what it has seen.”97  
 
John Lubbock, a friend of Darwin, would similarly argue that the cognitive register of 
spirits originated as the primitive expression of dreams and visions. Unable to separate 
the realm of death and life, the soul of the departed that may visit upon the primitive 
subject in a dream or vision was regarded as living-phantom. Lubbock would remark, 
“When a dead father or brother appears to a man in sleep,” he would continue, “he does 
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not doubt the realty of the occurrence, and hence concludes that their spirits are still 
alive.”98  
Significantly, for Donovan, Lubbock, Tylor and Darwin, the savage was 
represented as incapable of separating his subject status from objects. Consequently, 
primitive conceptions of the apparitional soul made them virtually incapable of abstract 
conceptions of the phenomenal world. Darwin would reproduce both Tylor’s conception 
of the savages inability to form abstract conceptions of objects and Donovan’s use of the 
Number as an index for the capacity of Newtonian mechanics, 
[I]t may be urged that, as man differs so greatly in his mental power from all other 
animals, there must be some error in this conclusion. No doubt the difference in this 
respect is enormous, even if we compare the mind of one of the lowest savages, who has 
no words to express any number higher than four, and who uses no abstract terms for the 
commonest objects or affections, with that of the most highly organised ape.99 
 
The inability for the lowest savages to use abstract concepts in order to separate subject 
from object was issued as the causal explanation of their historical inertia. Furthermore, 
the state of savagery was historicized in order to index an invented past that Europe 
exceeded through “enlightenment” – that is, they were able to separate the “false” mythos 
of religious psychology and apprehend “truth” through the individuated, self-conscious 
transcendental mind.100  
Darwin recommended influential Victorian anthropological studies of religion 
including Lubbock’s notion that religion emerges from the primitive impulse of 
deification in The Origins of Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man; John 
McLennan’s conception of totenism and that primitive subjects apprehend natural 
causality as spiritual agencies in The Worship of Animals and Plants; and Herbert 
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Spencer’s proposal regarding the origin of supernatural cognition in the primitive idea of 
ghosts, that is, the idea that humans had both a corporeal and spiritual essence in the 
Fortnightly Review.101 Darwin found Tylor’s dream and vision theory particularly 
intriguing as Tylor sought to produce an evolutionary diagram that distinguished between 
the animistic illusions of fetish, idolatry and taboo as opposed to rational scientific 
principles.102  
Tylor, however, was unable to formulate a functional-causal structure, or 
evolutionary system of laws. Rather he provided several examples, ranging from the 
native Fijian to the Greenlander, as separate developmental sequences that independently 
transformed through the faculty of reason.103 Hence, Tylor, according to Darwin, failed to 
provide an adequate evolutionary schema because he presumed a highly sophisticated 
form of perceptive reason in his theory of the origin of religion in dreams and visions.  
Darwin remarked that only when “the faculties of imagination, curiosity, reason, 
& c., had been fairly developed in man, his dreams would not have led him to believe in 
spirits, any more than in the case of a dog.”104 According to Darwin, therefore, there must 
have been “a still earlier and ruder stage”105 that came before the ability for primitive 
cognition to express dreaming and visions as phantom-doubles that travel to distant lands 
in the form shadows or vapors; or, alternatively, as receiving visits from the living spirits 
of departed souls.106 Put simply, these accounts concerning the origins of religious 
cognition in primitive superstition erroneously located religious cognition as unique 
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feature of the human intellect. They all failed, in other words, to adequately bridge the 
gap between human and non-human cognition. 
Lubbock, on the other hand, did attempt to construct an evolutionary history in 
The Origins of Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man (1870). Relying upon 
Henry Lichtenstein’s prosaic travelogues from the Eastern Cape, the Xhosa were reported 
to have presumed that an anchor cast ashore from a shipwreck was, in fact, alive. 
Lubbock observed in a footnote that “Dogs appear to do the same.”107 Lubbock, 
therefore, partially managed to link religion to the primitive instinct to ascribe agency to 
inanimate objects. 
 
 
Darwin’s Theory of Religion within a Bio-Evolutionary History  
Despite Lubbock’s attempt to provide a brief link between primitive human and 
canine cognition in a passing footnote, Darwin systematically located the colonial link 
between humans and non-human animals within his bio-evolutionary framework. 
Specifically, he would generate a bio-evolutionary schema of religion that did not 
reproduce the assumption that religiosity was a unique human mental faculty. Instead of 
locating religion to a belief in spiritual agencies that originated in the notion of the 
apparitional soul via nature, dreams or visions, Darwin reconceptualized religion – as a 
cognitive category of belief – in “anything which manifests power or movements is 
thought to be endowed with some form of life.”108 Crucially, he also stated, “this belief 
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seems to be almost universal with the less civilized races”109 The origin of religion, for 
Darwin, was specifically located in the mental faculties of imagination, wonder, and 
curiosity working together with a rudimentary form of reason.110 
According to Darwin, each of these mental faculties could be found in any 
number of animals, and, therefore, were not unique attributes of human beings. For 
instance, Darwin argued that primates feel wonder, curiosity, imagination and reason in 
addition to other faculties such as attention and memory.111 He also observed that 
retriever-dogs are capable of simple forms of reason without language.112 Darwin even 
suggested that other faculties that were held to be specific to humans were more 
developed in animals as opposed to primitive savages. For example, he observed that 
birds have a more developed sense of beauty indexed by their musical rhythms; however, 
he argued: “Judging from the hideous ornaments and the equally hideous music admired 
by most savages, it might be urged that their aesthetic faculty was not so highly 
developed as in certain animals, for instance, in birds.”113 By conceptualizing religion as 
ascribing agency to anything that moves, via mental and moral faculties, Darwin helped 
to close the gap between human and non-human animals. In short, it allowed him to 
produce a biological framework of evolutionary history as opposed to mere 
developmental sequences of Donovan, Tylor, or Lubbock for instance.  
Dogs, for Darwin, would feature as the most common non-human animal to 
reference as sharing religious cognitive faculties with primitive subjects. This was not 
because dogs were especially unique for Darwin; rather, he simply held deep affection for 
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his own dogs. Darwin could easily observe their behaviors as opposed to relying more 
heavily upon secondary observations of primates and other organisms from naturalists 
including Johann Rudolf Rengger, Alfred Edmund Brehm, or Sir Andrew Smith, for 
instance. Darwin observed that his own canine shared the superstitious primitive 
penchant for ascribing agency to moving objects in order to support an evolutionary link 
between human and non-human,  
The tendency in savages to imagine that natural objects and agencies are animated by 
spiritual or living essences, is perhaps illustrated by a little fact which I once noticed: my 
dog, a full-grown and very sensible animal, was lying on the lawn during a hot and still 
day; but at a little distance a slight breeze occasionally moved an open parasol, which 
would have been wholly disregarded by the dog, had any one stood near it. As it was, 
every time that the parasol slightly moved, the dog growled fiercely and barked. He must, 
I think, have reasoned to himself in a rapid and unconscious manner, that movement 
without any apparent cause indicated the presence of some strange living agent, and no 
stranger had a right to be on his territory.114 
 
Darwin would make the link between savage humans and his beloved dog explicit in his 
subsequent colonial ruminations.  
For Darwin, if the rudimentary cognitive faculties that attributed life to material 
objects were not developed by reason; this would lead to primitive forms of polytheistic 
anthropomorphism. He suggested that primitive forms of religious cognition naturally, 
yet mistakenly, assigned spirits with human passions such as the love of vengeance or 
elementary forms of justice, “the same affections which they themselves experienced.”115 
Whereas emotions such as love, fear, gratitude, hope, dependence and submission to 
transcendent powers form a constellation of complex intellectual and moral faculties, 
Darwin argued that a variety of non-human animals express similar sensibilities. Dogs, 
Darwin surmised, displayed profound love for their master, which correlated to their 
absolute submission, fear and gratitude for instance. Dogs and monkeys also expressed 
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unique behaviours of joy towards their master after being reunited with them – they did 
not display similar affection towards their own species in his estimation. The dog, 
Darwin considered, even looks to his master as a God.116  
In some instances, however, Darwin suggested that non-human animals have 
more developed mental faculties than primitive peoples – most notably, love. Recall, for 
example, Darwin’s contention of birds having a more developed sense of beauty in 
relation to the “hideous” aesthetic sensibilities of the Native Fuegian. In the case of 
belief, Darwin characterized the religious cognition of “savages” as more commonly 
associated with “bad spirits” as opposed to “good spirits.”117 Further, he expressed his 
agreement with Lubbock by quoting him as follows: “it is not too much to say that the 
horrible dread of unknown evil hangs like a thick cloud over savage life, and embitters 
every pleasure.”118 Consequently, for Darwin, the religious cognition of dogs and 
monkeys are largely characterized by their “deep love”, “joy” and other “beloved” 
expressions of devotion, whereas the ominous spiritual agencies of primitive fetish and 
taboo continually results in the state of wretched misery – the Indigenous primitive 
subject is not only represented as largely incapable of abstract thought, but also the 
emotional and moral domains of pleasure, joy, and, significantly, love.  
There does not seem to be a direct correlation between the category of “love” and 
the developed mental faculties through abstract, scientific forms of reason in Darwin’s 
thought. Rather, I argue that Darwin associates the capacity of “love” with the moral 
registers of Christian monotheism, which he entangles with the power of abstract 
cognition via scientific objectivity. This provides us with a clue in how Darwin 
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conceptualized primitive forms of polytheism through a progressive historicist frame that 
departed from a degenerative logic. For instance, Isaac Newton suggested that polytheism 
indexed the degenerative form of Biblical monotheism, while Edward Herbert of 
Churbury, John Toland, and Voltaire located polytheism as a corrupted expression of 
natural deism.119 Darwin, on the other hand, subverted this degenerative frame and 
conceptualized monotheism, associated with the developed moral faculty of “love”, to be 
correlated with progressive abstraction towards objective scientific truth. Primitive fetish 
rituals were characterized as “unknown evil” – including human sacrifice, witchcraft, and 
trials by ordeal – and were associated with simple moral faculties and poorly developed 
powers of reason. 
While Darwin seemed to conceptualize the state of primitive superstition as an 
immutable psychological condition, Indigenous people were represented as candidates for 
intellectual and moral perfectibility, that is, the primitive state, at least in theory, was 
reversible. In fact, Darwin explicitly states the Native Feugian appeared to represent an 
“intermediate condition.”120 Hence, through the development of their simple mental and 
moral faculties, through reason and love, they could pass through the different degrees of 
religiosity: from belief in “unseen spiritual agencies, then in fetishism, polytheism, and 
ultimately in monotheism.”121 Here Darwin located monotheism as the form of religious 
cognition associated with the highly developed powers of reason. However, Darwin 
ventured further and urged his readers to reflect upon the oppressive taboo and fetish 
rituals of the savage as they provided a historicist lens through which to celebrate 
Europe’s past that it exceeded through scientific abstraction: “it is well occasionally to 
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reflect on these superstitions, for they shew us what an infinite debt of gratitude we owe 
to the improvement of our reason, to science, and our accumulated knowledge.”122  
One is left ask the question: did Darwin conceptualize Protestant, Christian 
monotheism as the highest form of religious cognition that was compatible with 
disenchanted secular formations of scientific objectivity? Or, alternatively, did Darwin 
situate monotheistic forms of mental cognition as eventually unfolding towards abstract 
scientific objectivity, totally unhinged from theological metaphysics? I am not interested 
in situating Darwin within either a religious or secular domain, but rather am gesturing 
towards the entanglements between the religious and the secular. In other words, I would 
suggest that one cannot easily determine a clear “break” between the religious and the 
secular in Darwin’s thought; rather, he transforms and reorganizes theological categories 
into secular formations making any conceptual distinction problematic.  
I suggest, therefore, that Darwin linked human and non-human cognition through 
the reformulated theological category of religion. In this way, he did not simply excise 
the theological, but transformed its grammar. Specifically, through historicist world 
history underpinned by the contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous, the primitive 
existed as a living relic of Europe’s past that had been transcended through highly 
developed cognitive faculties. Cognition determined by degree and kind of religiosity, 
furthermore, was the basis for a progressive and evolutionary chronology. Consequently, 
the primitive was not only a figure of Europe’s past, but shared various mental and moral 
faculties with non-human animals. Primitive superstition, projected through a gradient 
diagram of religiosity, was held to inhibit the human ability to form abstract conceptions 
of existence rooted in scientific objectivity. Rituals of primitive fetish rituals and taboos, 
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and the belief in “bad spirits,” were held to restrict the development of the moral and 
emotional faculties of love and joy rooted in Protestant Christian monotheism.  
As a result of Darwin’s philosophical and bio-evolutionary thought, the primitive 
Feugian or Australian remained potential candidates for human perfectibility – that is, 
they must be colonized in order to become “civilized.” Darwin would in fact remark: “I 
have felt some difficulty in conceiving how inhabitant of Tierra del Fuego is to be 
converted into civilized man.”123 Darwin, in this regard, shares common colonial ground 
with Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Darwin attempted to link the mental faculties of humans to 
non-humans through a gradient map of religious belief in order to generate an 
evolutionary history; however, in doing so, he subsumed non-European “primitive” 
consciousness into the instinctual impulses of non-human animals. At times, Darwin even 
argued that animal cognition was more developed than the primitive subject in various 
domains such as beauty, pleasure and love.  
Rousseau, on the other hand, emphasized the natural purity of the noble savage to 
the point of subsuming their consciousness into intuitive forms of corporeality. While 
Darwin did not share Rousseau’s conviction concerning European decadence in relation 
to noble savagery, they both converged by conceptualizing the potential of human 
perfectibility through the vectors of European colonialism. While Rousseau would 
passionately condemn slavery as an abstract philosophical principal, Darwin was moved 
to activist forms of “humanitarian” abolitionism. And yet, it was through the registers of 
human compassion and welfare that Darwin endorsed the global encroachment of British 
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settler colonialism; it was in the name of civilization and humanity that his progressive 
and evolutionist notions of perfectibility were constituted.124  
 
 
Darwin, Slavery and Humanitarianism  
 A common apologist response to locating Darwin in the colonial matrix of power 
is that he was actively involved in the anti-slavery movement in the nineteenth century. 
So the argument goes: how could Darwin endorse the violence of European colonialism 
and imperialism if he so passionately contested what is held to be the most violent 
institution of European empire? Surely, unlike a figure like Rousseau, who argued against 
slavery as a theoretical reflection upon the category of freedom, Darwin’s critical praxis 
is held to be evidence that he cannot be associated with the butchering violence of 
colonialism. Contrasting this Eurocentric portrait, I argue that Darwin was not opposed to 
European empire, but rather actively endorsed it through humanitarian discourses of 
moral responsibility to institute colonial forms of governance aimed at “civilizing” – that 
is, to improve, protect and control the primitive non-European. My central aim, therefore, 
is to examine how the moral domains of benevolence and empathy intertwined with 
violence and cruelty through Darwin’s humanitarianism.   
   One the most widely cited works concerning Darwin’s role in the abolition of 
slavery is Adrian Desmond and James Moore’s Darwin's Sacred Cause: How a Hatred of 
Slavery Shaped Darwin's Views on Human Evolution. In this Eurocentric piece, they state 
that while Darwin did not attend abolitionist rallies, or produce anti-slavery petitions like 
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his Unitarian extended family members, he rather “subverted” slavery with the scientific 
evolutionary theory of common descent.125 I will focus upon two main domains that the 
authors claim shaped Darwin’s abolitionist humanitarianism, and, according to them, 
helped form his distinctive position concerning shared ancestry; first, the political climate 
of early nineteenth century Britain and the influence of antislavery advocates and 
institutions; second, Darwin’s experiences of witnessing slavery during his Beagle 
voyages.  
The larger abolitionist political climate of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century England, according to Desmond and Moore, was characterized by an eclectic 
network of individual and institutional actors. Moral passion, the authors suggest, 
motivated the humanitarians to reduce human suffering and pain through a wide range of 
affective registers including “compassion”, “kindness”, and “sympathy.” Contrasting this 
position, I argue that these abolitionist affective domains were constitutive of 
humanitarian rationalities to extend the powers of settler colonial governance.126 For 
instance Alan Lester and Fae Dussart argue British humanitarianism was paradoxical,  
Just at the time when elite Britons decided to abolish slavery abroad and reform 
governance at home; just when the first global campaign on behalf of distant and ‘less 
fortunate’ indigenous peoples was emerging; and just when colonial officials were first 
instructed to govern humanely, hundreds of thousands of Britons were encouraged to 
invade and occupy indigenous peoples’ lands on an unprecedentedly extensive scale.127  
 
In this reading, anti-slavery beliefs and practices were a co-constitutive feature of 
expanding the scope of British settler colonialism and its administrative capacity.128 It is 
within this context that I locate Darwin, that is, he featured as part of a larger 
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epistemological structure in which abolitionist humanitarianism and colonial governance 
entangled with a theologically inflected moral economy of compassion and protection.  
 In the next section I will briefly examine the genesis of the Sierra Leone 
Company and the humanitarian arguments of Thomas Clarkson and re-read him as a 
central figure in the production of colonial humanitarian governance. Clarkson’s 
significance, according to Desmond and Moore, lies not only with his connections to 
Darwin’s family, but in the larger abolitionist discourse of the nineteenth century that 
profoundly impacted Darwin. I will then situate Clarkson with other notable humanitarian 
abolitionists that influenced Darwin including James Cowles Prichard (1786 – 1848), and 
Sir William Lawrence (1783 – 1867) in order to suggest that British abolitionist 
humanitarianism formed part of a larger shift in British settler colonial governance.  
Thomas Clarkson became one of the main spokesmen for the London Committee 
of the Abolition Society. Along with Darwin’s grandfather Josiah Wedgwood, various 
funding outlets would help consolidate the Sierra Leone Company. According to 
Desmond and Moore, the company was established in order to place Africa above 
capitalist driven motives for profit and “to create a bridgehead in West Africa for 
liberated slaves.”129 The Sierra Leone colony, however, traces its roots to the colonial 
experiment conceived by Granville Sharpe (1735-1813) most notably in his A 
Representation of the Injustice and Dangerous Tendency of Tolerating Slavery in 
England (1769), and A Short Sketch of Temporal Regulation (1786).130 
 In the context of the Mansfield ruling of Somerset v. Stewart (1772), destitute and 
homeless freed slaves – known as the “Black Poor” – failed to gain employment in 
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England and could not find adequate support by the Poor Law committees.131 With the 
establishment of the Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor, England sought a 
solution to the Black Poor problem, which was held to be responsible for many of the 
country’s social ills. Moreover, in seeking an alternative to the slave trade that was 
increasingly becoming an economic drain on the national economy, the Sierra Leone 
Company was eventually established with the help of Clarkson. The mandate of the 
company was to cultivate the fruits of Christian morality, industry and civilization with a 
commercially viable trading centre in West Africa.132  
The colony of Sierra Leone would be a theatre for Europe’s own bygone primitive 
past that it long surpassed through “enlightenment.” For instance, Clarkson penned over 
two dozen works on slavery and he helped guide William Wilberforce into the fold of the 
abolitionist movement.133 Clarkson’s most notable work was his Essay on the Slavery 
and Commerce of the Human Species, Particularly the African (1786). In it, he criticized 
the violence of planters for not understanding that the “savage state” of Africa resembled 
that of Europe’s past, and, through colonial governance could “progress” according to the 
dictates of Enlightenment conceptions of European “civility”:  
In their own country…[t]hey are mostly in a savage state. Their powers of mind are 
limited to few objects. Their ideas are consequently few. It appears, however, that they 
follow the same mode of life and exercise the same arts, as the ancestors of those very 
Europeans [that] are described to have done in the same uncultivated state.134  
 
Clarkson continued and observed,  
 
when they are put in the mechanical arts, they do not discover a want of ingenuity. They 
attain them in as short a time as the Europeans, and arrive at a degree of excellence equal 
to that of their teachers…Their abilities in music are such to have been generally noticed. 
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They play frequently upon a variety of instruments without any other assistance than their 
own ingenuity.135 
 
These passages illustrate the multifarious Eurocentric notions of Enlightenment progress 
that were produced through the very figure he wished to redeem. Naturally musical, the 
African was cast as type of “noble savage” whose mental faculties follow the natural 
cadence of corporeal instinct and base passions rather than abstract, Newtonian 
mechanics. Clarkson maintained that slavery was economically unviable and would 
impede Christian conversion. He maintained, therefore, that Sierra Leone should be 
governed by the moral principles of benevolence and compassion in order to improve the 
uncultivated life of the unfortunate savage.  
This brief portrait of the Sierra Leone Company can serve as an example of the 
larger nineteenth century humanitarian colonial approach towards abolition. As Harris 
rightly suggests, “in British antislavery circles, the more childlike and savage the 
‘inferior’ races, the more they were regarded as needing the help of the civilized branches 
of humanity.”136 This approach, I suggest, was underpinned by the co-constitution 
between notions concerning Adamic unity of the human through Biblical monogenesis 
and Enlightenment progressivism; consequently, the African subject was held to be 
potentially perfectible through Christian conversion and improvement of their mental 
faculties via mechanical arts and industry. The nineteenth century antislavery movement, 
therefore, represents a flexible assemblage of individual and institutional actors including 
politicians, manufacturers, physicians, scientists, logisticians, educators and missionaries 
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that were mobilized through the dynamic affective registers of compassion and sympathy 
that intertwined with the cruelty and violence of coloniality.137  
That Clarkson opposed the institution of slavery did not mean he was opposed to 
colonialism, imperialism or British empire. What Desmond and Moore fail to account for 
in their analysis is that the very articulation of ending the institution of slavery – for 
abolitionist figures such as Clarkson, and, later, Darwin – was based upon representing 
the primitive non-European as a figure of Europe’s past, as an uncivilized savage that 
was incapable of mental abstraction and self-conscious transcendentalism. Rather than 
seeking to curtail colonial territorial expropriation and labour exploitation through 
plantation systems, or settler colonialism, the abolition movement extended technologies 
of British empire through the vehicles of humanitarian colonial governance – Sierra 
Leone thus stands as an example of an entire state apparatus produced through the 
matrices of humanitarian discourses of coloniality.  
Clarkson was part of a much larger network of thinkers that opposed slavery, but 
endorsed British colonialism and imperialism – most notably settler colonialism 
characterized by resource and territorial expropriation, and labour exploitation. For 
instance, James Cowles Prichard’s Researches into the Physical History of Mankind 
(1813), and Natural History of Man (1843) influenced Darwin’s work.138 Desmond and 
Moore suggest that Prichard was held in high regard by Darwin, and he stated: “How like 
my Book [Origin of Species] all this will be.”139 For Desmond and Moore, Prichard’s 
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work would form part of the “extraordinary growth” of studies concerned with ending the 
violence slavery.  
Prichard was born a Quaker and later would tend towards evangelicalism; he 
based his theory of civilizational development upon Biblical monogenesis, and sought to 
explain somatic differences based upon climatic factors. Committing himself to Mosaic 
chronicle, he sought to reconcile geological periods to Biblical Days of Creation in order 
to suggest that religion was an act of divine revelation, rather than the product of human 
mental cognition. Prichard argued that Adam was in fact a “Negro”, or that “the primitive 
stock of men were Negros.” 140 For Prichard, civilizational progress gradually turned man 
white. Similar to Darwin’s notion of sexual selection in the Descent of Man, Prichard 
suggested that divine providence implanted in human nature an instinctual proclivity for 
beauty in the form of lighter pigmentation. As darker skinned primitive peoples 
developed towards civilization, their inferior mental faculties progressed towards lighter 
somatic types.  
Paradoxically, it was through Pritchard’s conceptions of non-European moral and 
mental inferiority that made him a notable nineteenth century critic of slavery and an 
advocate of human rights. Prichard believed in the common ancestry of all human beings 
through Biblical monogenesis. This was the very location for suggesting that through 
civilizational progressive sequences, the original Adamic stock of Negro humans was 
potentially perfectible – they could resemble their European colonizers.141 In other words, 
epistemologically, his scientific notions of primitive inferiority were not moral or 
intellectual contradictions regarding his positions of abolitionism and human equality, but 
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the very condition for its articulation. As such, Prichard’s “secular” scientific writings 
entangled with the theological registers of Biblical monogenesis – they form plural points 
of enunciation for the coloniality of knowledge.  
Pritchard’s views were not a departure from dominant nineteenth century 
abolitionist positions, supported by scientific evolutionary conceptions of shared 
ancestry, and theological imputations of moral development in relation to the inferior 
primitive human. Sir William Lawrence, for instance, was an eminent British 
anthropologist of the nineteenth century and influenced Darwin’s theories of common 
descent. Lawrence suggested the inferior races of man were the result of Adamic 
degeneration. His firm belief in Christian charity towards those he held to be weak, 
ignorant, and naturally low members of humanity also entangled with the capitalist 
imperative to increase surplus value from an exploited labour force and the availability of 
raw materials – in short, Lawrence endorsed British colonial-capitalist global 
expansion.142 
For Lawrence, the slave trade represented an anti-Christian practice because it 
was not based upon theological principals of kindness and indulgence; rather, Europeans, 
having been blessed with superior endowments in mental and moral faculties, had a 
theological-ethical responsibility to “extend the blessings of civilization and multiply the 
enjoyments of social life”143 Like Prichard, Lawrence was a vociferous opponent of 
slavery and based his humanitarian evolutionary structure from the co-produced registers 
of Biblical monogenesis, Christian charity, and the Enlightenment progressive 
chronology of world-history – inferior peoples were conceived as non-contemporaneous 
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figures of Europe’s past. What is significant, however, is the absence of “racial” 
classificatory schemas, at least, in the modern biological sense.  
Conceptions of skin colour, for Prichard and Lawrence, were not organized 
according to what can be understood to be modern notions of biological physiognomy. In 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the body was still considerably flexible; 
consequently, pigmentation and corporeal functions were associated with climatic, 
geographical and dietary differences. Lawrence and Pritchard joined other prominent 
thinkers in associating differences in the body and flesh with geographical and ecological 
domains. For Clarkson, climatic variations accounted for differences in skin tone. He 
suggested that man was originally “dark olive” in order to refute the notion that black 
races were natural slaves and created by separate independent acts of Divine Will.144 
Charles de Secondat Montesquieu argued that environmental differences related to 
physiology in addition to forms of political organization and sociality. Further, Comte de 
Buffon suggested with the utmost conviction that if one relocated an African to Paris and 
prepared French cuisine for his dietary requirements, his descendants (within a few 
generations) would be endowed with white skin.145 And, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach 
suggested that the Negro was the result of Adamic degeneration; specifically, he 
suggested that dark skin was the result of bile secretions from the intense heat of the 
sun.146 Consequently, unlike later physiognomic racial systems of classification, where 
the body was conceptualized as an inflexible and immutable object, differences in what 
could be considered “race” were subsumed to reflections upon mental and moral 
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cognition.147 Darwin would not transcend the contingencies concerning the malleable 
nature of corporeality; rather, his bio-evolutionary framework traced the inferior mental 
and moral characteristics of primitivism through the vectors of religious gradation.  
In this section I argue that Darwin’s humanitarian discourses of benevolence and 
empathy depended upon and found expression through the colonial interventionist grid of 
protection and improvement. Significantly, however, I suggest that for Darwin, the 
abolitionist logic of humanitarian dehumanization was not underpinned by racial 
physiognomic differences because this presumes that the body was available, 
epistemologically, for signification as an immutable and transparent object of knowledge. 
I suggest, therefore, that Darwin’s colonial humanitarian project was underpinned by 
forms of dehumanization generated through the reordered conception of religion as a 
quantifiable index for moral and mental faculties. It would be in the post-Darwinian era 
that these mental and moral registers would be mapped onto the body as a stable category 
of classification.  
Upon reading Darwin’s passionate reactions against the visceral violence of 
enslaved peoples of African descent during his Beagle voyages, one is left to pause and 
consider what can seem to be a contradiction in his foul representations of Indigenous 
peoples of Rio de Janeiro and Tierra del Fuego. I will juxtapose these contrasting 
representations from a single diary entry to illustrate the complexity of his humanitarian 
colonial outlook. While in Rio de Janeiro on July 1832, Darwin would observe,  
The Brazilians, as far as I am able to judge, possess but a small share of those qualities 
which give dignity to mankind. Ignorant, cowardly, & indolent in the extreme; hospitable 
& good natured as long as it gives them no trouble; temperate, revengeful, but not 
quarrelsome; contented with themselves & their customs, they answer all remarks by 
asking "why cannot we do as our grandfathers before us did".— Their very appearance 
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bespeaks their little elevation of character.— figures short, they soon become corpulent; 
and their faces possessing little expression, appear sunk between the shoulders.148 
 
Later in the same day and in the diary same entry, he would remark of enslaved African 
peoples:  
I judge of it from their numbers, from their fine athletic figures, (especially contrasted 
with the Brazilians) proving they are in a congenial climate, & from clearly seeing their 
intellects have been much underrated.— they are the efficient workmen in all the 
necessary trades.— If the free blacks increase in numbers (as they must) & become 
discontented at not being equal to white men, the epoch of the general liberation would 
not be far distant. I believe the slaves are happier than what they themselves expected to 
be or than people in England think they are.— I am afraid however there are many 
terrible exceptions.— The leading feature in their character appears to be wonderful 
spirits & cheerfulness, good nature & a "stout heart" mingled with a good deal of 
obstinacy.— I hope the day will come when they will assert their own rights & forget to 
avenge their wrongs.149  
 
One the one hand, the Native Brazilians were conceptualized as almost unintelligible 
because their faces expressed few emotions and their bodies were associated with their 
inferior mental powers of cognition.  
Significantly, Darwin located Indigenous people’s deficiencies in moral and 
intellectual domains with their stubborn connection to “customs” and the practices of 
their ancestors. For Darwin, “custom” indexed primitive forms of religious superstition, 
which created a cognitive link between human and non-human animals. In this regard, 
Darwin linked the body with the mental faculties; crucially, however, I suggest that the 
mediating category for Darwin was religion. In his Beagle diaries and later publication in 
the Descent of Man and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Darwin did 
not produce an evolutionary history that linked human and non-human animals through 
racial physiognomic sequences. Rather, he formed relational bonds between the mental 
cognition of animals and non-human animals through gradient maps of religiosity – 
                                                        
148
 Darwin, Charles, Charles Darwin's Beagle Diary, Keynes, R. D, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, pp. 79 
149
 Ibid, 80 
250 
 
ascribing spiritual agencies to objects remained the central link between primitive 
humans and non-human animals.  
This is not to say, however, that Darwin failed to represent Indigenous and 
African peoples through the racial principals of physiognomy and phrenology. Clearly, in 
both passages, the face and body were associated with the development of the mental 
faculties. However, Darwin did not focus upon hierarchies of pigmentation, that is, he did 
not associate developed mental faculties with the lighter skin tones of the Indigenous 
Brazilian. Rather, he associated their “corpulent” figure, lack of facial expression and 
penchant for superstitious custom as an index for their ignorance, cowardliness and other 
intellectual and moral deficiencies. The body was not yet constituted as a stable object of 
power in order to produce a coherent modern discourse of race based upon physiology 
and epidermal forms of difference. Rather, different forms of racial signification indexed 
by phrenology, physiognomy, and skin tone for instance were congealing through 
Darwin’s gradient diagram of religiosity. What were largely absent in Darwin’s thought, 
therefore, were modern biological racial schemas for categorizing difference. 
The enslaved peoples of African descent, on the other hand, were represented as 
largely cheerful, courageous, and he associated this with their athletic bodies. Their 
mental faculties, Darwin considered, were underrated and their abilities to learn trades 
illustrated their ability to be “civilized” despite their “obstinacy”. Here Darwin took aim 
at one of the common anti-abolitionist assertions that claimed people of African descent 
were lazy and incapable of “industry.”  
What is also significant about the passage is that Darwin argued, remarkably, that 
people brutally enslaved as dehumanized units of labour were, in fact, “happier” than 
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they themselves expected. This sentiment is consistent in Darwin’s other diary and 
notebook passages in that acts of physical violence were held to impede the colonial 
project of civilizing the primitive non-European. For Darwin, feelings of empathy 
towards the suffering of those he regarded to be “wretched savages” produced a complex 
moral geography.150 For instance, Darwin states in his Beagle diaries:  
I was crossing a ferry with a negro, who was uncommonly stupid. In endeavouring to 
make him understand, I talked loud, and made signs, in doing which I passed my hand 
near his face. He, I suppose, thought I was in a passion, and was going to strike him; for 
instantly, with a frightened look and half-shut eyes, he dropped his hands. I shall never 
forget my feelings of surprise, disgust, and shame, at seeing a great powerful man afraid 
even to ward off a blow, directed, as he thought, at his face. This man had been trained to 
a degradation lower than the slavery of the most helpless animal.151 
 
In this passage, Darwin did not associate the physical musculature of the body with the 
mental faculties; rather, he located his fellow traveller as intellectually and morally 
inferior due to the cruel training of planters. For Darwin, the nexus between 
Enlightenment progressivism and evolutionism constituted the human as a malleable 
figure, and the African subject was potentially capable of developing their mental and 
moral faculties – he would turn to their religious beliefs in order to affirm an evolutionary 
link to dogs and monkeys.  
That Darwin opposed slavery on moral grounds and endorsed colonial governance 
on moral grounds did not make him exceptional, nor was it a case of not fully 
universalizing his positions against slavery due to some moral or intellectual 
contradiction. For Darwin, his humanitarian colonial prescription for civilizing the 
inferior primitive was based upon expanding European settler colonial governance. 
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Darwin’s first publication, penned along with FitzRoy, was entitled “A letter, containing 
remarks on the moral state of Tahiti, New Zealand, &c.,” and it appeared in the South 
African Christian Recorder in 1836.152  
Drawing authority from Sir James Mackintosh’s History of England, concerning 
civilizing capacity of missionaries in relation to Europe’s ancestors, James suggested that 
the Danes and Saxons were held to be “irreclaimable barbarians”, but were elevated to 
become “among the most industrious, intelligent, orderly, and humane, of the dwellers 
upon earth.”153 Aligning contemporaneous Indigenous peoples with the non-
contemporaneity of Europe’s ancestors, Darwin and FitzRoy recalled the four abducted 
children of Tierra del Fuego who they described as some of the “most degraded of human 
beings.” Darwin may have used a bio-evolutionary framework of shared human origins 
supported by moral arguments of compassion and benevolence in order to ground his 
humanitarian positions against slavery; however, he also actively endorsed the abduction 
of non-European children into the bondage of European, post-Enlightenment ways of 
being and knowing through the same humanitarian moral vectors.   
Unremarkably, Darwin and FitzRoy both fabricated the details of their successful 
conversion,  
They were taught the simpler religious truths and duties…although with the failings 
inseparable from a thorough-bred savage…they they once went naked, destitute of any 
covering, except a small piece of seal skin, worn only upon their shoulders; that they had 
devoured their enemies slain in battle; or that they had smothered, and afterwards eaten, 
the oldest women of their own tribe, when hard pressed by hunger during a severe winter! 
Surely, if three years sufficed to change the natures of such cannibal wretches as 
Fuegians, and transform them into well behaved, civilized people, who were very much 
liked by their English friends, there is some cause for thinking that a savage is not 
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irreclaimable, until advanced in life; however repugnant to our ideas have been his early 
habits.154 
 
They failed to mention, however, the utter failure of their odious civilizational 
experiment, that is, upon their return to Terra del Fuego, the surviving members failed to 
domesticate themselves to the duplicitous prescriptions of civilized life and left their 
abductors to return to their “early habits” – as mentioned above.  
 The article continued to praise the missionary efforts to civilize the “cheerful” 
Tahitians, and “wild cannibals” of New Zealand. Darwin and FitzRoy commend the 
success of the temperance movement as well as the voluntary prayers offered, Bible 
readings, and other acts of sincere religious veneration. The main thrust of their article, 
however, was a defense of the London Missionary Society’s conversion project, which 
represented a key location within English global circuits of imperial power. These 
circuits of power cannot be disassociated from their material inscriptions, including the 
purchase of Indigenous land; population transfers; resource extraction; labour 
exploitation, re-education; shifts in conceptions of hygiene and health care; dietary 
prescriptions; transformations in architectural and aesthetic domains, and so on. 
 These material inscriptions, however, should also be linked to the larger shifts in 
the colonial-capitalist world system. It should be noted that missionary and settler 
interests often clashed and they represented diverse and competing claims of authority; 
consequently, it is incorrect to simply suggest that missionaries and settlers formed a 
unified colonial monolith – Darwin and FitzRoy’s letter is, in part, representative of 
defending missionaries against the sentiments of settlers. Despite these clashes, however, 
the larger shift Darwin and the anti-slavery humanitarians helped produce was the 
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expansion of humanitarian forms of governance and the vast expansion of British settler 
colonialism. 
 For James Belich, one of the major shifts colonial-capitalist world system – 
borrowing and modifying Kenneth Pomeranz’s notion of the “Great Divergence” – was 
the dramatic shift in the nineteenth century British settler colonialism. For instance, he 
suggests that in 1790, the population of Spanish America was about fifteen million, 
which was over five times the size of Anglo-America. Moreover, the value of Spain’s 
European exports far exceeded that of Britain.155 What occurs over the nineteenth 
century, with the rise of humanitarian forms of British colonial governance proliferated 
through settler colonial expansion, and the reduction of the slave economy, is the 
explosive rise in the English settler population.   
Over the course of the long nineteenth century156, the size of British America 
went from one-fifth the size of Spanish America to around twice its size. While Britain 
expanded its settler empire to Australasia and South Africa (the geographical contexts for 
Darwin’s first publication), its Anglo-speaking population bloated from about twelve 
million to over two-hundred million – this is not counting the roughly four-hundred 
million people in England’s subject empire. This global expansion of British empire, 
underpinned by the logic of settler colonialism, overtook Russian, Indian, Chinese and 
Hispanic growth over the same period; thereby helping transform the character of the 
capitalist-colonial world system.157  
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For Belich, the “Anglo divergence” of the long nineteenth century was punctuated 
by three main co-constitutive processes: a) networks to establish systems of long-range 
communication, primarily through trade; b) empire to establish external control over 
subject populations, primarily through conquest; c) settlement to establish the 
reproduction of the metropole population, primarily through long-range migration. These 
interdependent processes, for Belich, overlapped and formed a flexible system for the 
Anglo divergence of the long nineteenth century. Moreover, these overlapping circuits of 
colonial governmentality were anchored by epistemologies of demographics, 
epidemiology, social hygiene, psychiatry, geology, anthropology, and theology as well as 
the institutions of urban planning, life insurance, mission societies, and healthcare 
systems for instance.158 According to Walter Mignolo, these colonial processes constitute 
the antecedents to Foucault’s biopolitical forms of governmentality.159 
The reason I have briefly transgressed from Darwin’s thought into the larger shifts 
in the colonial-capitalist world system is to index that his anti-slavery humanitarian 
positions helped to facilitate the Anglo divergence of the long nineteenth century. 
Darwin’s anti-slavery humanitarianism is a prime example of how the moral registers of 
benevolence and sympathy entangled with the violence of expanding British coloniality 
through networks, empire and settlement. What I have been suggesting is the 
epistemological structure that underpinned the emergence of British nineteenth century 
humanitarian rationalities cannot be decoupled from its colonial genesis. It is not so much 
that Darwin failed to fully apply or universalize his conception of the human to the non-
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European primitive as that the very condition of its enunciation was based upon the 
coloniality of knowledge.   
  In order to further examine the culmination of Darwin’s humanitarianism we can 
examine Darwin’s voluminous correspondences. For instance, Darwin reveals the manner 
in which he expressed the relationship of intellectual gradation amongst European and 
non-European peoples in relation to natural selection. Not to be mistaken for later 
articulations of what would be known as “social Darwinism”, he does offer further 
insights concerning civilizational progress. For instance, speaking of the primacy of 
intellectual gradation as evidence for natural selection being a more reliable measure of 
progress than corporeal structure, he would write to Charles Lyell in 1859:  
I can see no difficulty in the most intellectual individuals of a species being continually 
selected; & the intellect of the new species thus improved, aided probably by effects of 
inherited mental exercise. I look at this process as now going on with the races of man; 
the less intellectual races being exterminated.160  
 
Similarly, he would state in his correspondences to Charles Kingsley in 1862, 
“In 500 years how the Anglo-saxon race will have spread & exterminated whole nations; 
& in consequence how much the Human race, viewed as a unit, will have risen in 
rank.”161 Finally in his correspondence with William Graham, in 1881, Darwin outlines 
his vision of human progress through an evolutionary history of natural selection: 
“Looking to the world at no very distant date, what an endless number of the lower races 
will have been eliminated by the higher civilised races throughout the world.”162 These 
violent colonial predictions were not simply a feature of “early” Darwin or some 
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aberration in his bio-evolutionary history of common descent. Rather, the striking 
consistency in each of the letters span over the course of his early publications to his 
latter stages of his life.  
Although Darwin does candidly utilize the language of “race”, I would suggest 
that his bio-evolutionary structure was not primarily based organized upon the axis of 
physiognomic biological racial schemas. The body, for Darwin, and in particular 
pigmentation and physiology, was not the major determinate of human difference. 
Rather, mental and moral cognition conceived through the vectors of religious gradation 
cast the superstitious primitive subject – debased in fetish rituals and taboo – as unable to 
transform their social, material and moral existence through abstract scientific forms of 
cognition, and monotheistic Protestant Christianity. In short, for Darwin, the body was 
not yet totally conceptualized as an immutable category appropriated for scientific forms 
of signification.163   
Shifts in conceptualizing the body were certainly taking place, and can be found 
in Darwin’s work as well as in many of his contemporaries. However, I argue that 
Darwin did not exceed the contingencies regarding the flexible conception of the human 
body. What did not appear in Darwin’s thought was a process in which inferior mental 
and moral attributes, generated through the gradient map of religiosity, were mapped onto 
the body. Put differently, for Darwin, the body remained malleable; it was not conceived 
as a stable empirical site to inscribe the mental and moral deficiencies generated through 
the category of superstitious cognition.  
I argue, therefore, that what would later become biological racial schemas 
emerged, epistemologically, through theological registers. I suggest that it was not a fully 
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disenchanted secular conception of the body that made it suddenly available for scientific 
racial forms of signification. Rather, the secular and the religious entangled through a 
complex process of co-contamination in order to transform the body into an object 
available for inferior forms of mental and moral signification, and, crucially, in order to 
link human and non-human animals together through a progressive and bio-evolutionary 
epistemological structure. Put directly, the history of racialization cannot be decoupled 
from theology when one examines its historical genesis through coloniality.  
 This, however, is in no way at attempt to sanitize or apologize for Darwin’s 
violent Eurocentrism, nor does the notion of historical anachronism shield Darwin from 
ethical judgment. Rather, I would suggest that exploring the epistemological structure of 
Darwin’s bio-evolutionary history allows us to better understand the nature of coloniality, 
and, therefore, to better conceive of decolonial options beyond simply locating Darwin as 
yet another racist and despicably filthy colonizer.  
 In this chapter I argued that Darwin’s theory of bio-evolution by natural selection 
was generated through the matrices of coloniality vis-à-vis rise of British global colonial 
expansion, reliance upon existing colonial travelogues and naturalistic scientific data, and 
his own colonial ethnology. Also, I argued that his thought did not represent an 
epistemological break with theological metaphysics through a presumed disenchanted 
structure of “secular” science, but rather he helped rearrange and transform Christian 
theology into mental and moral cognitive processes in order to serve as evidence for his 
bio-evolutionary theory.  
For Darwin, the answer to the tension between variation and continuity within a 
bio-evolutionary framework was not to be found in physiognomic differences organized 
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through modern racial classifications, but in the matrices of theology. Darwin produced 
his own novel theory of religion that departed from dominant anthropological ones 
derived from vision and dream theory. The result of deploying religion as an index of 
mental and moral cognition allowed Darwin to create relational bonds between human 
and non-human animals. In short, that the origins of religious cognition could be found in 
non-human animals as well as primitive humans confirmed, for Darwin, an evolutionary 
schema. Finally, I argued that despite Darwin’s anti-slavery positions, which were 
underpinned by the notion that man shared common origins, he endorsed the global 
spread of British empire. British settler colonialism, linked to the developmental 
discourse of civilizing the primitive savage, exploded in the wake of the anti-slavery 
movement helping to transform the nature of the global-capitalist world system.  
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Conclusion  
 
One of the central tensions of this dissertation concerns accounting for the 
continuing trace of the theological and mapping its transformations and reinscriptions 
within the colonial matrix of power, while seeking to index epistemological ruptures and 
discursive breaks that ostensibly evacuate particular theological categories and constitute 
distinct formations of power within coloniality. Rather than simply argue on the side of 
historical continuities that presuppose an uncontaminated full presence of theological 
citations throughout historical epochs, or, conversely, argue for the displacement of 
theological categories by the emergence of secular forms of colonial power vis-à-vis 
human and cultural difference, I suggest these two domains are co-produced and 
entangled. 
In the first chapter I illustrated how the historical period of the Renaissance 
apprehended unfamiliar New World human and cultural differences by a theocentric Latin 
Christian epistemic structure. As a result, difference was translated through a discourse of 
commensurability and resemblances via various papal bulls as well as Biblical readings of 
monogenesis that entangled with non-Christian Aristotelian philosophy concerning 
inherent human slave nature. Moreover, Noachian narratives regarding the right to travel 
and globalize Christianity were co-produced with a religio-secular sovereign claim of 
Spain over the New World and its inhabitants. These processes, I argued, were intensely 
debated and resulted in often contradictory outcomes through the co-produced registers of 
Christian theology and material processes of territorial expropriation, resource extraction 
and labour exploitation. I illustrated how, for instance, readings of Biblical monogenesis 
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underwent discursive rearrangements to its conceptual grammar in order to authorize 
colonial expansion and conquest. Hence, rather than suggest that Christian theological 
notions of salvation, monogenesis, or the theologically inscribed Great Chain of Being 
were simply expunged, or was used as ideological justification for global capitalism and 
Spanish sovereign power over the Americas, I suggested they were co-contaminated and 
negotiated in a provisional fashion. 
In the second chapter, I examined how liberal notions of the universal 
individuated human were co-produced through coloniality, rather than generated outside 
of it. Locating liberalism as a practice, that is, how the foundational categories of liberal 
thought were fashioned through epistemological and material processes of coloniality 
allowed me to interrogate the ego and theo-politics of Locke’s thought. His labour theory 
of property, in my reading, was co-produced through processes related to global 
capitalism, colonialism and Protestant Christian theology. Specifically, his arguments for 
instituting a distinct English style colonial plantation system of land tenure were 
interwoven with his particular reading of Genesis and Protestant theological notions 
concerning the disengagement of transcendent agency from land and other material 
figures. Resituating liberal Lockean thought as a colonial practice firmly opposes locating 
his “non-liberal” exclusionary arguments as moral failure, or aberrations attributable to 
individual prejudice. Such arguments, I argue, presumes that liberal Lockean thought can 
be decoupled from its very genesis, and that liberalism more broadly can redeem itself by 
“including” those historically left out – thereby fulfilling its own global mission liberal 
universality. 
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In the third chapter, I argued that the Rousseau’s thought concerning human 
perfectibility was generated out of a melancholic discourse that juxtaposed 
representations European decadence with notions of the uncorrupted natural virtue of the 
so-called noble savage. I argued that Rousseau’s representations of the original state of 
nature were generated though his textual dependence of travelogues and missionary 
chronicles that fashioned the noble-savage tradition through the fusion of Christian 
theological discourses of commensurability generated by Biblical monogenesis and 
Platonic notions of perfected forms. Further, Enlightenment natural historical 
classificatory schemas, which relied upon the medieval theological structure of the Great 
Chain of Being, allowed Rousseau to undermine notions of divine concord by examining 
the unique place of the human in the Chain through his distinctive novel and musical 
forms. Hence, he simultaneously relied upon a distinctive Christian lineage while 
simultaneously subverting it by further focusing upon human agency of the detached 
inward looking individuated subject. 
As a result, I argued that his notions of a malleable human nature and 
perfectibility, which were key to his political philosophy concerning a critique of 
decadent European civil society, were generated in relation to colonial ethnology 
concerning the noble savage and state of nature. Paradoxically, however, while he offers 
a strong criticism of Eurocentrism, he ends up arguing that unleashing the potential of 
human perfectibility is contingent upon the institution of what he deems to be artificial 
European civil society. In short, he authorizes European colonialism so that noble 
savages can attain human perfection. I suggest that while his political philosophy is 
seemingly bereft of Christian theological citations his thought retain its traces – they are 
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entwined. 
In the fourth chapter I examined the nineteenth century and the work of Darwin. I 
illustrated that Darwin’s biological evolutionary theory of descent by natural selection 
was not produced by a disenchanted, scientific biological notion of the human. I argue 
that this bio-evolutionary theory was dependent upon the discursive reorganization and 
transformation of “religion” into a psychological category of cognitive belief through 
eighteenth and nineteenth century colonial historiography. I suggested that he located 
rudimentary forms of religious cognition within primitive humans and non-human 
animals in order to create a bio-evolutionary link. That humans descended from non- 
human animals was, for Darwin, primarily accomplished by appealing to religion rather 
than through secular scientific physiognomic domains. I argued that Darwin’s arguments 
for abolishing the institution of slavery were dependent upon furthering the global project 
of British colonial humanitarianism. Similar to Rousseau’s notion of human 
perfectibility, the potential for the primitive savage to reach a Eurocentric notion of 
perfection was dependent upon them being colonized. 
I suggested that Darwin did not conceptualize the body as a stable object for 
scientific racial forms of signification. His cognitive bio-evolutionary religious diagram 
concerning inferior mental and moral faculties was not traced upon the body via an 
epidermalized schema. Rather, his thought reflected upon a somatic structure that was 
largely flexible. Secular scientific forms of racialization, therefore, did not emerge 
through a process of excising the religious markers of mental and moral depravity, but 
rather they were co-constituted. The secular and the religious intertwined in order to 
transform the body into a largely stable object available for inferior forms of 
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mental and moral signification, and, crucially, in order to link humans and animals within a bio-
evolutionary history. Consequently, scientific forms of racial signification emerged through a 
complex process whereby theological citations were rearranged and transformed within 
coloniality. Put directly, the sordid history of racialization is contingent upon theology rather 
than its absence. 
Each chapter examined the imbrication between the shifting theological, philosophical 
and political rationalities that authorized conceptions of human difference within the colonial-
capitalist world system. I suggested that the shifting nature of temporality, specifically, the 
Judeo-Christian time of salvation, was a key register of Renaissance, Classical and Romantic 
epistemology. This shifting theocentric epistemic tradition, I argued, authorized the 
classification, translation and organization of the unfamiliar into a discourse of 
commensurability. Consequently, this reveals that a presumed self/other binary is not a 
transhistorical frame that can be applied to every historical moment. Further, conceiving 
difference through a racial self/other frame was produced through particular formations of 
knowledge and power not available to the historical junctures that I examined. While it is often 
common to attribute modern notions of race to colonial power regimes, as I illustrated through 
the thought of Quijano, Mignolo and Buck-Morss for instance, I argued this is an anachronism; 
however, revealing this anachronism did not evacuate an ethical and critical analysis regarding 
the coloniality of knowledge and forms of violence that it authorized. Rather, this dissertation 
hoped to stand as a critical interrogation of the shifting epistemic traditions that enable particular 
forms of thought to be made possible. 
This project, therefore, is not meant to bind the theological or transcendent forms of 
being and knowing intrinsically with a logic of exclusionary violence that must be overcome or 
265 
 
exceeded within a purely immanent and secular form of critique and worlding. Put differently, 
I am not suggesting that it is really Christianity that underpinned the violence of coloniality. 
Rather, by tracing the theocentric grammar of rendering the unfamiliar as being 
commensurable in the wake of colonial expansion, I hoped to illustrate that the boundaries 
between the religious and the theological are not clear-cut, but rather entangled in particular 
formations of power at specific historical junctures. 
Consequently, I examined the entangled character of the theological and the secular that 
emerged through distinctive constellations of power suggesting that any discrete distinction 
between them would only impoverish an examination of coloniality. I argued for the continuing 
trace of the theological in the making of modern racial schemas and the colonial-capitalist world 
system that continue to reconstitute themselves in the contemporary “secular” moment. 
Finally, I want this dissertation to open up further examinations concerning the 
importance of non-secular forms of subaltern knowledge and cosmologies in the unmaking of 
the colonial-capitalist world system. As such, an implicit aim of this dissertation was to 
develop a decolonial reading practice that does not simply argue that non-secular notions of 
difference need to be expelled or circumscribed to the personal realm in order to be truly 
oppositional or decolonial. Rather, I gestured towards the hermeneutics of ethical translations 
regarding subaltern epistemology and ontology in the hope of offering what can be called a 
“solution”, or, perhaps better expressed by decolonial authors an “option.” That is, I want to 
express my dissatisfaction with literature that concludes rigorous examinations of colonialism 
and imperialism by suggesting “we need to imagine new possibilities.” While the notion of 
“decolonial options” can be read as a liberal form of tolerance for difference that is displaced to 
a future utopian horizon, I understand the notion as an ethical practice of translation that moves 
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towards what decolonial scholarship has described as “multi-versality,” or “pluri-versality.” 
This line of inquiry seeks to move towards the existence of multiple co-existing 
epistemological traditions, rather than the thrust of universalism that seeks to subsume 
difference into itself while masking the constitutive violence of its establishment. 
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